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CONTENTS

Contents of 'LATIN AMERICA,' August 1982 (LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Aug 82).....	1
Territorial Disputes in Latin America (B. F. Martynov, V. P. Sudarev; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Aug 82).....	3
Brazilian Writer Backs Argentine Claim to Falklands (Editorial Report).....	36
Contents of 'LATIN AMERICA,' September 1982 (LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Sep 82).....	37
Salvadoran CP Chief Interviewed on Results of March Elections (Schafik Jorge Handal Interview; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Sep 82).....	39
Guatemalan Rebel Spokesmen Interviewed on Political Situation (Andrea Ramirez, Rosa Arenas; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Sep 82).....	50
Book on Arms Race in Latin America Reviewed (A. Yu. Teslenko; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Sep 82).....	54
Table of Contents of Journal 'LATINSKAYA AMERIKA' (LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	57
'New Situation' in Latin America Following Falklands Crisis (V. N. Lunin; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	58

'Modernizing-Repressive' Regimes Present Problem for 'Developmentalist' Ideology (A. F. Shul'govskiy; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	74
Mexican Industrialization Weakens PRI Influence on Workers (Yu. I. Andreyeva; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	89
Role of Mexican PRI, Presidency Examined (K. D. Garibashvili; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	99
Recent Changes in Mexican Foreign Policy Surveyed (Ye. G. Lapshev; LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, Nov 82).....	106

CONTENTS OF 'LATIN AMERICA,' AUGUST 1982

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 14 Jul 82)
pp 3-4

[Text] Contents

"Territorial Disputes in Latin America" (Part I)--B. F. Martynov and V. P. Sudarev.....	5
"Argentina's Sovereign Rights in the South Atlantic"--Luis Rubio Chavarri y Alcala-Zamora (Brazil).....	16
"Agrarian Reform and Problems in Rural Development"--Jacque Chonchol (Chile).....	30
"Problems in the Unity of the Trade-Union Movement in Colombia"--V. M. Pchela.....	37

History

"The Undeclared War Against the Dominican Republic" (Part I)-- F. M. Sergeyev.....	45
"Mexican-Soviet Relations During World War II"--Juan Gustavo Galindo (Mexico).....	60

USSR-Latin America

"This Is Radio Moscow..." (Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Spanish-Language Broadcasting)--B. S. Volov.....	64
"Soviet Play on the Mexican Stage" Conversation with Ye. N. Lazarev and Selma Ancira.....	77

Art and Literature

Brazil's Singer (Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Amado's Birth)

"The Extraordinary World of Jorge Amado"--Yu. V. Pokal'chuk (Kiev).....	89
"The Gift of Creativity, the Gift of Friendship"--V. N. Kuteyshchikova.....	103

Translations

"In the Guatemalan Rain Forest..."--Mario Menendez Rodriguez.....	114
---	-----

Book Shelf

"Industrial Development of Latin American Countries Under the Conditions of Technological Revolution," ed-in-chief I. K. Sheremet'yev, reviewed by A. A. Atroshenko.....	125
"The Socialist International and the 'Third World'" by Zajari M. Zajariev, reviewed by V. V. Razuvayev.....	127

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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, Aug 82, No 9, Sep 82

[Article by B. F. Martynov and V. P. Sudarev]

[No 8, Aug 82 pp 5-29]

[Text] The Reagan Administration's aggressive line in the international arena and the resulting dramatic increase of world tension in the 1980's are directly responsible for the crises that are springing up in regions, particularly Latin America, where they were a relatively rare occurrence in the past. They have had a strong destabilizing effect on all intergovernmental relations on the continent and have helped to exacerbate one of their traditional elements--territorial disputes.

Although Latin America is one of the most "peaceful" parts of the world, it is the center, paradoxically enough, of numerous intergovernmental territorial disputes concerning the interests of virtually all states of the continent to one degree or another. The constant nature of this phenomenon in general, which is reflected in the periodic birth of "hot spots" in the region that threaten to grow into open armed conflicts and endanger peace on the continent, indisputably requires an analysis of the main factors influencing this area of contemporary relations between Latin American states, and the determination, despite the spontaneous nature of some conflicts, of their possible evolutionary patterns.

There are now around 10 "active" territorial claims in Latin America. Obviously, these disputes differ widely in terms of their character, degree of intensity and role in foreign policy. For some countries these claims have been basic foreign policy aims for a long time (for example, Ecuador's desire for the revision of its border status with Peru and Bolivia's desire for access to the Pacific Ocean). These territorial disputes usually create the most tension and lead to conflicts. Some are sporadic in nature, remaining dormant, and seemingly forgotten, for long periods of time and then suddenly evolving into sources of friction (for example, the disputes between Guatemala and Honduras and between Nicaragua and Costa Rica).¹

Despite the fact that each territorial dispute has its own definite characteristics, stemming from the specific effects of an entire group of political,

economic, ethnic and other factors, and demands concrete investigation, the authors felt it would be possible and necessary to single out the common features in the genesis and evolution of these disputes and then move on from the general to the specific.²

One of the principal common features is that the overwhelming majority of these problems were engendered by the legacy of the colonial era. The initially disperse nature of the Spanish territory in Latin America and the absence of precise boundaries, as well as the repeated attempts to "augment" territory at the expense of neighbors under the conditions of political instability in the 19th and 20th centuries, gave rise to many territorial conflicts, several of which led to wars. The long-standing dispute between Spain and Portugal over the boundaries of their colonial possessions in the New World, reflected in an entire series of treaties (Tordesillas--1494, Madrid--1750, San Ildefonso--1777), was never completely resolved. This not only resulted in a number of conflicts between Brazil and the Spanish-speaking states in the 18th and 19th centuries but has also caused neighboring states to take a suspicious view of Brazil's exploration and development of the vast regions of the Amazon because they are afraid that the "mobile boundary" doctrine might be implemented.

The fact that the terms of legal treaties were essentially dictated by the victors did not contribute to the complete resolution of border problems, which merely took on a chronic nature. External factors were already having a strong effect on territorial disputes in the 19th century. The support of the large power backing up a state involved in the conflict often predetermined the outcome of the battle.³

Clashes between large powers were an important factor contributing to these conflicts. For example, the territory of Paraguay was the object of serious Anglo-Franco-American clashes in the second half of the 19th century, and these eventually led to one of the longest and most bloody wars on the continent (1864-1870)--between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay on one side and Paraguay on the other. Paraguay lost almost half of its territory as a result of this war.⁴ Another example is the second Pacific war fought by Chile, Peru and Bolivia in 1879-1883. The victory of Chile, backed up by England, did not completely resolve the questions about the ownership of some territories but, rather, became the main reason why the problem of Bolivia's access to the ocean has turned into one of the most acute territorial disputes of our day.

The influence of external factors increased sharply when the era of imperialism began. When American imperialism was being vigorously cultivated in Latin America at the beginning of the 20th century, many territorial disputes in the region represented favorable opportunities for the reinforcement of Washington's control over the foreign policy of the states involved. Making use of such leverage as arms shipments, economic "aid" and so forth, U.S. imperialist circles generally had a chance to channel conflicts in convenient directions and take advantage of clashes in order to counteract intraregional unifying processes, suppress the liberation struggle and intensify expansion on the continent.

This was facilitated greatly by the region's high degree of isolation in the international arena during the period between the wars and, to some degree, in the 1940's and 1950's as well, which caused many Latin American governments to view the United States as a kind of "arbiter" of the Western Hemisphere. A significant role was also played by the isolation of the Latin American states from one another and the apparent priority they assigned to the development of relations with the United States rather than with their neighbors. This was also a result of the class basis of the foreign policy of Latin American countries, most of which were being governed at that time by the traditional oligarchy and corrupt military elite, who were already using territorial problems to divert the attention of the popular masses from the burden of economic and social problems and to acquire advantages at the expense of their weaker neighbors.

On the other hand, it must be said that the slogans of "pan-American unity," which were energetically put forth by the United States even before the war, demanded that Washington take an extremely flexible approach to these problems and often called for U.S. mediation services, using the methods of undercover diplomacy combined with the official, allegedly peace-keeping policy. This was also promoted by the fears that a conflict could acquire international scales and serve as a kind of bridgehead for the reinforcement of the positions of European rivals.

When U.S. imperialist expansion in Latin America was just beginning, the North American companies founded in the countries of this region became a powerful detonator of territorial disputes when they deliberately caused border clashes between Latin American states for reasons having to do with market competition. A vivid example of this was the war between Paraguay and Bolivia over the Chaco region in 1932-1935. Another example in the first half of the 20th century was the exacerbation of the territorial dispute between Guatemala and Honduras, backed up by the United Fruit and Cuyamel Fruit banana companies, which naturally had an interest in using the disputed border region of 3,500 square kilometers to enlarge their plantations.⁵

The beginning of a new stage in international relations in Latin America in the 1960's, marked by more active intraregional cooperation, the development of the tendency toward joint responses in the dialogue with the United States, the diversification of foreign contacts and the departure of an entire group of states from their onesided pro-American orientation, had a definite effect on territorial problems. Such foreign policy principles as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the renunciation of war as a means of settling disputes won increasing support on the continent. An important role in this process was played by the heightened receptivity to these principles by the bourgeois reformist forces with increasing influence in many of these countries and, in general, by the growing influence of the masses on foreign policy. All of these factors naturally tended to deter armed conflicts in the region, particularly clashes over territorial disputes. It is indicative that many states of the continent began to negotiate precisely during this period, and especially in the 1970's, for the purpose of finding mutually acceptable solutions to acute problems.

There was also an entire group of factors, however, with the opposite effect. The main one was the evolution of the U.S. approach to these problems. From the first half of the 1960's on, U.S. policy in the region was marked by attempts to adapt to the radical changes on the continent that began with the Cuban revolution. Imperialism could no longer hope to retain the role of permanent "arbiter" in Latin American territorial disputes. The national consciousness was elevated and the tendency toward joint action grew stronger in Latin America. In addition, U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba, Panama and the Dominican Republic intensified anti-imperialist feelings.

On the other hand, there were three things that made Washington pay more attention to Latin American territorial disputes during those years. First of all, imperialist circles tried to use the "involvement" of progressive regimes in territorial disputes as additional leverage. This approach was apparent, in particular, when the U.S. Congress ratified, in July 1981 (!), the American-Colombian treaty signed in 1972 to secure Colombian jurisdiction over several islands claimed by Nicaragua. The political subtext of this action was quite obvious: It was to restrict the interests of the Nicaraguan state, which had embarked on the course of progressive development, aggravate its foreign policy difficulties and intensify the conflict in its relations with Colombia.

Secondly, as the Latin American countries expanded their international contacts and began to emerge from the "shelter" of the inter-American system, territorial disputes with any degree of intensity could, according to U.S. ruling circles, have a negative effect on their strategic positions in the hemisphere due to the intensification of the struggle between the two systems.

Finally and thirdly, the energy crisis and Washington's growing interest in supplies of strategic raw materials from Latin America led to the examination of territorial conflicts from the standpoint of the presence of natural resources in the disputed region and the interest of multinational corporations in their exploitation.

The United States could not rely only on the "forceful resolution" of various problems and realized the need for a more flexible approach to Latin American territorial disputes. For example, the "minimal presence" policy of R. Nixon and H. Kissinger often signified a show of impartiality and "equidistance" on the part of official Washington with regard to various territorial problems, but actually gave imperialism greater freedom to act either through military dictatorships or with the aid of multinational corporations.

The desire to use unresolved territorial disputes to undermine the common position of countries in the region on matters pertaining to the reorganization of inter-American relations still occupies an important place in U.S. policy. This is particularly true of the activities of the Organization of American States (OAS). In recent years, American diplomacy has named the "settlement" of territorial disputes (the only exception has been the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain) as one of the cardinal functions of this organization. Taking advantage of clashes within the region, the United States is trying to divide the Latin American countries in the OAS, restrict

their sphere of activity to the investigation of conflicts and keep disputes from being discussed in the United Nations. All of this gives Washington more influence. For example, the decision adopted in 1979 by the Inter-American Judicial Committee, recommending that Belize's future be discussed behind the back of the government and people of this country by means of bilateral talks between England and Guatemala, cannot be described as anything other than a throwback to neocolonialism in this organization.⁶ In fall 1980 the OAS mediated a treaty between El Salvador and Honduras. This treaty, which was signed more than 10 years after the "soccer war," essentially gave both regimes "free rein" in the struggle against liberation movements in Central America, especially in El Salvador. It is indicative that the treaty delineated the border between the two states along the two-thirds of their common boundary which had never been disputed. The sides planned to reach an agreement on the actually disputed portion within the next 5 years.

The most striking feature of the treaty is the decision to abolish the demilitarized border zone created in 1970 after the end of the "soccer war." The motive is obvious--to prevent the use of this zone by the civilian population of both states as a "refuge" from persecution by punitive detachments and, in general, to promote the military-police integration of the two regimes, the outlines of which became distinct at the beginning of the 1980's (particularly after the creation of the so-called "Central American Democratic Community"). For example, the repeated violations of the Honduran border by Salvadoran punitive detachments for attacks on Salvadoran refugee camps were not actually protested by Honduran ruling circles. According to reports in the press, Honduran troops even took part in the mass murders committed by the Salvadoran army in Rio Sumpula in May 1981.⁷ Another important fact should be noted in this connection. The territorial dispute itself has remained virtually an open question and could be used by reactionary forces in the event of a patriotic victory--in El Salvador, for example--as a pretext for the exacerbation of the situation in this region.

The regulation of relations between Latin American countries in territorial matters has also been impeded by the growing political heterogeneity of the region in the 1970's and the appearance of regimes with differing and even opposing aims in Latin America at a time of severe structural crisis and increasing difficulties in the search for avenues of development. Within this context a destabilizing role has been played by the reactionary military dictatorships which have "established themselves" or temporarily gained strength in a number of Latin American countries as a result of the vigorous offensive of imperialist and reactionary forces in the middle of the 1970's. It is indicative that several territorial disputes became noticeably more complicated precisely at this time. After the United States "transferred" some of its punitive functions in the region to these regimes, they made repeated attempts to exacerbate existing territorial problems to exert pressure on progressive governments and intensify their foreign policy difficulties. A good example of this was the new Chilean junta's immediate attempts to use the problem of Bolivian access to the sea in order to create a conflict with the Peruvian regime, which was of a progressive nature at that time.

Besides this, the artificial exaggeration of territorial problems is a tried and tested means of "internal mobilization," a way of "uniting the masses" around the government, to which reactionary dictatorships often resort either at the time they take power or when a domestic crisis increases in intensity. "Channeling the hatred of the popular masses against a neighbor instead of against their oppressors," pointed out J. Laborde, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Argentina, "weakens militant anti-imperialist solidarity and creates even more favorable conditions for intervention by monopolies in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries with the 'sacred' aim of 'judging' the conflicting parties and 'helping' suffering people."⁸ In addition to the abovementioned actions of the Pinochet junta, other evidence of this can be found in the attempts of the Somoza regime to "internationalize" the civil war in the country by deliberately inventing a border conflict with Costa Rica. This was also the motive for the attachment of greater significance to the "sea problem" by the rightwing nationalist regime of H. Banzer in Bolivia.⁹

The factors having some destabilizing effect on several territorial disputes in Latin America also include the increasingly severe raw material crisis in the world capitalist economy in the 1970's, and especially the energy crisis. The presence of rich deposits of oil and other minerals in several disputed regions--the Gulf of Venezuela, the upper Amazon, the continental shelf off the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the cis-Antarctic regions and others--noticeably enlivened the activity of states "involved" in the disputes.

The unsettled nature of territorial problems in Latin America is now acquiring another important aspect--the tendency toward a more intense arms race in the region. Here a significant role was played by the measures that were immediately taken by the new Reagan Administration to expand arms transfers, and it is precisely the countries with territorial problems that are among the main Latin American clients. For example, the U.S. Government resumed military aid to Chile, in line with its policy of stronger ties with rightwing military regimes. A decision was made on transfers of the latest F-16 supersonic fighter-bombers to Venezuela, which Washington wanted to turn into a privileged ally. According to Peru's CARETAS magazine, within an amazingly short period of time--less than 30 days after the request was made--the U.S. Government authorized the sale of Israeli-produced supersonic "Kfir" fighter-bombers to Ecuador at the beginning of 1981. This is something that Israel and Ecuador had wanted to do for 4 years.¹⁰

Arms purchases by the states "involved" in territorial disputes generally evoke a chain reaction; in other words, the "rearming" of one side inspires the other to do the same. This is turning Latin America into a potentially huge sales market for military equipment, and this is attracting more and more of the major arms manufacturers in the capitalist countries to this region. For example, the attempts of the U.S. military-industrial complex, whose interests are being defended to the maximum by the Reagan Administration, to make use of favorable market conditions and the reversals of the competitive struggle recently led to the development of export models of military equipment designed expressly for Latin America. Northrop and General Dynamics are preparing for the production of a fighter plane, conditionally named the

"FX" (and costing 9 million dollars) and based on the F-15 and F-16 designs. The Arms General firm is ready to sell special military motor vehicles in Latin America.

The United States' competitors are also showing some interest. For example, in spite of its 1971 decision not to export weapons to seats of tension, the FRG has nevertheless been building submarines and other military equipment for Chile and other regimes in recent years.¹¹

The existence of unsolved territorial problems is one of the factors motivating several Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Bolivia) to produce their own weapons.

Of course, this is doing nothing to alleviate tension in the region's "hot spots" and it is complicating the search for mutually acceptable solutions to problems.

Obviously, all of the abovementioned general features of Latin American territorial problems take on a quite distinctive coloring in each specific case, and a correct understanding of their influence on international relations in the region therefore necessitates an examination of today's most heated territorial disputes.

A prominent place among these is occupied by the dispute between Argentina and England over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands--the most acute conflict between a Latin American country and a European imperialist power. We are also examining it in detail because it recently became much more acute and created peace-endangering tension in the South Atlantic.

The Falkland (Malvinas) Issue

The long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Argentina over the ownership of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands led to an armed conflict between these states in April 1982.

The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands are an archipelago located in the South Atlantic near the coast of Argentina and 12,000 kilometers from Great Britain. The territory of the archipelago is 11,718 square kilometers. The islands have been considered Great Britain's colonial possessions since 1833. The inhabitants have their own system of internal self-rule. There is a legislative council in Port Stanley, the capital of the islands.

Argentina does not recognize this British jurisdiction and has been demanding the return of the islands since 1833, as well as the return of South Georgia, an island located 1,200 kilometers east of Port Stanley, and the uninhabited South Sandwich Islands near Antarctica.

Argentina bases its claim on the following grounds: In 1520 the islands were discovered by Spaniard E. Gomez and belonged to Spain; Argentina is Spain's legal heir to all of its former colonies in the Cape Horn region; Argentine troops occupied the islands in 1820 and founded a settlement there.

headed by a governor; in 1833 the Argentines were driven off the islands by the English, and in 1908 Great Britain seized South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, which were also considered to be Argentine possessions. Finally, the proximity of these islands to Argentina is an important consideration.

In addition to these purely legal grounds, there are also serious economic factors motivating Argentina to demand the return of the islands. According to some data, oil deposits on the continental shelf in this region far exceed the deposits being worked by Great Britain in the North Sea.

Besides this, the continental shelf of the "Argentine sea" is extremely rich in fish and krill, and 2 million of the 3.3 million square kilometers of this shelf are in the region of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.

Since both states claim a sector in Antarctica (Argentina in the region between 25° and 74° west longitude and Great Britain between 20° and 80° west longitude) and these sectors overlap, Argentina is trying to divest Great Britain of its control over the islands before the expiration date of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 so that this control cannot be used as grounds for British rights to the Antarctic sector.

In defense of its "ownership" rights to the archipelago, Great Britain asserts that it was discovered by English explorer J. Davis in 1592. Whitehall has announced that the period of Spanish rule and the existence of an Argentine settlement on the islands are not enough to substantiate the claims of Argentina. The government of Great Britain now maintains that the interests of the islands' inhabitants, who are descended from English settlers, dictate the need to protect its subjects.

In 1965 the 20th Session of the UN General Assembly acknowledged the existence of the dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in Resolution No 2065 and requested the sides to negotiate the matter. The Argentine-English talks which began in 1966 did not, however, touch upon the issue of sovereignty and were confined to communications between the islands and the mainland. By 1973 a series of agreements had been signed on tourism, postal communications, medical care and education. The Argentine Air Force built a landing strip in Port Stanley and arranged for flights between the islands and Argentina.

After a group of Argentine youths landed in Port Stanley to hoist a national flag there, Great Britain used this as a pretext to cut off the talks and to enlarge its own garrison on the islands in August 1973. That same year the Justicialist government of Juan Domingo Peron sent a letter to UN Secretary General K. Waldheim to demand that the colonial status of the islands be terminated on the basis of the General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to All Colonial Countries and Peoples. In December 1973 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3160, appealing for the peaceful resolution of the problem in order to terminate the colonial status of the islands.

Relations between the two countries became strained once again in 1975. The reason was the British parliamentary special commission, headed by Lord

Shackleton, sent to the Falklands (Malvinas) to study the economy of the islands. The Argentine foreign minister announced that inspections like these were the republic's own affair. The reply from the foreign office essentially said that no one could keep Great Britain from sending economic missions to its own possessions.¹² Ambassadors were recalled from both countries for consultations and the interests of both states were represented by charges d'affaires from 28 October 1975 to November 1979.

A report published by the Shackleton Commission implied that the economic stagnation of the islands and the intensive emigration of their population could only be prevented by means of economic cooperation with Argentina, particularly in the exploitation of sea resources and minerals. In 1977 London took steps to resume talks with Argentina.

Three rounds of talks--in Rome (July 1977), New York (December 1977) and Lima (February 1978)--produced no concrete results.

The interests of the inhabitants of the colony necessitated the invitation of a representative of the colony's legislative council to the fourth round of talks, in New York in April-June 1980. Since this round also produced no tangible results due to Great Britain's rejection of the possibility of the reinstatement of Argentine sovereignty over the islands, Whitehall had to make its own first proposals regarding the settlement of the dispute, apparently with a view to Argentina's support in the United Nations, OAS and nonaligned movement. In December 1980, N. Ridley, Great Britain's assistant secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, visited Argentina and proposed the following alternative: a "freeze" on the status quo for an indefinite period of time, the joint rule of the islands (a condominium) and a long-term lease on the islands for Great Britain with the retention of all oil exploration and extraction rights on the continental shelf for an area of 200 miles without any kind of concessions, as well as all fishing rights in a 200-mile zone around the islands. This was to be a 99-year lease.¹³ The Argentine public and press immediately objected to these proposals, which would have perpetuated Great Britain's domination of the archipelago and its natural resources.

London simultaneously began to take steps to strengthen its influence on the islands. Local industry was completely turned over to British monopolies, which then began to explore the oil deposits on the continental shelf. In January 1981 the Argentine foreign minister protested England's intention to resettle some of the inhabitants of St. Helena on the archipelago. The purpose of this action, in Argentina's opinion, was to prevent the rapid depopulation of the islands and later refuse to turn them over to Argentina on the grounds that this would be contrary to the interests of their population (London, however, has cut the island inhabitants' allocations each year). If Great Britain were to turn the islands over to Argentina, it would not only lose potentially rich oil deposits but also a strategically important point along the route from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On 31 July 1981 the Argentine Government requested Great Britain to give the negotiation process "definite momentum" for the purpose of settling the

problem. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship stressed that on one condition--that Argentine sovereignty be recognized--the republic would take part in drafting practical plans which would take England's interests on the islands into account and would be willing to have the United Nations guarantee the fulfillment of conditions securing the rights of the inhabitants. Earlier, in March 1981, the Argentine representative at the talks in New York assured the members of the legislative council of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands that Argentina was prepared to guarantee the inhabitants of the islands internal self-rule within the Argentine Republic and "turn the Malvinas into its most prosperous area." In February 1982, a month before the dramatic escalation of tension in this region, the Argentine Government proposed the creation of a mechanism for special consultations with Great Britain on this disputed issue. These consultations would be held monthly. The English side did not reply specifically to any of these proposals, however.

Commenting on the negotiations which had been going on for 15 years and had not produced any results, Argentina's influential magazine ESTRATEGIA noted that a characteristic feature of the talks was Great Britain's attempts to "put a freeze" on the sovereignty question, which the Argentine side had regarded as the main issue, and to confine the talks to the discussion of economic matters "for the purpose of winning an opportunity for the unimpeded exploitation of the resources of the sea and continental shelf around the islands." At that time, at the end of 1981, the magazine was already pointing out the possibility of the occupation of the islands by Argentine troops if Great Britain should continue its obstructionist behavior.¹⁴

According to reports from Argentine sources, on 18 March 1982 a group of Argentine workers departed for South Georgia to work for a private British firm after receiving permission from the British embassy in Buenos Aires to do so. The authorities on the island refused the Argentines entry, however, and a naval ship was sent to deport them. This was immediately interpreted by Argentina as a threat of force. Another English naval ship simultaneously brought reinforcements to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Argentina regarded the British actions as cause for Buenos Aires to take legal self-defense measures. As the Argentine press emphasized, the occupation of the disputed islands by Argentina was not an act of aggression, but an attempt to reclaim illegally seized territories.

On 8 April 1982 the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, as well as South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, were officially declared a province of Argentina in an Argentine government decree. Buenos Aires sent a governor to the main city, which was renamed Puerto Rivero (and then Puerto Argentino).

The influence of domestic political factors was also significant. The landing of Argentine troops on the islands contributed much to the alleviation of the crisis that had come into being in Argentina itself by March 1982, which had been intensified dramatically by the confrontation between the military government on one side and the leading political parties and the General Confederation of Labor leadership on the other. The government justifiably hoped to enhance its prestige within the country by issuing the publicly supported

just demand for the return of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands before the 150th anniversary of their seizure by England (in 1983).

The Conservative Thatcher government had an abrupt reaction to the occupation of the islands by Argentina. A task force of more than 40 warships was sent to the islands in order to, according to government statements, "restore British sovereignty" over these territories. With a view to the opposition in the Parliament and the English public's mounting worries about the increased tension in relations with Argentina, many political correspondents noted that M. Thatcher's prestige as a statesman was being seriously tested. The Conservative "hard line" in relations with Argentina was viewed as an attempt by Thatcher not only to exert psychological pressure on Buenos Aires but also to restore Britain's prestige as a "great sea power" at any cost and thereby strengthen her government's "authority."

When the UN Security Council met on 3 April 1982 at Great Britain's request, it adopted Resolution 502, asking both sides to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. The resolution envisaged the withdrawal of all Argentine troops from the islands as the first step. This demand was rejected by Argentina, which announced that it was "colonialist in nature" and was inconsistent with previous UN resolutions on the Anglo-Argentine territorial dispute. The representative from Panama who voted against the resolution gave the same explanation for his action. The representative of the USSR abstained. Argentina also rejected the Security Council resolution on the grounds that Great Britain had sent a powerful task force to the South Atlantic and declared a 200-mile "war zone" around the islands immediately after its adoption, in spite of the appeal for a peaceful settlement.

There is no question that the recognition of Argentina's sovereign rights to the disputed territory is the crux of the matter. Judging by the proposals of the Galtieri government, Argentina was willing to withdraw its troops from the islands if Great Britain had recalled its task force from the conflict zone and had agreed to eventually recognize Argentina's sovereign rights, which could have served as the basis for subsequent negotiations. On 17 April 1982 N. Costa Mendez, the republic's minister of foreign relations and worship, repeated that no matter what kind of peaceful initiatives his country might put forth, they would not be followed by the renunciation of sovereign rights to the Malvinas (Falklands). Whitehall, however, denied the possibility of any kind of recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the archipelago, whether it be the symbolic raising of the Argentine flag in Port Stanley or the appointment of a provisional governor of the islands by Argentina, and resolved to rely on force and economic reprisals.

The international aspect of the Falkland (Malvinas) crisis warrants special consideration. Although this crisis is confined to a relatively small part of the South Atlantic, it is nevertheless related to a number of problems transcending the bounds of the Western Hemisphere, particularly the United States' obligations to its allies in NATO and the 1947 "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance" and the global problem of the developed capitalist states' interrelations with developing countries.

The Argentine press was writing about the U.S. "interest" in the archipelago long before the conflict began. In particular, NUEVA PRESENCIA noted that the United States was trying to make use of the territorial dispute to exert direct pressure on Argentina in the hope of including this country in the so-called South Atlantic pact and of acquiring a military base on the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. Pointing out the fact that Great Britain would need a strong ally if the crisis should escalate, the newspaper recalled that it was the American Navy that had helped Great Britain consolidate its hold on the islands in 1833.¹⁵ The development of the crisis corroborated the predictions about the U.S. role in the conflict. During a 53-minute conversation between the presidents of Argentina and the United States just before the occupation of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, Ronald Reagan informed his Argentine colleague that the United States would support Great Britain.¹⁶ Washington offered Great Britain the use of its military base on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic as a spot for the concentration and operational deployment of the British task force sent to the islands. According to reports in the press, the movements of Argentine armed forces were recorded by American satellites and this information was regularly transmitted to the British defense establishment. The United States provided London with all pertinent tactical information about Argentina. Several appeals were made in the Congress for more active intervention by Washington in the conflict on England's side, even to the point of using the American Navy against Argentina.

The scales of American support for Great Britain originally appeared anything but unlimited, however. On the level of theory, if Argentina were to suffer an attack in the "security zone" stipulated in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (which includes the Falklands), all other signatories, including the United States, would be obligated to take its side in accord with the letter and spirit of the treaty. Although Washington argued that the treaty provisions were inapplicable in this specific case and that the United States also had to honor its NATO commitments, it must have realized that its open support of Great Britain could have led to the denunciation of the treaty, which had long been used to suppress the anti-imperialist struggle on the continent, by Argentina and other Latin American countries. On the practical level, the United States was fully aware that its support for London would give rise to a new and strong wave of anti-American feelings in the countries south of the Rio Grande. Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration paid no attention to the political consequences and openly took the side of the Thatcher government at the end of April.

At first, the United States tried to act as an "impartial judge," hoping to earn political capital from its "peace-making mission" and to simultaneously secure its own interests, namely to unite the efforts of Great Britain and Argentina in the "defense" of the South Atlantic "against the intrigues of international communism."

The mediating mission of U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig, who made several "shuttle flights" to London and Buenos Aires, was a total failure. Argentina did not accept the American-English plan for the creation of a "trilateral administration" on the islands, consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Argentina, which clearly indicated Washington's

intention to gain a firm hold on the islands. Although Argentina did not renounce its rights to sovereignty over the islands, it reaffirmed its willingness to continue the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Great Britain, however, made a different choice and was the first to use force in the conflict.

The reaction of the Latin American republics to the occupation of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was generally positive for Buenos Aires, which had always relied on the solidarity of the Latin American countries in this matter, despite the fact that many of them objected to the use of force as a method of settling territorial disputes. Argentina's action was condemned only by the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean--the members of the Commonwealth headed by Great Britain. In particular, Guyana judged the Argentine behavior harshly, partly motivated by the fear that a similar step could be taken by Venezuela, which has made claims to a large part of Guyana (Grenada was an exception to this rule and favored the eradication of one of the last colonies in the Western Hemisphere).

As for Chile, which is engaged in a dispute with Argentina over some islands in the Beagle Channel, the position of the Pinochet junta is quite ambiguous. Argentina's position has been supported in general in official statements, but anti-Argentine actions have been taken "behind the scenes." The junta is afraid that Argentina could make a similar move with regard to the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. Anti-Argentine sentiments have also been expressed in articles in many Chilean newspapers. Political correspondents do not exclude the possibility of a change in Chile's position, however, because the junta is wary of being even more isolated on the continent.

The position of Brazil is of great significance because the coastline of this huge country stretches to the South Atlantic. Brazil did not allow the British Navy to use the base on the island of Trinidad to fuel the ships in the English task force. Brazil also took other measures. In particular, it held up an English "Vulcan" plane on its way to the conflict zone. These actions by the Brazilian Government, along with its support of Argentina in the OAS, indicate unequivocal solidarity with Argentina.

The 20th conference of OAS foreign ministers, convened at Argentina's request, was called to order in Washington on 26 April. Predictably, the conference adopted a resolution in support of Argentina, with 17 states voting in favor of it (the United States, Chile, Colombia¹⁷ and Trinidad and Tobago abstained). The resolution asks Great Britain to cease hostilities immediately and begin negotiations. The conference decisions, which attested to diplomatic support for Argentina by the majority of countries in the region, pleased Buenos Aires. At the same time, "the outcome of the vote indicated a serious diplomatic problem for Washington, which has obligations to NATO and the OAS."¹⁸

On 27 April U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig sent Buenos Aires Great Britain's response to Argentina's proposals on the settlement of the crisis. The Argentine proposals included recognition of the republic's sovereignty over the disputed territory, the withdrawal of the troops of both sides from the conflict zone and the creation of a joint Argentine-English administration on

the islands, which would remain in force until all of the problems connected with the territorial dispute had been completely solved. Great Britain refused to recognize Argentine sovereignty, making the future of the islands dependent on a referendum there, which, in Argentina's opinion, contradicts UN General Assembly Resolution 2065. Besides this, the English plan reduced the number of Argentine representatives in the future island administration. "London's proposals essentially signified a return to the British administration on the archipelago prior to 2 April 1982," the Argentine government declaration said. "The British Government," it went on, "is making every effort to retain its control over the islands, even at the cost of substantial losses." Argentina also rejected A. Haig's "mediating" services, which consisted in satisfying Great Britain--the privileged ally--to the maximum, and appealed to the United Nations for help. According to one high-placed official from the Argentine foreign ministry, "Haig used every arm-twisting tactic on us."¹⁹

After Buenos Aires refused to accept the Anglo-American "settlement" plan, President Reagan announced the institution of sanctions against Argentina. At the same time, Great Britain received an official U.S. promise of support and material and technical assistance. Washington's open intervention in the conflict on Great Britain's side "untied the hands" of the British admirals. On 2 May the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano" was torpedoed and sunk by an English nuclear submarine outside the 200-mile "combat zone." Much of the crew either died or disappeared without a trace. Great Britain also began to incur substantial losses in combat ships, planes and personnel. But this did not bring the Thatcher government to its senses. Confident of the support of the United States, it resolved to expand hostilities in the South Atlantic and to seize the islands by force.

The landing of English troops on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands escalated the tension in this part of the world even more. The fierce battles on the islands, involving the use of artillery, aviation and tanks, showed the entire world the true value of Whitehall's "concern" for the interests of the inhabitants. After the Thatcher government had decided to settle the crisis by force, relying on the extensive material and diplomatic support of the United States, it essentially blocked the mediating activity of UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar.

Great Britain is trying to perpetuate the colonial status of the archipelago, which considerably diminishes the possibility of a compromise with Argentina. Evidence of the Anglo-American alliance in the United Nations, aimed at undermining the peaceful efforts of this organization, could be seen in the double veto imposed on 5 June 1982 by the representatives of these two countries in the Security Council on a resolution submitted by Spain and Panama, which envisaged an immediate ceasefire in the combat zone.

In the middle of July England re-established its military control over the islands by force. The Argentine Government had announced several times prior to this that it would not recognize the colonial status reinstated by force by Great Britain and would continue its efforts, and even military actions, to reunite the islands with Argentina.

Whatever the subsequent course of events might be, the echoes of the Falkland crisis will be heard in the international arena for a long time and will affect Washington's relations with its southern neighbors. Washington's unconditional support of its NATO ally in the South Atlantic put a serious crack in the building of the inter-American system, which had been maintained so scrupulously by American diplomacy ever since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which was concluded to repulse "outside invasions" but was actually used by Washington to suppress the liberation movement on the continent, was "forgotten" by the United States the very first time the danger of this kind of extracontinental invasion of a member of the inter-American system became a reality after World War II. "The U.S. position could split the inter-American system because it has ignored its inter-American treaty obligations and the OAS Charter, as well as the decisions of the 20th consultative conference of foreign ministers," a note from the Argentine Government to the chairman of the conference said. Washington's violation of a resolution which was adopted at the conference by a two-thirds majority of the OAS members and was therefore binding, and what was even more important--its announcement of military support for an extracontinental state involved in an armed conflict with one of the American states, evoked a storm of indignation in the region. A Costa Rican government statement of 2 May blamed the United States for the breakdown of the OAS and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and suggested that OAS headquarters be moved out of Washington. Deputies in the Peruvian National Congress adopted a resolution calling for the dissolution of the OAS and the creation of a Latin American regional organization. The governments of Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and other countries criticized the U.S. decisions which ignored the wishes of Latin America. The facts testify that the Falkland crisis has already had a serious effect on Argentine foreign and domestic policy and has changed this policy considerably.

Another aspect of the Falkland crisis is connected with the embargo on imports of Argentine goods announced on 10 April 1982 by the EEC "big ten." An Argentine government statement on this matter described the measure as an act of economic aggression and a dangerous precedent with a potential serious effect on the future development of international economic relations. The document stressed the unfair nature of this action by states not directly involved in the conflict against a country with which normal and friendly relations were being maintained. Regardless of the harm the embargo could inflict on Argentina (the EEC countries account for around one-fourth of all Argentine commodity turnover), it is already that this measure has created additional difficulties in the relations between Latin America and Western Europe. The EEC, the Argentine statement said, provided an example of what the developing countries can expect if they try to defend their legitimate national interests.

After the embargo was announced, the majority of Latin American states immediately took Argentina's side. Support for Argentina was expressed by inter-governmental associations on the continent--the Latin American Integration Association, the Latin American Parliament and so forth--and by the leaders

of several countries. In particular, President F. Belaunde Terry of Peru called the EEC boycott of Argentine goods "aggression against the entire continent." Permanent Secretary C. Alzamora of the Latin American Economic System called upon the Latin American countries to take retaliatory collective action against imports from EEC countries.

Several states began to give Argentina direct material assistance. On 18 April 1982 the members of the Andean Group decided at a meeting in Lima to increase their trade with Argentina to help it overcome the effects of the EEC sanctions. "The support of Argentina is putting Latin America in opposition to the United States and the EEC. This is taking on all the features of a North-South confrontation, despite all of the U.S. and English arguments to the contrary. This covert confrontation between Latin America and the Western countries will have an important effect on the region in the next few years," a special interest London publication noted.²⁰

The Falkland crisis has exposed the true essence of U.S. policy in Latin America and has provided new evidence of the falsity of Western diplomacy's renunciation of the policy of colonialism and diktat in relations with the developing states. The consequences of the events in the South Atlantic will unavoidably weaken Washington's political and military influence even more in the countries south of the Rio Grande.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Mezhhgosudarstvennyye otnosheniya v Latinskoy Amerike" [Intergovernmental Relations in Latin America], Moscow, 1977, pp 260-264.
2. For more about the origins and essence of territorial disputes, see B. M. Klimenko, "Mirnoye resheniye territorial'nykh sporov" [The Peaceful Settlement of Territorial Disputes], Moscow, 1982.
3. "Mezhhgosudarstvennyye otnosheniya v Latinskoy Amerike," pp 252-257.
4. Ibid., pp 284-285.
5. Ibid., p 262.
6. See M. V. Antyasov, "Panamerikanizm: ideologiya i politika" [Pan-Americanism: Ideology and Policy], Moscow, 1981, p 158. For more about Guatemala's claims to Belizean territory, see E. M. Borisov, "Belize: Independence or Partition?" LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1980, No 8; A. S. Fetisov, "A New Sovereign State in Latin America," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 1.
7. LE MONDE, Paris, 13 August 1981.
8. J. Laborde, "Imperialism and Border Conflicts," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1978, No 11, p 61.
9. For more about the problem of Bolivian access to the sea, see S. M. Pugayeva, "Bolivia and the Sea," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1978, No 5.

10. CARETAS, Lima, 1981, No 643, pp 18-19. According to U.S. terms, Israel must seek permission for each Kfir export transaction because the engines for these planes are manufactured by the North American Northrop firm.
11. See O. A. Zhirnov, "West German Monopolies and the Latin American Arms Market," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 5 (editor's note).
12. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, London, 1977, No 28405.
13. LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL REPORT. SOUTHERN CONE, London, 1981, No 1, p 6.
14. ESTRATEGIYA, Buenos Aires, 1981, No 67/68, p 17.
15. NUEVA PRESENCIA, Buenos Aires, 18 September 1981.
16. AMERICA LATINA. INFORME POLITICO, London, 1982, No 8, p 1.
17. Although Colombia recognized the accuracy and validity of the Argentine demands, it abstained from the vote in the OAS because it did not agree with the methods Argentina was using to restore its legal rights (it must be said in this connection that Colombia is engaged in territorial disputes with other countries and it is most probably afraid of setting a precedent).
18. LATIN AMERICA. WEEKLY REPORT, London, 1982, No 16, p 1.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p 9.

[No 9, Sep 82 pp 5-25]

[Text] Argentina-Chile

The subject of this dispute, which has been going on since the countries won their independence, is the boundary in the Beagle Channel,¹ which serves, along with the Strait of Magellan, as a kind of gateway from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The absence of a precise boundary in a channel of strategic significance during the period of Spanish rule predetermined the unproductive fighting that has been going on for more than a century and a half between the two countries and has repeatedly driven them to the verge of armed confrontation. During several rounds of negotiations, some of which led to the signing of long but actually unbinding documents, Chile traditionally issued claims to several islands in the channel, giving it access to the Atlantic, and Argentina insisted on the "traditional" division of ocean expanses along a vertical line from Cape Horn (that is, its access to the Atlantic and Chile's to the Pacific)--or, in other words, the "one ocean" principle.

In recent years there has been noticeable friction between the two states for several reasons, and this has created an explosive situation in the south of the continent.

First of all, after both countries established a 200-mile maritime zone, questions about the ownership of the islands in the Beagle Channel acquired new overtones. The exclusion of these islands from the boundaries of one state virtually made the channel inaccessible to it and also had a significant effect on plans to exploit the potentially rich resources of minerals, fish and krill in the cis-Antarctic region. This applied primarily to Argentina, for which the annexation of the islands by Chile would have considerably complicated its access to the Atlantic from its naval base in Ushuaia, located on the north shore of the channel, and the approach to its base in Antarctica. Besides this, recent reports of rich oilfields on the southern tip of the mainland, stretching all the way to the Beagle Channel according to forecasts, also aroused heightened interest in this region.²

Secondly, the assumption of power in both countries in the 1970's by military circles, in which geopolitical theories are extremely popular and which are more interested, in principle, in the military-strategic aspects of policy, also gave the Beagle Channel problem heightened importance. For example, Pinochet, the head of the Chilean junta, stressed in his work "Geopolitics" that "access to two or more oceans is the ideal for any state." This thesis, as Peruvian CARETAS magazine noted, colored the Chilean junta's approach to the Beagle Channel issue.³ The idea that control over the South Atlantic and access to the Pacific are of primary significance to the country in the event of extraordinary circumstances is a widely held belief in the Argentine armed forces.

The arbitration decision announced in 1977 by the queen of England, to whom Argentina and Chile had appealed in 1971 in connection with the deadlock in their bilateral negotiations, led to friction unprecedented in the postwar period in relations between the two states. In essence, the decision recognized Chile's ownership of three small islands--Picton, Lennox and Nueva--which actually closed off access to the channel.⁴

This decision was rejected as unacceptable by Argentina and evoked unconcealed pleasure from the Pinochet junta. It is indicative that the Chilean authorities, disregarding Argentina's protests, decided to extend their 200-mile maritime zone from these three islands, which then overlapped part of Argentina's territorial waters, just 2 months after the decision was announced. Maps of these sea boundaries were then published in Chile.

When bilateral relations reached the critical point, which was reflected, in particular, in the concentration of naval forces in the disputed region, Chile and Argentina resumed their negotiations and, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to find a solution, signed an agreement on Vatican mediation in 1979.

Although official meetings, including some on the highest level, precluded an armed conflict, relations remained tense. This was reflected in continuous "shows of strength," during the course of which, as CARETAS reported, Argentine air force planes raided the decks of Chilean warships which were violating "etiquette" by crossing Argentina's 200-mile territorial zone on their way to the Strait of Magellan.⁵ In 1979-1981 border incidents continued, citizens of both countries were arrested under suspicion of espionage, a chauvinist campaign was launched and the border between the two states was closed.

In 1980 the Chilean junta took a number of overtly unfriendly steps against Argentina. Chile ostentatiously resumed trade relations with the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, although prior to this it had, like most of the other Latin American countries, supported Argentina's claims to these islands. The plans announced by the Pinochet junta for the development of the Beagle Channel, envisaging investments totaling 2 million dollars, were also of a provocative nature.

On 12 December 1980 the Vatican informed the two states of its plan for the settlement of the conflict, which essentially consisted, according to reports in the press, in turning the channel into a demilitarized "zone of peace" jointly controlled by Argentina and Chile, but with Chilean sovereignty over the islands of Picton, Lennox and Nueva. This would give Chile access to the South Atlantic. The Chilean junta immediately consented to this plan. The Argentine Government predictably announced in March 1981 that it could not accept the plan because, in the first place, it was unwilling to grant Chile sovereignty over the three islands and, in the second place, the extension of Chilean sovereignty to regions of the South Atlantic would violate the "one island" principle that had been established in the protocol of 1893.⁶

The continuous friction in Argentine-Chilean relations gave Pope John Paul II reason to issue an appeal to both states in May 1981, asking them to maintain an atmosphere "conducive to mediation" and to abandon the hostile tactics employed in the last few years. The two sides declared their agreement with the spirit of the message and opened their common border soon afterward. In September 1981 O. Camilion, Argentine minister of foreign relations and worship, went to the Vatican for 3 days of talks for a general review of the issue. In particular, he advocated broader Argentine-Chilean contacts for the possible planning of mutual concessions. According to Camilion, these contacts could become a new stage in the resolution of the problem.

Imperialist circles in the United States are quite interested in this dispute because they have traditionally attached military-strategic significance to the region and have made continuous attempts to put together a South Atlantic bloc.

The Reagan Administration, which has placed particular emphasis on military-political aspects in its Latin American policy and has taken several steps to improve relations with military dictatorships in the region, has displayed increasing interest, as events have shown, in the Argentine-Chilean dispute. Speaking in Santiago on 8 August 1981, J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the United Nations, said that the United States supported the Vatican's efforts to mediate between Chile and Argentina and would continue to keep an eye on the state of affairs in this area.⁷ The hope of consolidating conservative forces in Latin America and stabilizing the situation in this strategically important region could motivate Washington to make another attempt at "peace-making." It is a fact, however, that the U.S. "mediating mission" in the Anglo-Argentine conflict undermined the Reagan Administration's "authority" even in rightwing dictatorships.

In 1982 the Argentine-Chilean dispute came to the attention of the world public once again. The armed conflict between Great Britain and Argentina in

the South Atlantic gave rise to numerous suppositions about the possible spread of the conflict to other countries, particularly since the choice of peaceful means by which Argentina and Chile can settle the acute territorial dispute in a nearby region is diminishing. On 21 January 1982 the Galtieri government announced that Argentina was cancelling its 5 April 1972 treaty with Chile on the peaceful settlement of disputes with the aid of the World Court in The Hague, because the treaty had not proved to be a reliable instrument in the resolution of the problem. Argentina also noted that it still had hopes for the Vatican's mediating mission. Chile countered by expressing its intention to invoke the treaty, which will remain in force until 27 December 1982, if the Vatican mission should fail. The intense Anglo-Argentine conflict put what could be described as a temporary "freeze" on the Argentine-Chilean dispute, but it is probable that its future development will depend greatly on the fighting over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and its outcome. In this context, Washington's move toward open support of Great Britain in its conflict with Argentina could exacerbate the situation in the Beagle Channel even more.

Ecuadorean-Peruvian Conflict

This dispute is one of the most acute and explosive ones in Latin America and has had a definite effect on relations between the two states for almost an entire century. The subject of the dispute is a region located in the "triangle" formed by the Marañon and Napo rivers and the eastern slopes of the Cordilleras with a total area of around 200,000 square kilometers.

The dispute dates back to the beginning of the 19th century, when the first disagreements arose over the administrative territorial boundaries of Spanish possessions in the New World. This dispute reached the intergovernmental level after Ecuador withdrew from the Gran Colombia federation, which was formed during the independence struggle of the Spanish colonies and was dissolved in 1830. Ecuador announced its claims to the entire region making up the Quito Audiencia in the colonial era. Peru rejected this demand, citing a royal "patent" of 1802 which granted the viceroy in Lima authority over the vast Amazon regions southeast of Quito. The absence of precise boundaries led to repeated sharp clashes and even conflicts between Ecuador and Peru throughout the 19th century.

In 1941 the first major armed conflict broke out between the two states. Peru, which had the stronger army, occupied a large section of Ecuador's territory and made the evacuation of its troops conditional upon the signing of a border treaty. In 1942 Ecuador signed the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, mediated by the guarantor nations of the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and lost almost half of its territory within the boundaries that had been set in 1829 and 150,000 square kilometers of disputed territory, thereby losing access to navigable upper reaches of the Amazon and its tributaries.⁸

The border problem understandably continued to create friction in relations between the two countries in the postwar period. The situation became particularly tense when Ecuador denied the legal force of the Rio Protocol in 1960 on the grounds that it was imposed on it as a result of an aggressive war

and the pressure exerted by the guarantor states. Besides this, Ecuadorean ruling circles declared that this treaty had never established the exact boundary in the Cordillera del Condor region, a section stretching 80 kilometers, because it contained cartographical errors.⁹

From the 1960's, each successive Ecuadorean government made the revision of the country's border status with Peru one of its central and long-range foreign policy aims. On Ecuadorean maps the border was "pushed back" to the Marañon River, and official correspondence contained the wording: "Ecuador has always been, and will always be, a country with access to the Amazon." Peru's reaction to Ecuador's position was pointedly negative.

The energy crisis which broke out in the 1970's caused both sides to take even more interest in the oil-rich region. In this connection, it must be said that Peru acquires much of its oil in regions claimed by Ecuador. As a result, Peruvian-Ecuadorean relations continued to display a high degree of tension, reflected in periodic border incidents, some of which grew into armed conflicts.

In January 1981 the biggest conflict of the postwar period broke out between the two states.

The two countries asserted that the conflict had taken place on their territory and accused one another of unprovoked aggression. The Ecuadorean authorities announced that a Peruvian helicopter had opened fire on the Paquisha border station on 22 January 1981 and that Ecuadorean border stations located in the Cordillera del Condor region had then been bombed 6 days later.

The Peruvian side accused Ecuador of firing at the helicopter, which was on a regular flight over Peruvian border stations, after Ecuadorean troops had moved 12 kilometers into Peru's territory. Peruvian Foreign Minister J. Arias Stella said that Ecuador had given these border stations the names of nearby settlements on Ecuadorean territory--Paquisha, Malaico and Machinasa--"to confuse world public opinion."¹⁰ Ecuador countered by announcing that the Ecuadorean Paquisha border station had no connection with the settlement of the same name and was located 20 kilometers away from it.

During the ensuing "5-day war," in which both sides suffered casualties, Peru was able to drive the Ecuadorean troops out of the border stations they had occupied. On 1 February 1981 a ceasefire agreement was reached through the intervention of the OAS and the four guarantor countries of the Rio Protocol. On 2 February a conference of the OAS foreign ministers was convened at Ecuador's request. The fundamentals of the Peruvian-Ecuadorean territorial problem were not discussed at the conference, however, because J. Arias Stella declared that the OAS lacked the authority to investigate a dispute which should be under the jurisdiction of the guarantor countries. He accused Ecuador of trying to win world public support for its claims at any price. The Ecuadorean foreign minister countered by accusing Peru of trying to divert its own population's attention from grave domestic problems by starting an armed conflict on the border with Ecuador.

According to reports in the Latin American press, Ecuador could not insist on the discussion of the border problem because neither the OAS nor the guarantor countries made any attempt to resume the analysis of Ecuador's claims. Peruvian ruling circles resolutely opposed, just as they had in the past, all initiatives aimed at the reassessment of the border status.

The tension in the relations between the two states subsequently decreased considerably. In March 1981, for example, military subunits on both sides were withdrawn from the border, and in April the border was reopened. President F. Belaunde Terry of Peru declared his country's willingness to negotiate an agreement with Ecuador on free shipping on the Peruvian rivers, noting that this was the only way of settling the conflict. Ecuador's recognition of the legal force of the Rio Protocol, the president stressed, would be an essential condition for the conclusion of this agreement.

Some changes were also apparent in Ecuador's position. The president of the country, O. Hurtado, declared the need to find a new approach to the matter, which should combine some of the positions defended by Ecuador in the past but also accord with the Rio Protocol.

The new president's line was opposed within the government, particularly by Vice President L. Roldos (the brother of former President J. Roldos, who died in a mysterious airplane crash in May 1981). In December 1981 the Ecuadorean Ministry of Foreign Relations published a bulletin, apparently to reaffirm the territorial claims, which stressed: "Ecuador has always sought, and will continue to seek, recognition of its rights to the Amazon region."¹¹

Opposition within the country compelled President Hurtado to visit Brazil 1982. Ecuadorean diplomatic circles pronounced the trip a success. Brazil, which is not only one of the guarantors of the Rio Protocol but is also the largest Latin American power and has great political influence on the continent, is already becoming the leader of the countries in this region, for which its assistance in the resolution of problems, including territorial disputes, is of particular importance primarily because it serves to "balance" U.S. influence. Although Brazil did not change its stance with regard to the Rio Protocol, President Figueiredo "sympathized" with Hurtado's statements about the border problem with Peru. The president of Peru then expressed his wish to "find a harmonious solution to the territorial dispute."¹²

The future will show whether the two sides take further steps to regulate their relations or whether they are merely taking another "breather." In any case, the Ecuadorean-Peruvian conflict has provided more graphic evidence of the high cost of attempts to settle disputes with weapons.

For example, according to Ecuadorean Minister of Finances and Public Credit R. Paz, the armed conflict with Peru cost more than 80 million dollars, which was 3.5 percent of the 1981 budget and led to several "strict austerity" measures.¹³ These measures dealt a severe blow to the financial status of the masses. It is obvious that the projected rearming of this country's air force will have a similar effect.

The political cost was also quite high. There is no question that the armed conflict injured the international prestige both states had won in the 1970's with their anti-imperialist foreign policy line. Furthermore, this kind of strife augments the ability of Washington and the U.S. military-industrial complex to control the foreign policy of the two countries and to take advantage of conflicts in order to strengthen the United States' own position in a region rich in strategic raw materials.

Colombia-Nicaragua

The U.S. practice of using territorial questions in its own interest was particularly apparent after the intensification of the disagreements between Nicaragua and Colombia over the ownership of the islands of San Andres and Providencia, as well as Roncador, Quita Sueno and Serrana in the Caribbean Sea.

On 31 July 1981, as noted previously, the U.S. Senate ratified an American-Colombia treaty, signed 8 September 1972, transferring the islands of Roncador, Quita Sueno and Serrana to Colombia.¹⁴ The treaty was ratified 9 years after it had been signed by the U.S. and Colombian governments, despite the note of protest sent to the U.S. State Department by the Nicaraguan State Council to substantiate Nicaragua's ownership of these islands.

The ratification of the treaty just a few days after the receipt of the note evoked a storm of protest in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan State Council, justifiably interpreting the U.S. administration's action as an attempt to create friction between Nicaragua and its neighbors and to exacerbate the country's external difficulties, sent a message to the Colombian Congress, stressing that the United States had no authority to ratify a treaty concerning the interests of a third country, and appealing for a dialogue to determine the causes of the long-standing territorial dispute.

The conflict dates back to the days when the territory now known as Colombia and Nicaragua was divided among various administrative-territorial units of the Spanish possessions in the New World. In 1803 the Viceroyalty of New Granada (which included what is now Colombia) was charged by royal decree to guard the Caribbean coastline of the Captaincy General of Guatemala (which included what is now Nicaragua) against pirate raids.

In 1806 the decree was repealed and the function of guarding the coastline was transferred directly to the captaincy general, but the future government of Colombia was to use the 1803 decree as grounds for claims to the islands of San Andres and Providencia, which were used by the government of New Granada as a naval base for 3 years.

In the late 1920's and early 1930's, when the territory of Nicaragua was occupied by American troops fighting against the Free People's Army of Augusto Cesar Sandino, the United States used its prerogative as the temporary "master" of the country to "alleviate" conflicts with Colombia by turning the islands over to it. The foreign minister of the Nicaraguan government of that time, C. Quadra, refused to sign the treaty, which turned part of Nicaragua's

territory over to Colombia, on the grounds that the Nicaraguan constitution prohibited the signing of treaties restricting national sovereignty. His deputy, J. Barcenas-Meneses, signed the treaty instead in March 1928. On the Colombian side the treaty was signed by Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official D. Esguerra. Within a year after the signing of the treaty (the "Barcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty"), President J. Moncada of Nicaragua received an ultimatum from U.S. Secretary of State F. Kellogg, threatening U.S. sanctions unless the treaty were to be ratified soon. In March 1930 Nicaragua ratified the treaty. Colombia then began a battle over the ownership of the Roncador, Quita Sueno and Serrana islands, insisting that they were part of the San Andres archipelago.

The victory of the Sandinist popular revolution immediately put all treaties concluded by the country under duress in question, including the Barcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty.

On 4 February 1980 the Nicaraguan State Council published a "White Paper" in which the treaty was declared invalid because it was imposed on the country by force during the occupation. The same document called the American-Colombian treaty of 8 September 1972 a more subtle seizure of Nicaraguan territory. The white paper demanded the return of the islands of San Andres and Providencia to Nicaragua, particularly in view of the fact that Nicaraguan authorities were present on these islands in 1880, at the time of Nicaragua's struggle with Great Britain over the Mosquito Coast colony (Nicaragua's east coast). The geographic attachment of these islands to Nicaragua was also substantiated in the white paper by the fact that all of them are part of the state's continental shelf. The island of San Andres, the white paper said, is located 105 nautical miles from Nicaragua, Providencia is 123 miles away, and Roncador, Quita Sueno and Serrana are 140 and 210 miles away, while their respective distances from the Colombian coastline are 356, 380 and 500 nautical miles. The white paper called for an open dialogue between the two fraternal peoples--Colombians and Nicaraguans--with the recognition of their responsibility to other Latin Americans for the maintenance of friendly relations on the continent.¹⁵

The Colombian Foreign Ministry's reply to the Nicaraguan white paper was, according to the Latin American press, quite abrupt. The Nicaraguan demand for the denunciation of the Barcenas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty was rejected as something contrary to the "pacta sunt servanda" principle ("treaties must be observed"). Furthermore, the Colombian Foreign Ministry did not attach any importance to the fact that Nicaragua had signed the treaty under U.S. pressure. In reply to the Nicaraguan white paper, Colombia published its own white paper to set forth its official position on the dispute. The statement that the islands were part of the Nicaraguan continental shelf was called illogical because, as the document said, according to this principle Nicaraguan sovereignty would then extend to all other nearby islands, including the sovereign state of Jamaica. On these grounds, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to negotiate the ownership of the islands.¹⁶

The exacerbation of the territorial dispute created tension in relations between the two states. Colombia has no interest in negotiating the status of

Roncador, Quita Sueno and Serrana because this would unavoidably cast doubts on the Barceñas Meneses-Esguerra Treaty on the ownership of San Andres and Providencia, which are an important center of Colombian fishing and tourism with a fairly developed infrastructure.

In addition, this territorial dispute has now been complicated by a number of political factors. According to Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs M. D'Escoto, the United States and Colombia are cooperating closely in the matter to aggravate the foreign difficulties of Nicaragua, which is already being pressured by Washington. Besides this, the territorial dispute with Nicaragua is being used by Colombian ruling circles as a means of quelling the growth of opposition feelings within the country. The intensification of the partisan movement in Colombia in 1980-1981 was called a result of "subversive activity" by Cuba and Nicaragua.

The means employed in the country to escalate tension and fuel an anti-communist campaign included, for example, an ostentatious 3-day trip to San Andres by the Colombian president and members of his government in September 1980. This was protested by Nicaragua. The subsequent invitation of Colombia to subscribe to Reagan's so-called "Caribbean initiative" in March 1982 reflected the recently apparent political and military convergence of Washington and Bogota.

The United States has an interest in a stronger Colombian military presence in the Caribbean. In 1982 it decided to give Colombia 13.5 million dollars in military aid, most of which will be used to modernize its navy and its naval and air force bases in this region, including the San Andres and Providencia bases. Washington is trying to acquire its own naval base in direct proximity to Nicaraguan territory. In March 1982 official representatives of the United States and Colombia met in secret to negotiate the use of Colombian military airfields and naval bases on San Andres and Providencia by the Pentagon. The fact that the secret negotiations had taken place was confirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger as well as by State Department staffer D. Fisher and the Colombian ambassador to the United States.

Colombia-Venezuela

Colombia also has an unresolved dispute with Venezuela over the former's claim to part of the Gulf of Venezuela. A definitive delineation of the land border between the two states took place in 1941, but it did not concern the Gulf of Venezuela, which is now being disputed. The governments of Venezuela and Colombia tried to alleviate the consequences of the July 1970 escalation of tension on the border between the two countries through negotiations.¹⁷

In 1977 the two sides drafted a border agreement, but it was rejected by the Venezuelan Congress. Relations between the two states are seriously complicated by another important circumstance--the periodic deportation of illegal Colombian immigrants from Venezuela. Besides this, the brutality of Venezuelan employers, which has often led to the murder of Colombians, has repeatedly escalated tension on the border and has even led to armed conflicts.

like the one in March 1980, when Venezuelan troops repulsed a Colombian attack on the Boca de Grita border station. This clash was followed by the escalation of tension. In response to Colombia's reinforcement of its border garrisons with artillery and to the mobilization of troops on Guajira Peninsula, Venezuela announced the heightened combat readiness of its troops in November 1980.

Tension on the border, in turn, naturally affects the attempts to settle the unresolved dispute. Almost 12 years after the beginning of the Venezuelan-Colombian talks, they are still at a standstill. The agreement drafted by the sides in 1980 stipulated that Colombia would have access to the gulf but the Los Monjes Islands would remain Venezuela's property.¹⁸ The leading Venezuelan political parties--the ruling COPEI [Christian Social Party] and the opposition Democratic Action--expressed willingness to sign a border treaty on the condition of preliminary approval of the draft in a nationwide referendum. The increase of tension on the border put an end to the plans for the referendum. The People's Electoral Movement and one faction of the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left] party objected to the agreement with Colombia. Anti-Colombian feelings grew stronger in the country. When Venezuelan President L. Herrera visited regions bordering on Colombia in May 1981, he said that the resumption of the talks on the maritime border was not anticipated in the near future.¹⁹

Some Colombian newspapers associated the escalation of tension on the border between the two countries in March-November 1980 with the general increase in Colombian aggression against neighboring countries and with the struggle for leadership in the Caribbean.²⁰

The unresolved status of this dispute can escalate tension in the Caribbean and intensify the arms race throughout the subregion. The Latin American public is seriously worried about Venezuela's purchase of the latest F-16 fighter-bombers from the United States, which will give it a perceptible advantage over the air forces of neighboring countries. In 1981 Venezuela received the first of five missile-carrying frigates of the "Mariscal Sucre" design it had ordered from Italy. To date, these ships are unequalled in Latin America.

The Colombian Government, which is also taking steps to build up its armed forces, must realize the risk of prolonging an unsettled dispute with its neighbor. In July 1981 Colombian President J. Turbay Ayala suggested to his Venezuelan colleague that a mutually acceptable solution to the problem be found.²⁰

Venezuela-Guyana

The dispute between Venezuela and Guyana concerns a territory with a total area of around 160,000 square kilometers west of Essequibo River, constituting approximately five-eighths of Guyana's territory. A comparatively full explanation of the history of this dispute can be found in Soviet studies. We should recall that the territory of British Guiana (now Guyana) had increased from 52,000 square kilometers to 282,000 by the end of the 19th century as a

result of English expansion. In 1899 the World Court, convened at the request of the United States after this country became involved in the territorial dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, ruled that 116,000 square kilometers of the disputed territory (or almost all that England had demanded) be turned over to British Guiana, and 13,000 square kilometers to Venezuela.

In the beginning of the 1950's, when large deposits of iron ore, bauxite, uranium, petroleum, manganese and other minerals were discovered in the former disputed territory, Venezuela demanded a review of the 1899 ruling.

After the declaration of Guyanese independence on 26 May 1966, the territorial dispute with Venezuela became more acute and the frequency of border incidents increased. A joint commission was created in Geneva in 1966 to solve the problem. It terminated its work on 17 February 1970 without making any final decision. For this reason, representatives of Great Britain, Guyana, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago signed a protocol in Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago) in June 1970 to guarantee the observance of the status quo for the next 12 years by the states concerned.²²

The Port of Spain Protocol specified that the sides could renew the agreement for another 12 years. If either side should refuse to renew it, however, it would be replaced by the agreement concluded by Venezuela and Great Britain in Geneva in February 1966, in which the sides pledged to find a peaceful solution to the problem in accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter.

The views of leading Venezuelan political parties on the territorial dispute with Guyana were marked by the hope of gaining territorial concessions from Guyana with the aid of economic and political pressure. Venezuela took several steps in the OAS to keep the organization from accepting Guyana as a member. When Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez visited Georgetown in October 1978, Guyana was unable to convince him to sign the agreement on assistance and scientific and technical cooperation it wanted.

Bilateral relations were not improved by Guyanese President F. Burnham's visit to Caracas in April 1981. During this visit, the office of the president of Venezuela published a document which implied that Venezuela had no intention of renewing the Port of Spain Protocol after its expiration date of 17 June 1982 (the Guyanese Government was officially informed of this in December 1981). The document censured Guyana for its "unilateral actions" in Essequibo, referring to Georgetown's plans for the economic development of this territory.²³ According to reports in the press, Guyana hopes to turn this mineral-rich region into the center of the aluminum industry. It also plans the more extensive exploitation of uranium, petroleum and gold deposits. The first step in the development of Essequibo was supposed to be the construction of a large hydroelectric power station on Mazaruni River to supply the entire region with electricity.²⁴

During F. Burnham's visit to Caracas, it became clear that Guyana had no intention of backing down. Venezuela then took a tougher line in relations with its neighbor. It refused to supply Guyana with oil, and on 18 June 1981

the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the IBRD a note demanding that Guyana not be given a loan for the construction of the GES.

In April-May 1981 an intense anti-Guyanese campaign was launched by the Venezuelan mass media. On 12 April a group of Venezuelan youths, headed by Minister of Youth C. Brewer Carias, infiltrated the Essequibo region with the hope of establishing de facto sovereignty over the zone.²⁵ Shots were fired on the Venezuelan-Guyanese border at the beginning of May 1981. The Venezuelan Ministry of National Defense announced that the "excursions" in Essequibo were not supported by the armed forces and were not in line with the policy of the nation's leadership. On the other hand, it was noted that the border with Guyana was under constant control by the army.²⁶ The Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement to reaffirm the country's claims to part of Guyana and expressed the firm intention to settle the problem through negotiation.²⁷

In his public statements, Guyanese President F. Burnham said several times that Guyana would not make any territorial concessions. Defending the principle of the status quo, Guyana is relying on the 1899 ruling, and particularly on such factors as its long ownership of the Essequibo territory and the economic value of this territory to an underdeveloped country like Guyana. In his May Day speech in Georgetown in 1981, Burnham also declared that the population of Essequibo, constituting 30 percent of the population of Guyana, did not want a change of citizenship. In his speech at the fourth congress of the ruling People's National Congress party in August 1981, Burnham accused Venezuela of trying to destabilize the Guyanese economy, particularly by complicating conditions for Guyanese exports, refusing to deliver oil and creating obstacles to keep Guyana from acquiring loans from international banks. This last circumstance forced Guyana to cancel its plans to build a GES on Mazaruni River.

The Venezuelan Christian Democratic government apparently plans to make the Essequibo question a cardinal policy issue and to use it in the election campaign which will coincide with the expiration date of the Port of Spain Protocol. Judging by numerous statements by the Venezuelan president, the struggle will be waged by diplomatic means and will be extremely peaceful in nature. It is probable, however, that Venezuela will be unable to acquire sufficient serious diplomatic support. Its neighbors--Brazil and Colombia--have no interest in strengthening Venezuela at Guyana's expense. Furthermore, Colombia has its own unsettled dispute with Venezuela. The Republic of Cuba has consistently taken Guyana's side. As for the island states of the Caribbean, Venezuela's expectation that they, as recipients of Venezuelan financial aid, will support it in its dispute with Guyana, has not been justified. In May 1981 the labor ministers of the Caribbean Community (CAC) expressed support for Guyana when they met in Antigua. The subsequent visit by Venezuelan OAS representative I. Cardozo to three Caribbean countries--Dominica, Antigua and St. Vincent--did not produce any promising results for Venezuela. Venezuelan Foreign Minister J. Zambrano Velasco's visit to London in June 1981 was unsuccessful because the October conference of the heads of state and government of the Commonwealth countries, to which all of the CAC countries belong, had expressed support for Guyana in its dispute with Venezuela.

Venezuela can count only on the covert support of the United States, for which the exacerbation of the Venezuelan-Guyanese dispute is serving as an instrument of pressure on Guyana. Washington is also doing its best to exacerbate Guyana's economic difficulties. A special bulletin of the People's Progressive Party of Guyana, listing the reasons for U.S. "displeasure" with Guyana (its position on the Middle East problem, its friendly relations with Cuba and so forth), says that the United States is obviously supporting the more extremist Venezuelan circles in the hope of forcing Guyana to take a position further to the right.²⁸

The Guyanese public is naturally alarmed by Venezuela's purchase of modern supersonic fighter planes from the United States and the reinforcement of the Venezuelan naval presence near Guyana's territorial waters. Another significant factor was Venezuela's position at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly, when it voted against a resolution on non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Reports of plans to increase the number of troops on the border with Guyana have been heard repeatedly from Caracas since the end of 1981.

Opposition parties in Venezuela are expressing discontent with the increased friction in relations with Guyana. Democratic Action Secretary General J. Lusinchi advocated the peaceful settlement of the problem. Another political party in the country--the People's Electoral Movement--accused the Herrera government of blindly following in the wake of U.S. policy. Obviously, there are several factors in the Venezuelan-Guyanese dispute which are promoting or preventing the growth of the territorial problem into an armed conflict.

The landing of Argentine troops on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in April 1982 evoked, on the one hand, an upsurge of nationalist feelings in Venezuela and, on the other, fear in Guyana that Caracas might take similar action in Essequibo. This fear became stronger after the Canadian Home Oil company, engaged in oil exploration in the Essequibo region, announced the discovery of high-quality petroleum there. The use of force by Venezuela, however, would unavoidably evoke a hostile reaction from Brazil, which is participating in several joint economic programs with Guyana and is interested in exploiting uranium deposits in Essequibo. The same kind of reaction could be expected from Colombia. It is possible that Great Britain could take Guyana's side in view of the fact that Guyana is a member of the Commonwealth. Under these conditions, Venezuela would be unable to expect support from the United States, which has no wish to see another armed conflict on the continent involving Great Britain and one or more Latin American countries. At a press conference in April 1982 the president of Venezuela declared that his country was not planning an invasion of Essequibo, but the conflict in the South Atlantic was giving it an ideal opportunity to exert stronger psychological pressure on the Burnham government, which was experiencing economic difficulties.²⁹ Political correspondents are not excluding the possibility that the question of unilateral actions with regard to the disputed territory will be debated by the Herrera government.

In view of the present international situation, it is obvious that today's territorial disputes in Latin America are affecting more than bilateral

relations. As something that affects the interests of imperialist states, especially the United States and Great Britain, and the policy of multinational corporations to one degree or another, and as something closely connected with the raw material and energy crises, each of these conflicts transcends the boundaries of purely regional problems. It is indicative that as international economic relations have grown more complicated and the international contacts of countries in this region have expanded, they have been more likely to direct UN attention to some territorial disagreements, particularly those connected with the problem of eradicating colonialism. One of the main reasons is that the United States is striving to uphold the doctrine of "initial investigation" in the OAS as a means of controlling the international relations of countries in the Western Hemisphere. It was therefore no coincidence that Mexico, Peru, Panama and some other countries wanted Article 2 of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to include the stipulation that the procedure by which disputes between Latin American states are examined in the OAS should not replace Articles 34-35 of the UN Charter, which authorize the Security Council to immediately investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international friction. The UN rostrum has been of great help to the Latin American countries in reducing the possibility of covert intervention by Washington on the side of one participant in a territorial dispute. Besides this, the U.S. actions in support of Great Britain in the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the South Atlantic, which went against the resolution of the 20th conference of OAS foreign ministers, actually split this organization and put the effectiveness of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in question.

The resolutions adopted several times in the United Nations with regard to the termination of the colonial status of Belize and the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands were based on the provisions of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960 on the initiative of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet stance on the settlement of territorial disputes is clear. "The process of untangling the knots of intergovernmental disagreements and solving unresolved problems must be accomplished at the negotiation table by peaceful means," Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko stressed at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly. "The renunciation of the use of force must become an immutable law of international life. This demand is met by the proposal put forth from the rostrum of the 25th CPSU Congress--the proposal of a world treaty on non-aggression in international relations."³⁰ In the Western Hemisphere, just as in other parts of the world, L. I. Brezhnev said, "the Soviet Union proceeds from its principled policy of eliminating existing seats of tension, preventing the birth of new ones, disallowing intervention in the internal affairs of states and peoples and settling disputes by peaceful means, through negotiation."³¹

Of course, most of the territorial disputes, such as the Colombian-Nicaraguan, Peruvian-Ecuadorean, Venezuelan-Guyanese and others, could be resolved on a bilateral basis in the presence of goodwill.

Some unresolved territorial disputes in Latin America have recently become objects of attention in the nonaligned movement. The final declaration of the

sixth conference of heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries in Guyana in September 1979 expressed support for Bolivia in its desire for access to the sea and Argentina in its struggle for the return of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and appealed for the granting of independence to Belize with unconditional respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.³²

In spite of all the difficulties involved in solving territorial disputes and their relationship to other problems in contemporary international relations, one thing is clear: Their settlement would contribute to the establishment of a stable system of intergovernmental relations, based on the principles of detente, equality, anticolonialism and mutual respect for the legal interests of various sides, and would eradicate the policy of hegemonism and aggression as a means of "settling" disputes.

FOOTNOTES

1. The channel was named after the "Beagle," the ship in which English sailors, commanded by R. Fitzroy, sailed through this channel from the Atlantic to the Pacific in April 1830.
2. RESUMEN, Caracas, 1981, No 396, p 46.
3. CARETAS, Lima, 1981, No 640, p 46.
4. For more detail, see V. B. Tarasov, "'Hot Spots' in the Antarctic Region," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1979, No 3, pp 92-96 (see the map in the same article).
5. CARETAS, 1981, No 640, p 46.
6. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, London, 1981, No 30952.
7. CLARIN, Buenos Aires, 9 August 1981.
8. For more detail, see "Mezhhgosudarstvennyye otnosheniya v Latinskoy Amerike" [Intergovernmental Relations in Latin America], Moscow, 1977, pp 282-284.
9. The border was never delineated in this region, in spite of the fact that a special joint commission was formed for this purpose in the 1950's.
10. LATIN AMERICA. WEEKLY REPORT, London, 1981, No 6, p 1.
11. CARTA DE NOTICIAS, Quito, 1981, No 222, p 4.
12. AMERICA LATINA. INFORME POLITICO, London, 1982, No 5, p 036.
13. LE MONDE, Paris, 22 May 1981.

14. Quita Sueno, Roncador and Serrana were put under U.S. control in 1919 by the so-called "Guano Act," in accordance with which any islands judged "unowned" by Washington would be considered U.S. property if guano deposits should be discovered there. On 8 September 1972 the United States and Colombia signed a treaty turning these islands over to Colombia. The Senate's ratification of the treaty in 1981, described by the United States as a gesture of "goodwill" and a "move to strengthen friendly relations" with Colombia, actually aggravated Colombian-Nicaraguan relations.
15. "Libro Blanco sobre el caso de San Andres y Providencia," Managua, 1980.
16. EL TIEMPO, Bogota, 4 September 1980.
17. For more detail, see "Mezghosudarstvennyye otnosheniya v Latinskoy Amerike," pp 273-276.
18. EL TIEMPO, 22 October 1980.
19. EL NACIONAL, Caracas, 15 May 1981.
20. EL TIEMPO, 16 July 1981; EL ESPECTADOR, Bogota, 2 July 1981.
21. EL TIEMPO, 16 July 1981.
22. "Documents of the Territorial Integrity of Guyana," Georgetown, 1981, pp 21-23.
23. "Documents Concerning the Visit to Venezuela of the President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana," Georgetown, 1981, p 18.
24. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, London, 14 July 1981.
25. EL DIARIO DE CARACAS, 22 April 1981.
26. EL NACIONAL, 7 May 1981.
27. EL UNIVERSAL, Caracas, 3 May 1981.
28. "Towards a Peaceful Solution. A PPP Publication," Georgetown, 1981, p 22.
29. LATIN AMERICA. WEEKLY REPORT, 1982, No 17, p 7.
30. A. A. Gromyko, "Vo imya torzhestva leninskoy vneshney politiki. Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, p 487.
31. PRAVDA, 5 May 1982.
32. MEZHDUNARODNAYA POLITIKA, Belgrade, 1979, No 707, pp 28, 30.

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8588

CSO: 1807/33

BRAZILIAN WRITER BACKS ARGENTINE CLAIM TO FALKLANDS

[Editorial Report] Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 8, August 1982 publishes on pages 16-23 a 1100-word article entitled "Argentina's Sovereign Rights in the South Atlantic" by Luis Rubio Chavarri y Alcala-Zamora, identified as a jurist, writer and director of the Institute of Spanish Culture in Brazil. The article cites the historical priority of Spanish discovery of, and claims to, the Falkland Islands over those of Great Britain. It notes a number of Spanish place names in the islands, which appear even on British maps. The article rejects Britain's arguments in support of its claims. The English settlers have no right to determine the fate of the islands since their presence there, and the absence of Argentine settlers, is the result of acts of force by Britain and since the settlers are not "aboriginal" inhabitants; Argentina's use of force in 1982 is justified by Britain's use of force in 1833.

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CONTENTS OF 'LATIN AMERICA,' SEPTEMBER 1982

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 6 Aug 82)
pp 3-4

[Text] Contents

"Territorial Disputes in Latin America" (Part I)-- B. F. Martynov and V. P. Sudarev.....	5
"The Technological Revolution and the Status of the Latin American Industrial Proletariat"--B. M. Merin and Yu. I. Vizgunova.....	26
"Industrial Planning in Brazil"--Paul Halpap (GDR).....	36

Meetings and Interviews

"Political Struggle, 'Elections' and Military Actions in El Salvador" Conversation with Secretary General Schafik Jorge Handal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador.....	44
"Guatemala: Relative Balance of Forces" Conversation with Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union Spokespersons Andrea Ramirez and Rosa Arenas.....	57
"No Return to the Colonial Past" Interview with Secretary General Patricio Echegaray of the Young Communist Federation of Argentina.....	62

History

"Undeclared War Against the Dominican Republic" (Part II)-- F. M. Sergeyev.....	68
--	----

Art and Literature

"The Continent's Political Songs"--T. L. Ogurtseva and S. N. Vladimirovskiy.....	83
"Ramon Urdaneta's Views on Venezuelan Literary Life".....	92
"Baldomero Fernandez Moreno: Selected Pages" Prefaced and translated by Sergey Goncharenko.....	101

Investigation and Discovery

"Ancient Mayan Lyric Poetry"--G. G. Yershova.....	108
---	-----

Book Shelf

"Latin America: Arms and Disarmament," reviewed by A. Yu. Teslenko.....	134
"History of Latin America from Antiquity to the Early 20th Century" by M. S. Al'perovich and L. Yu. Slezkin, reviewed by B. N. Komissarov.....	136
"The Church and the Oligarchy in Latin America, 1810-1959" by I. R. Grigulevich, reviewed by V. P. Andronova.....	138

Commentary

"New Government--Old Problems"--Faustino Collado, secretary general of the Young Socialist Force (Dominican Republic).....	141
"On the Results of the Elections in the Dominican Republic"-- T. I. Kremer.....	143

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8588

CSO: 1807/34

SALVADORAN CP CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON RESULTS OF MARCH ELECTIONS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 6 Aug 82)
pp 44-56

[Interview with Schafik Jorge Handal, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador, by correspondent in Central America; date of interview not specified: "Political Struggle, 'Elections' and Military Actions in El Salvador"]

[Text] Our correspondent interviewed Secretary General Schafik Jorge Handal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of El Salvador in a Central American country. The text of the interview is printed below.

Question: What do you think of the present situation in Central America?

Answer: It is a well-known fact that the revolutionary process has acquired its greatest dimensions in precisely this part of the continent. Soon it will be the third anniversary of the Sandinist revolution in Nicaragua, whose people not only took over the government but are also transforming the country. This revolution is able to defend itself and we therefore believe that it will not be smashed. A broad-scale armed revolutionary movement has started in El Salvador; a revolutionary war is going on in Guatemala, which has come back to life after the decline of the partisan movement in the 1970's and is now developing quite quickly. The situation in the rest of the subregion is also stirring. All of Central America, including traditionally bourgeois-democratic Costa Rica, is experiencing the buildup of a revolutionary struggle, even though its scales vary from one country to another.

The armed forces command was completely replaced in Honduras after the new present, Roberto Suazo Cordova, took office. To a considerable extent, the Reagan Administration has attained its goal here: The reorganization of the armed forces command led to the replacement of the patriotic officers who were resisting Washington's pressure to turn the Honduran army into an instrument of intervention, aggression and provocation against Nicaragua and El Salvador. As a result of these maneuvers, Washington has been successful in making Honduras a kind of bridgehead for the support of its counterrevolutionary line in Central America.

Nevertheless, the Honduran people and the country's democratic and revolutionary forces, now being subjected to increasingly severe repression (the forms of bloody reprisals that were characteristic of El Salvador in 1974-1975 are now fully characteristic of Honduras), are rising up, with a clear realization of their responsibility, for a struggle against their aggressive and merciless enemy.

The purpose of the coup d'etat in Guatemala was to create the kind of conditions that would facilitate the acceptance of American military and political support by the regime. It is no secret that the U.S. Government refrained from offering military assistance to the totally discredited government of General Lucas Garcia, responsible for the annihilation of tens of thousands of Guatemalan patriots. When the revolutionary war began to break out in Guatemala, however, imperialism had to aid and support the regime and engage in broader military intervention in this country's affairs. This is why the need arose to change the regime's facade. Elections were held in Guatemala, but these did not produce the results needed by the United States. This made a military coup necessary. Although we cannot say that events transpired precisely according to the scenario composed in the United States, in essence this was a move which gave Washington a chance to continue the armed suppression of people's war in Guatemala, and in a more open and more brazen manner. It is not surprising that this is happening today, now that the armed revolutionary movement in this country is developing successfully through the achievement of increasingly high levels of unity. Incidentally, the Guatemalan Labor Party has recently become more active in this struggle.

A few words should also be said about Costa Rica, which also experienced a change of presidents recently. The country is in a state of severe socio-economic crisis. With Washington's help, Costa Rican reactionary forces are trying to accelerate the eradication of traditional bourgeois-democratic institutions. The police force has grown extremely strong and part of the force is no longer controllable even by the executive authority; bloody terrorist and repressive actions are more frequent; torture is being used more widely. Costa Rica's revolutionary, progressive and democratic forces are now in serious danger. The signature of the Reagan Administration, which is leaving the bloody traces of counterrevolutionary terror everywhere, is therefore just as apparent in Costa Rica as in other states of Central America. Somoza's gangs, preparing to invade Nicaragua, are quite active here.

The new administration here, however, has taken a positive stand on the present situation in Central America, particularly with regard to the Salvadoran question. It is in favor of seeking a political solution to our country's crisis. According to Costa Rican democratic circles, the cabinet formed recently by the new president appears promising and could take some constructive action.

On the whole, therefore, the political scene in Central America is distinguished by the development of revolutionary, and not counterrevolutionary, tendencies. Counterrevolution is a reaction to people's war and will be unable, in the final analysis, to stop the march of history in our countries. After all, the foundation for the development of the revolutionary process here is, on the

one hand, a severe economic crisis in which all of the solutions proposed by local capitalists and American imperialists are failing and, on the other, the growing awareness and militancy of the masses and the increased unity of leftist forces acting in ways which correspond more and more to the conditions of struggle in each country.

Question: What do you think of the significance of the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador for the development of the democratic anti-imperialist movement in Central America?

Answer: This matter has its regional and international aspects. It is clear that the armed revolutionary movement in El Salvador and the popular revolutionary wave have risen quite high. This fact alone underscores the significance of events in our country for all Central America. But there is also another side to these events, which could be described as a function performed by the Salvadoran revolutionary movement for all other states of the subregion. A revolutionary process is developing in Central America, and the Nicaraguan people's victorious revolution is in the vanguard. The Reagan Administration wants to halt this process and restore the conditions which existed during the era of absolute U.S. domination of the subregion. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, to block the path of the revolution in Central America by starting with acts of overt aggression against Nicaragua.

Given these circumstances, El Salvador is becoming the main target in the move to smash the Central American revolution. People in the United States believe that it would be easier to invade El Salvador and that the probability of a counterrevolutionary victory is greater in this country. Besides this, intervention could expand the conflict, escalate it and spread the war to the entire region, and this would make any subsequent direct intervention against Nicaragua and all of Central America appear justifiable to the American public and world public opinion. This is the view of Washington and Central American reaction. In this connection, the revolutionary movement in El Salvador has become the advance stronghold of resistance to imperialist aggression and a forepost of the revolutionary process.

We Salvadoran revolutionaries, united in the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), are aware of the international significance and international duty of our revolutionary movement. This is why we have resolved to redouble our preparedness to oppose imperialism everywhere, in all areas, anywhere we have to do this. Obviously, we do not want aggression. We are striving to avert it and we believe that we have achieved much. The United States is in a position of international isolation. The events on the Malvinas Islands exposed the anti-Latin-American essence of U.S. foreign policy and of the "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." This put the inter-American system as a whole in a state of crisis. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to put an end to this crisis. It will be extremely difficult for Washington to use the so-called "inter-American forces" to support its counterrevolutionary actions in El Salvador and other Central American countries in the near future.

This is why we are maintaining vigilance and are constantly seeking ways of preventing intervention. We feel a sense of international solidarity, particularly the solidarity of the people of the United States, most of whom do not agree with their government's interventionist goals.

This is what we think of the significance of our struggle for Central America, and not only as an example, but also in the sense that each revolution and each revolutionary movement influences the development of revolutionary processes in this region.

Question: What do you think of the 28 March elections and their results?

Answer: The elections were a political event warranting the most serious analysis. It is obvious that the data on participation in these elections and on the number of voters were shamelessly juggled. Apparently, some voters came to the polling place under the threat of terror, and not only the now commonplace reprisals which have resulted in the appearance of beheaded and mutilated corpses on the streets of our cities, and especially in the capital, each day. Other methods of psychological pressure were employed during the campaign. For example, civil servants and some of the workers of private enterprises were informed a few days before the elections that the wages they were supposed to receive before election day would be withheld and would only be surrendered to the individual upon receipt of a ballot stub. This was not only a threat in the sense of possible financial loss--in our country, this could have been interpreted as a death threat.

There is no doubt that there was also some voluntary participation in the elections. Most of these voters fall into three categories. The first group consists of parties on the extreme right, especially the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARN)--a typically fascist organization both in the ideological and in the structural sense. It has its own armed formations and a definite social base, consisting of part of the bourgeoisie, especially the grand bourgeoisie, almost all of the latifundists and the social groups dependent on them. Besides this, it consists of the paramilitary formations united and organized under the command of Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, who made a career for himself in the service of the regime's repressive system and who has been described even by the former U.S. ambassador as a "pathological killer."

It was precisely the members of this group who stood in line before the polling booths. These alleged "civilians" who stood in an orderly line or made up the nucleus of the line were mainly members of d'Aubuisson's paramilitary gangs. They forced those who had been frightened and demoralized to stand with them.

Members of the National Conciliation Party (PCN), which was the military dictatorship's main source of support for 18 years (1961-1979), also voted voluntarily. This party is an element of the organized right wing. Some of its members--although not many--even want to regain their lost privileges.

Almost all of the people who voted for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Democratic Action party (AD) believed that the elections would help

to stop the war. There was good reason for this belief because it was deliberately fostered by the U.S. Government. It is not surprising that the pages of the American press were then filled with statements by U.S. leaders which connected the elections with peace talks. Behind this lay the intention to alleviate the pressure of the U.S. public's demands for a political solution to the conflict in El Salvador. Besides this, the U.S. administration hoped to give some Salvadorans, especially urbanites, who were already weary of war, an incentive to vote. These people are well aware that the FMLN and the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) have announced their willingness to start negotiating at any time.

There was another group of people who cast their votes voluntarily--our comrades from the underground urban resistance. They had to vote to keep their papers in order, complete with the notation "voted." After all, patrols in San Salvador and other cities constantly conduct searches on the streets and in homes, and papers are the first thing they demand to see. Our comrades had to maintain their cover and this is obviously the only reason why they voted.

Another fact is significant in this connection. More than half a million refugees are living outside El Salvador. According to international organizations, such as the Red Cross and others, they might even number 800,000. They would certainly have voted against the regime, but they could not vote!

An analysis of the election results provides sufficient evidence that the official figures, alleging that 1 million, 1.3 million or even 1.6 million people voted, are ridiculous. Even the Central Electoral Board announced just before the elections that only 800,000 ballots had been ordered from the printer. No one knows where the figure twice as high as this came from. Besides this, other indicators--for example, the amount of time spent by each citizen in the voting booth, the correlation between the government estimate of the number of voters and the number of polling places admitted by the government to be functioning in the country, etc.--can be used to calculate the average number of voters per polling place. These data testify that only around 400,000 people cast votes. This, however, is not a low figure--it represents 25 percent of the voters. It did much to change our ideas about the situation in the country because this percentage signified a definite political failure for us. This must be admitted in all seriousness.

When the voting was over and the results were announced, they were even a surprise to Washington, which had planned on a different turn of events. People in Washington thought that the elections should result in the creation of a government in which the deciding role would be played by the PDC, possibly in an alliance with the AD. But the more reactionary circles heading the ARN challenged even the U.S. Government. Reagan himself admitted that it would be extremely difficult for the United States to support a rightwing government in El Salvador. The American ambassador conferred openly several times with party leaders to convince them to accept the U.S. demands. This was followed by the formation of the so-called "national unity government," with the PDC as one of its elements.

The United States had to let the army back onto the political stage. But after all, one of the purposes of the elections was precisely to keep the

army from taking a direct part in politics while strengthening its unity in combat operations. Eventually, as a result of direct army pressure on the party, A. Magana, a National Conciliation Party spokesman who tried to pass himself off as an independent, was appointed president. The U.S. Government had to resort to sweeping maneuvers in the army, with its various currents and groupings, to convince the army to take this stand. As a result, the position of the fascists in the army, headed by General Garcia, grew stronger. He was precisely the man who represented the main obstacle to the American attempts to give the Salvadoran regime an appealing image. Garcia was one of the men who zealously pursued the policy of genocide in its most reactionary, brutal and criminal form. But now the Americans are almost announcing publicly that they are prepared to deal with him, despite the fact that Abdul Gutierrez was their protege.

Therefore, on the political level, the ARN and PCN, which hold the majority in the new government, have grown stronger. Magana was considered as a possible presidential candidate several times in the past and was a close adviser of at least three presidents from the PCN: General Sanchez Hernandez, Colonel Arturo Molina and General Carlos Humberto Romero. Besides this, Magana is one of the leaders of the well-known paramilitary terrorist organization ORDEN. The first vice president is Raul Molina, the secretary general of the PCN and also a member of the ORDEN leadership. Another vice president is an ARN spokesman. Finally, another vice president is from the PDC.

The minister of the presidency--a kind of prime minister--is attorney Francisco Jose Guerrero, who was minister of foreign affairs in the government of General Sanchez Hernandez during the "soccer war" with Honduras. When he was chairman of the legislative assembly earlier, he was mixed up in some shady deals.

In this way, the PCN has become the main force in the government and the ARN is playing the main role in the army. The ARN also has the strongest position in the constitutional assembly and some important cabinet posts.

Question: What kind of representation does the PDC have in the new government?

Answer: The ministers of foreign affairs, education, justice and labor are PDC spokesmen. They can play only a minimal role in the government. Obviously, the election results were nothing like the ones anticipated by the U.S. Government, and for the PDC this is an extremely serious defeat.

Question: What do the popular masses think of the election results and the activities of the new government?

Answer: The people who voted with good intentions, believing that they were helping to end the war, now feel deeply offended, deceived and disillusioned. There has been a sharp change in their mood. The elections did not bring negotiations any closer because, as Magana said when he was sworn in, he would not consent to negotiations as, in his opinion, there was nothing to negotiate.

The popular masses realize that their votes had absolutely no effect on the appearance of the new government, which took final shape in the conference rooms of the American embassy with the participation of U.S. government spokesmen, such as General Vernon Walters. He was in El Salvador for only 2 days, gathered together all of the leaders of the parties which had participated in the elections and, according to one witness, warned them that he had not come for the purpose of debate, but to help the political parties correct the situation quickly and, above all, to form a "national unity government." He told the party leaders they had 20 minutes to form a government. He then left the room and returned in 20 minutes. Of course, no decisions had been made when he returned. He then said: "Fine, if you cannot decide, the army will." On the very next day, the armed forces held a conference attended by representatives of the political parties and a military delegation of 24 officers, including the commanders of the five infantry brigades making up the army's main force. Party leaders were told that the army would like to see Magana as the country's president.

It is clear, therefore, that no elections were needed for the formation of a new government in El Salvador. This is why the people feel deceived. They are angry, they know that peace will not result from the elections and that the present rulers will continue to shed the blood of our people as long as they stay in power.

Question: What position do the country's revolutionary forces occupy in this situation?

Answer: We are fully in sympathy with the feelings of the Salvadoran common people and reaffirm our intention to seek a political solution to the national crisis. We also reaffirm our determination to continue fighting and our non-acceptance of the future the new government, carrying out Washington's wishes, is planning for our country.

In February and March we launched a new campaign of combat operations which ended just a few days after the elections. During this campaign, opposing armed forces were dealt strong blows, as a result of which they suffered their heaviest losses since all of the fighting began, and we seized the largest quantity of weapons since the beginning of the war. This is why the armed forces command, always so pretentious and boastful in the past, had only restrained comments to make this time. The commanders launched a sweeping propaganda campaign over the elections, but did not say a word about their military successes. If they had tried, they would have been opposed by the officers whose losses and failures had caused them to take an increasingly serious look at the war. Many soldiers, non-commissioned officers and even officers fell in battle. We destroyed tanks, armored cars and motor vehicles and even took artillery mounts. Aviation suffered serious losses--both in combat and directly on airfields.

As a result, when General Garcia assessed the military situation 15 or 20 days after the elections, he said that the army would have to fight the FMLN for at least 5 years to win the war. But after all, until recently the army command was speaking of a mopping-up operation which would take only 3 months and would put the government in control of everything. Morale in the army is

linked directly with the perceptible blows it incurred during the campaign which ended at the beginning of April. We are still striking the enemy on various fronts.

The enemy offensive in Morazan was a failure, and a major one, particularly since this was the first time that part of the "Ramon Belloso" battalion, recently trained in the United States, took part in the fighting. Its subunits were involved in the Morazan offensive along with subunits of the "Atlaqatl" battalion, trained by "Green Berets," and the "Atonal" battalion, also trained by Yankees. Part of the "Ramon Belloso" battalion was smashed by our brigades.

It is significant that the training of soldiers from the "Atlaqatl," "Atonal" and "Ramon Belloso" battalions in the United States has given rise to acute conflicts within the Salvadoran armed forces.

Question: Approximately how many soldiers were involved in this operation?

Answer: More than 4,000 soldiers with artillery and air support and so forth. After suffering heavy personnel and materiel losses, they had to begin retreating on 2 May. New attempts were then made to attack our positions, but the advance army subunits preferred to retreat after their very first encounters with the partisans.

The punitive expedition took revenge for this defeat against the civilian population of Usulután Department, on the banks of the Lempa River. They bombed and devastated entire rural communities and then sent journalists there to photograph these ruins, cynically passing them off as destroyed partisan camps.

All of this occurred when the Magana government was already in power and proves that it was created to continue the counterrevolutionary war. Therefore, the purpose of the new regime is to reinforce the dominant position of fascist elements. Whereas the military dictatorship previously showed signs of fascism, the situation now is one of institutionalized fascism with its own party. This is the new feature of the current situation.

Question: What is the state of the economy under these conditions?

Answer: According to the statistics (I will cite them from memory) of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), production declined recently in 50 branches of the Salvadoran economy. This was not simply a slower growth rate, but an obvious decline. The gross national product last year was 38 percent below the 1978 figure.

The economy is still functioning to some extent, however, because the southern part of the country, including the capital and some other important cities, and the western regions have not suffered directly from the military operations. Acts of sabotage do take place in the capital, but the reason is that the enemy's main strategic forces are concentrated there. Partisan activity in the western part of the country is not distinguished by intensity and does not extend to the entire territory, as it does in the eastern and central

regions. Besides this, the U.S. Government, as we know, is administering massive dollar injections to sustain economic activity.

The critical state of the economy is the reason for the mass unemployment. Emigration, however, has alleviated the situation somewhat. I have already mentioned that there are many refugees--people who had to leave their own land--outside the country. Many people are going to the United States, Mexico and other countries in search of work. Even so, unemployment is too high within the country.

Question: What about the FMLN armed forces and the revolutionary movement?

Answer: Our movement has been developing and growing constantly during the course of the war. Furthermore, the partisan armed forces are not only growing in numbers but are also acquiring more experience. The best evidence of this is the fact that the junta's troops cannot destroy us despite their augmentation, American aid, technical equipment, higher-level military command and so forth. What is more, FMLN armed detachments often take the offensive against the army.

It must be said, however, that FMLN political work in the capital and some other cities has lost some of its intensity. This is partly due to the enemy's brutal repressive actions. There is still a need to find new forms of political struggle, meeting the requirements of the current situation. From the standpoint of the conditions and possibilities of this kind of work, we can now distinguish between three zones in the country.

The first is the territory controlled by the FMLN. Here the mass movement is strong, the people take part in combat operations, more and more young people are joining partisan detachments and the population is helping to defend the controlled territory. If it had not been for this active support, the FMLN would have been destroyed. Imagine what the situation must be like in a tiny country with a territory of 21,000 square kilometers and a war of these dimensions. How could we survive without the support of the masses? This would be simply impossible.

The second zone could be called intermediate. It is here that battles are being fought. The power of the enemy is not absolute here, but we also do not have enough control (I am not referring to completely liberated zones. There are none of these and there cannot be any until we have liberated the entire country). We have support bases with food supplies and so forth in this zone. Enemy attacks in these regions are usually unexpected and massive. Therefore, this is a sphere of contention by the two sides.

Finally, there is the third zone, where the junta is dominant. It takes in the capital, some other cities and part of the western region. The situation here is controlled by the enemy.

Of course, our possibilities for political struggle differ in each zone. They are most limited in the capital, which is like a showcase for the rest of the world. Several hundred foreign journalists can always be found in San Salvador

and they are the ones who suggest that the FMLN's mass political struggle is declining. This is due not only to bloody acts of repression, but also to the insufficient development of new forms of political struggle, which would either intensify the struggle or sustain it at its present level. We are seeking new solutions and we think we will find them.

Among other matters of concern to the FMLN, the problem of unity is extremely important. As you know, the FMLN consists of five parties, each of which has its own armed organization. Our front is the result of prolonged efforts to unite revolutionary forces. It now includes all of the country's revolutionary organizations without exception. This is an important achievement. If we take Nicaragua as an example, the situation was slightly different there. There was one organization--the Sandinist National Liberation Front--which broke up into three currents at one time and then was reunified.

Our situation is different: The parties making up the FMLN have different structures and political characteristics and their own armed forces. It was much more difficult to unite them, but we were able to do this. It was not easy to coordinate the political struggle either, but we were able to do this. It was even more difficult to coordinate diplomatic struggle, but democratic forces did this as well. All of the leading progressive organizations in our country joined the revolutionary democratic front. What is more, another task of major importance was performed--the coordination of the combat operations of five armies. We can speak of these achievements with pride.

Those who try to present the matter differently, emphasizing our disagreements, are not describing our actual status and our developmental tendencies accurately. Since the FMLN consists of five parties, five points of view naturally coexist within it. Nevertheless, the disagreements have constantly grown less intense and all of the organizations are achieving a higher level of maturity. We have grown increasingly convinced that coordinated and united action is the most important contributing factor, the decisive element of future successes in the reinforcement of FMLN positions.

Question: What is the value of the fighting experience of the Salvadoran revolutionaries?

Answer: The experience of revolutionary struggle in El Salvador proves that all methods of struggle must be combined: legal and illegal, armed and peaceful. Our experience also presupposes the presence of two sides: positive and negative. When we were able to combine all forms of struggle, the revolutionary process developed successfully in all areas. As soon as some of these methods were used less--what I was just referring to in reference to the political struggle in the cities, especially in San Salvador--difficulties arose immediately.

People's revolutionary war should not consist only of military actions. They are naturally the main element, or the war would not be a war. But struggle against reactionary forces also takes place in politics and in the diplomatic sphere. Here various forms of struggle are combined and it is extremely important to combine them correctly.

The unity of revolutionary forces, however, is the principal condition and guarantee of successful actions against a common enemy. The fact that we have been able to achieve this unity in spite of tremendous difficulties in the Salvadoran people's struggle and in spite of the strength of the enemy opposing us, makes us confident that the revolution in El Salvador will be victorious. This victory will be a great contribution to the revolutionary cause in Central America and the Latin American revolutionary cause.

We are striving to analyze our own revolutionary experience not to teach others, but to gain a better understanding of the strong and weak points of our struggle. As Lenin stressed repeatedly, there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory. At the same time, revolutionary practice is the source of theory and simultaneously tests its accuracy. When history puts entire peoples and entire regions in motion, much that seemed indisputable in the past is questioned, and much that was believed yesterday is refuted by today's realities. This is quite natural.

We are also striving to analyze our experience to share its successes with revolutionary movements in other countries and warn them against the problems we encountered. There are people in Latin America who need to know this and who can benefit from a theory based on this historic experience. We believe that an important period has begun in our region, distinguished by an approach to revolution in Latin America based on effective and scientifically valid political theories.

Your LATINSKAYA AMERIKA journal has always been on our side in this. We value its contribution to the analysis of our struggle and sincerely thank you once again.

According to recent reports, FMLN subunits attacked government troops 160 times in the first half of 1982, resulting in the loss of around 2,000 soldiers and officers. The FMLN detachments seized 449 weapons of various types, including mortars, grenade throwers and large-caliber machine guns. They conducted 460 operations to blow up bridges, power lines and so forth.

In an attempt to reverse the course of events, the United States and local reactionary forces resorted to a dangerous venture: In July 1982 several thousand Honduran soldiers invaded Salvadoran territory in the region of Morazan Department, where FMLN detachments are fighting. This was another step in the escalation of counterrevolution in Central America, which could have a serious effect on the cause of peace and social progress in this region.--taken from a press release.

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GUATEMALAN REBEL SPOKESMEN INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL SITUATION

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[Report by Andrea Ramirez and Rosa Arenas, representatives of Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union: "Guatemala: A Relative Balance of Forces"]

[Text] Andrea Ramirez and Rosa Arenas, representing the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, were invited by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace to visit our country. We direct our readers' attention to the following abridgment of a conversation with them in our editorial offices.

The purpose of our trip is to inform the world public of the situation in Guatemala and the activities of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), which was formed by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the Armed Popular Organization (ORPA) and the leadership of the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). As you know, particularly from talks with our comrades,* these organizations decided in 1981 to unite all partisan groups. They accomplished this the same year. The drafting of a joint political program in January 1982 was an important event in the unification process.

The history of the armed struggle in Guatemala, which has been going on for the last 20 years, can be divided into two stages: the 1960's, when the revolutionary movement failed, and the stage which began in 1972. It is true that our revolutionary organizations fought in different regions in the 1970's without coordinating their actions. Nevertheless, when the unification process began, the partisan movement took in most of Guatemala, and this was one of the main reasons for the rapid unification of revolutionary forces.

In recent years we have had to fight not only against the regime, but also against its supporters--primarily the United States but also ruling circles in Israel, Chile, Argentina, Taiwan and South Africa. In spite of the assistance these states gave the Guatemalan Government, it has been unable to stop the development of the revolutionary struggle in the country. In fact, its escalation has strengthened the partisan movement, and this, in turn, has contributed much to the state of crisis within the dominant classes.

* See LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1982, No 5, pp 23-32 (editor's note).

Of course, the reasons for the crisis do not consist only in the growing revolutionary movement in our country--it is also the result of the growth of the revolutionary struggle in all of Central America. For example, capitalists began to leave Guatemala after the victory of the revolution in Nicaragua. More capital left the country when the revolutionary struggle in El Salvador began to grow. A total of 500 million dollars has been transferred to foreign banks in the last 2 years (the entire national budget is 1.4 billion dollars), and this has hurt the economy greatly. Another sign of the crisis is the reduction of currency reserves. Today these reserves could only pay for imports for the next 10-15 days, while 3 months is the acceptable figure for international credit organizations. For this reason, the international credit needed by Guatemala can only be regarded as political. The state of the economy is therefore already being affected greatly by the view of Guatemala as an insolvent state.

Other signs of economic crisis include, for example, the disintegration of the Central American Common Market (CACM), which was also a result of the situation in the subregion. In particular, serious difficulties are being experienced by the Costa Rican economy, and this reduces the possibility of investments by its bourgeoisie in the development of Guatemalan enterprises. Exports to El Salvador have been made virtually impossible by the domestic political situation in that country. Honduras has never been an important sales market for Guatemalan industry. Only Nicaragua is importing around 30 percent of the goods exported by our country. It is also significant that subsidiaries of 78 multinational corporations are operating in various branches of the Guatemalan economy, and not only in industry. This means that the collapse of the CACM has affected the interests of all industrialists, including foreigners.

Besides this, the income from the tourist industry, which was once one of the main sources of foreign currency, has recently decreased sharply. On the other hand, military spending has increased considerably because the government is financing more and more antipartisan operations.

Another external factor exacerbating the crisis is the falling price of coffee in the world market.

The political crisis of the ruling classes was particularly apparent during the last elections. You had a chance to observe this tragicomic farce. The goals pursued in Guatemala by the Reagan Administration cannot be disregarded. It was trying to pressure the ruling elite in order to redecorate the regime's facade by electing a candidate who could lend an air of respectability to a government which commits genocide against its own people and has completely discredited itself in the international arena.

In spite of all this, ruling classes stood firm and would not make any concessions. The reason for this is the extremely reactionary policy and ideology of the Guatemalan authorities and their reluctance to change their economic policy even at the suggestion of the Reagan Administration. They nominated General Anibal Guevara, former defense minister and head of the police force.

Representatives of the "Quatripartita" bloc were saying even before the campaign began that the authorities would not be able to hold elections on 60 percent of the country's territory, where 71 percent of the population lives, because a revolutionary partisan struggle is being fought there. This turned out to be true. Furthermore, we feel that the election results surpassed even our expectations. Much of the population in these regions did not vote. Only those who had to vote, whose participation could be monitored--mainly civil servants--came to the polling booths. It is true that we were unable to boycott the elections in the country's east, where our position is not as strong. Even there, however, part of the population sympathizes with the revolution and has joined the struggle.

Our organizations were not trying to stop the elections because we were still incapable of doing this, but we did propose to boycott them and keep the regime from utilizing its customary means of pressuring the public, such as the bribing of voters or their transport to polling places in military or government vehicles. This is why we blocked the roads and bridges wherever we could to tie up traffic. Besides this, we conducted active political propaganda within public organizations to popularize the main points of the program for a revolutionary, patriotic, popular and democratic government, and not within the context of an election campaign but as a political alternative mode of development, as a final goal. In addition, as we have already said, we asked the masses not to vote. The results of the 7 March elections proved that we were able to achieve our goals.

The crisis of the ruling classes is apparent in the military sphere as well as economics and politics. The Guatemalan regime has a strong enough army, equipped with modern weapons and trained for antipartisan struggle. It has qualified military advisers from the countries assisting the regime and specialists in counterinsurgency operations in urban and rural areas. The army is being augmented primarily through compulsory mobilization, and most of the draftees are Indians. Most of the military units in the west are composed of inhabitants of eastern regions, and vice versa.

Only special units, the kaibiles, stayed loyal to the regime to the end, because they have undergone particularly intensive psychological and ideological training. The term "kaibiles" is taken from the name of one of the characters in a holy book of the Quiche tribe of Maya Indians, the "Popol Vuh." In the Quiche language, "Kaibi Balam" means "Night Jaguar." All special army subunits in Guatemala (just as in other Central American countries) are given Indian names to make it easier for soldiers to remember them. The toughest soldiers from regular army subunits are selected to serve in these units. During talks with the kaibiles, they were asked whether they would be able to arrest or kill their parents or brothers. They answered in the affirmative, stipulating only that their relatives would have to act improperly or shamefully before they could do this. And it is true that the kaibiles act unhesitatingly. They have fully proved their loyalty to the regime with the brutality of their punitive operations in various parts of the country.

As the popular struggle grew, however, antigovernment feelings became stronger in the armed forces. The population is avoiding conscription, and this makes it difficult to increase the size of the army. Our organizations have also

done much to reduce its combat capabilities. Our representatives often risk their own lives asking the Indians not to go into military service and explaining to them that the army is fighting against the people, including them. We have also issued these appeals to officers and soldiers who have not stained themselves with blood by taking part in repressive actions.

Therefore, the dominant classes cannot halt the growth of the revolutionary struggle even with the help of the army. We have every reason to say that the regime is suffering a military crisis.

Another important factor contributing to the development of the partisan movement is the involvement of Indian peasants in the struggle. Just 2 years ago their participation in the revolutionary struggle did not have the same dimensions as it does today. Whereas the peasants who were driven off the land previously demanded only the return of these territories, Indian peasants have recently begun to protest discrimination as well and object to their inferior sociopolitical status. This is precisely why our military-political organizations are now being joined by members of the main Indian ethnic groups--the Quiche, Kelchi, Cakchiquel, Mam and others. Indian demonstrations are no longer spontaneous. They are part of the organized popular struggle. And after all, the objective of uniting all partisan forces for joint combat operations was set only last year.

The growing revolutionary struggle gives us reason to say that military-political organizations had achieved their goals of expanding the scales of partisan activity and including the broad masses in the movement by 1981. As a result of all this, we have now achieved a relative balance of forces. The important considerations here are not only the territorial scales of our actions and the broad participation of the people in these actions, but also the level of struggle, the strategic objectives for which we are fighting and the facilities located in combat regions. All of this suggests that we can consider taking over the country.

Under these conditions, military-political organizations hope to form a broad national-patriotic front, uniting all patriotic, democratic and popular forces. This is still only a plan, but we hope to act on it soon. Some important steps have already been taken in this direction. A Guatemalan Committee for Patriotic Unity was formed in February of this year, consisting of 26 representatives of various sociopolitical forces. They include such prominent figures as Luis Cardoza y Aragon, Guillermo Toriello Garrido, Manuel Galich and others. The leaders of two social-democratic parties are also taking part in the committee's work, and it is probable that this is the first time they have stopped fighting with one another and have sat at the same table. The members of the committee include leaders of the trade-union, workers, Indian and Christian movements, journalists and famous writers.

We are fighting to extend the revolutionary struggle to the entire nation, we are exposing the repressive policy of the ruling regime and the reactionary plans of American imperialism and we are striving to intensify the polarization of forces, but the main purpose of our work is to create a political patriotic front to serve as the basis of a working class alliance with the peasantry. All of those who support our movement--the intelligentsia, the middle strata and students--will rally round it.

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BOOK ON ARMS RACE IN LATIN AMERICA REVIEWED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 82 (signed to press 6 Aug 82)
pp 134-136

[Review by A. Yu. Teslenko of book "Latinskaya Amerika: Problemy voruzheniy i razoruzheniya" [Latin America: Arms and Disarmament], Moscow, Nauka, 1982, 136 pages]

[Text] This new book, which has been published under the auspices of the Peace and Disarmament Scientific Research Council (Academician N. N. Inozemtsev, chairman) and compiled with the aid of the Soviet Peace Fund, is the first publication in Soviet scientific literature, and the only one as yet, about the latest tendencies in the U.S.-inspired arms race in Latin America and the struggle to stop it and to prevent the spread of nuclear arms in the region.

As Professor V. V. Vol'skiy, doctor of economic sciences, correctly notes in the introduction, "the arms race is having an increasing effect on the economy and policy of many Latin American states and on their position in the world arena, especially in the United Nations, and is creating new and difficult problems for progressive democratic forces in these countries" (p 8).

The book being reviewed is relatively short, but it is exceptionally informative and meaningful and is distinguished by a new approach to the explanation of the Latin American countries' position on the arms race and disarmament and on the most urgent problems of war and peace. One of the book's chief merits is a thorough analysis of the differing views of Latin American states on aspects of disarmament, stemming from differences in the nature of their political regimes, the levels of their economic development and the degrees of their dependence on the United States.

The peculiarities of the process by which the military potential of the Latin American countries was created and developed are analyzed in the first chapter, "Arms and Politics" (P. P. Yakovlev, author). The author concentrates on the distinctive features of the arms race in the countries of this region and the establishment of a military industry in some of them (especially Brazil and Argentina). He quite justifiably draws a direct connection between the arms race in Latin America and such negative socioeconomic phenomena as the militarization of public life, the limitation of democratic freedoms and

the intensification of repressive actions against the working class and all progressive forces. The author concludes that the intensification of the militarization process in the Latin American countries is not an isolated event in the states of this region, but is closely related to the general crisis of capitalism on the global scale and the crisis of the model of dependent capitalist development in the Latin American countries (p 24). He cites numerous new facts about military spending in the Latin American countries, the volume of their arms purchases abroad and the production of military equipment in these countries. His assessment of the military potential of the two leading countries of the region (Brazil and Argentina) is intriguing, as is the information about the growing exports of various types of weapons from these countries. The problems of the expanding U.S. military presence in Latin America are discussed in detail.

Making extensive use of Latin American communist party documents, the author cogently demonstrates that the working class, supported by all progressive and peaceful forces, is in the vanguard of the struggle of the people of this region against the arms race.

The main technical and economic problems facing the Latin American countries in the area of nuclear power engineering are analyzed in the second chapter, "Latin America and the Problem of Nuclear Non-Proliferation" (O. A. Zhirnov and P. P. Yakovlev, authors). The authors describe the extremely diversified and contradictory political scene resulting from the use of nuclear power in Latin America. The authors express important ideas about the different, still far from obvious economic and political consequences of the development of nuclear power engineering and nuclear research in Latin America. They give the reader a chance to acquire a precise and specific understanding of all the difficult problems connected with the history of this issue and also discuss the bilateral and multilateral contacts of countries in this region: their cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy with the IAEA, with each other and with the developed capitalist countries.

The third and final chapter, "Latin American Diplomacy in the United Nations and the Problems of Disarmament" (V. V. Gorokhov and P. P. Yakovlev, authors), contains a thorough analysis of the activities of Latin American diplomacy in the United Nations with regard to arms race limitation and disarmament. This aspect of the foreign policy activity of states in the region, which largely determines their place in world politics, has been given relatively little attention by Soviet experts on Latin American affairs.

The authors trace the evolution of the position of Latin American diplomacy in the United Nations on disarmament issues, carefully pointing out the crucial aspects of this activity and focusing attention on the diverging and contradictory approaches of Latin American countries to various problems and concepts of disarmament.

Although the work is a success in general, we have some grounds for criticism. This is made all the more necessary by the fact that not all of its chapters and sections are of equal value from the standpoint of generalizations and conclusions. In particular, more attention could have been paid in the first

chapter to the establishment of local military-industrial complexes in the region and the role played in this process by multinational corporations. In our opinion, the authors tend to oversimplify somewhat in their discussion of the main factors stimulating the arms race in Latin America. For example, they have disregarded the important issue of the struggle for political and economic hegemony in South America between Brazil and Argentina, a struggle which became particularly intense after World War II. We object to the statement that several Latin American countries began to purchase weapons from countries other than the United States after the government of Peru acquired "Mirage" planes in France in 1967 (p 11). We must say that an important role in this process was played by the comprehensive plan drawn up at the end of the 1960's by the government of Argentina, envisaging large purchases of military equipment in Western Europe. We also feel that the capabilities of Soviet diplomacy in cooperation with the Latin American countries with regard to fundamental problems of disarmament could have been discussed more specifically in the third chapter. Finally, the new trends in U.S. military policy (under the Reagan Administration) in Latin America are not discussed enough in the work. The book is not devoid of minor distortions of the facts and isolated repetitions. Sometimes the material is presented in too much detail.

Nevertheless, all of the specific comments do not lower the high rating we have given this publication, which is satisfying the growing interest of Soviet and foreign readers in one of the major issues of the present day.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS OF JOURNAL 'LATINSKAYA AMERIKA'

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 3-4

[Text]	Page
V.N. Lunin, "The Crisis in the South Atlantic and its Consequences"	5
A.F. Shul'govskiy, "The State and 'Civil Society': New Concepts"	24
O.I. Zhuravleva, "The Transnational Corporations and the Food Problem in the Latin American Countries"	41
Mexico: Political and Economic Development, Sovereign International Policy	
Yu.I. Andreyeva, "Problems of the Country's Development and the Struggle of the Proletariat"	48
Fernando Carmona (Mexico), "Foreign Investment Policy and Structural Dependence"	60
K.D. Garibashvili, "Certain Singularities of the Political Structure"	72
V.A. Narzykulov, "Methodology of Economic Programming"	78
G.V. Nikol'skaya, "Controlled Ejido Evolution"	83
Ye.G. Lapshev, "Ideological Principles of Foreign Policy"	97
USSR-Latin America	
V.L. Jait, "Exhibition of Mexican Architecture"	106
Art and Literature	
I.K. Shatunovskaya, "Tashkent-82: The National Cinema Fights and Contemplates"	109
Mario Florian: "Mountains Above, Grief Below". Introduction and translation by Vladimir Reznichenko	123
Cuban Painting Through the Prism of the Revolution	130
Bookshelf	
A.A. Sokolov, "The Working Class in Mexican History. The Immediate Future" by Manuel Camacho, Mexico, 1980	140
E.V. Demenchonok, "Science in Mexican History" by Eli de Gortari, Mexico, 1980	142

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8850

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'NEW SITUATION' IN LATIN AMERICA FOLLOWING FALKLANDS CRISIS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 5-23

[Article by V.N. Lunin, "The Crisis in the South Atlantic and its Consequences"]

[Text] Recent and most recent times in Latin America have been marked by a number of events which have become most important landmarks in the struggle of the peoples of the continent for independence. Two April 1982 was, to judge by everything, such a landmark.

The nature and development of the conflict in the South Atlantic prompted the peoples and governments of the region to express in this form or the other their attitude toward Argentina's demands for the restoration of its national sovereignty over the Falkland (Malvinas) and South Sandwich islands and South Georgia and toward the colonial adventure of Britain, which was supported by the Reagan administration. Undoubtedly, the motives of the political, economic and other assistance to Argentina on the part of the governments of different states of the continent were not identical. In some they are determined by the consistent anti-imperialist nature of their foreign policy, which is aimed at defending the principles of sovereignty and doing away with the vestiges of colonialism. In others they were caused by the singularities of the internal political situation and an endeavor to raise the prestige of the ruling circles within the country. Yet others saw in the Anglo-Argentine conflict a chance to "slam the door" in the face of Washington, stimulating the weakened relations with their regional neighbors. In a number of countries the support given Argentina was explained by a combination of various motives.

Whatever the case, the imperialist action of Britain, supported by the United States, led to the paradox of the uniform reaction of such polar forces as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador and the El Salvador junta itself and the governments of Nicaragua and Uruguay, Grenada and Haiti and Cuba and Guatemala. This fact confirms that, despite even the fundamental differences in the social and economic reality in different countries, a certain common basis for effective joint action may and does exist in the region. In this specific instance even avowedly pro-imperialist forces were forced to adopt a position of political independence and consolidation of national sovereignty and liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism and a rebuff to diktat in international relations. These urgent demands have matured to the extent that in a situation of acute crisis even the conservative circles cannot go against them. They are forced to take account of their profound popularity among the people.

In the course of the events in the South Atlantic a number of Latin American countries also put forward interesting initiatives aimed at the achievement of the organizational political rapprochement of the states of the region. As prominent political figures of the continent believe, they need to be implemented in practice and enshrined institutionally. Otherwise the hopes of the imperialist and colonialist circles, who claim that the flash of solidarity is merely a manifestation of the higher than usual emotional assertiveness typical of Latin Americans and that a calm will follow the storm, will triumph. There is a topical ring in this connection to the words of the ideologist of the battle for the "second liberation" of Latin America and prophet of the Cuban revolution, Jose Marti: "The trees must stand in line and bar the path to the giant in the 7-league boots! The time of trials, the time of marching in single formation has come. We must go forward with closed ranks, monolithically, like the silver in the Andes!"*

Ignoring the internal problems of the developing countries and endeavoring to compress into simplistic outlines the complex questions of relations between the developing and developed capitalist states, in the first days of the Anglo-Argentine conflict Washington (and, naturally, London also) attempted on this occasion also to portray the problem as ... the result of East-West confrontation. But these demagogic attempts failed, however. Reality itself, the Latin American press observed, showed that the problem of the Malvinas has become a mirror of the deep-lying conflicts in, rather, the "North-South dialogue" framework. "Our conflict in the Malvinas," the Argentine newspaper CLARIN wrote, "is the result not of East-West confrontation but of the hostility of the rich North (the reference is to the developed capitalist countries--V.L.) toward the underdeveloped South. This conflict has become part of the struggle of all who support a fairer international economic order and oppose the vestiges of colonialism."**

The position adopted in the course of the crisis not only by Britain and the United States but other leading capitalist countries also enabled many Latin American states to really evaluate the true goals of the West's policy in respect of the developing countries. The Anglo-Argentine conflict was a permanent "lesson" for the continent whose consequences will be reflected in the international activity of the Latin American republics at least in the immediate and medium-term future.

And at the same time in the concrete content of the conflict the restoration of Britain's colonial status on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) has not solved the problem itself. Argentina has not withdrawn, as it has never withdrawn in the past, the main question: concerning sovereignty over its territories in the South Atlantic. "A complete cessation of military operations," the Argentine Government note to the United Nations following the British occupation of the archipelago observed, "will be achieved only when the United Kingdom lifts the naval and air blockade and economic sanctions and when it withdraws its occupying military units from the islands and recalls the special naval forces

* Jose Marti, "Selections," Moscow, 1978, p 272.

** Quoted from MUNDO OBRERO, Madrid, No 179, 1982, p 7.

and nuclear submarines in the waters of the region. Only negotiations within the UN framework can lead to a final settlement of the conflict, removing the situation of illegal colonial domination, which is maintained by force and which in itself represents a constant threat to peace."*

The Argentine Angle

Primarily and most directly the events in the South Atlantic have been reflected in Argentina. The motives of Leopoldo Galtieri's military government when it resolved on 2 April 1982 to restore national sovereignty over the Falkland (Malvinas) and South Sandwich islands and South Georgia, having carried out an operation for their occupation by the Argentine armed forces, were, as is known, by no means straightforward. Of determining significance for the military were considerations of an internal nature, particularly an endeavor to find a way out of the political deadlock and the exacerbated crisis of the Chicago School economic model which had been implemented in practice since 1976 and which had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. But, irrespective of the concrete motivating causes, the operation to do away with the colonial status of the islands in the South Atlantic objectively became, as the Argentine communists observed, an act of anti-imperialism.**

To all appearances, the Argentine military did not expect that the Reagan administration would support Britain so openly during the conflict--the hope was for Washington's neutral position, at least. In a reply at the end of May 1982 to Reagan in connection with his congratulations on Argentina's national day L. Galtieri noted particularly that the people and government of the republic "have been shocked by the entirely unexpected position of the United States, which has taken the side of Great Britain in its conflict with Argentina."***

The Argentine Government's response to the actions of the White House, which in addition to support for Britain had also on 30 April imposed sanctions on Argentina, was essential adjustments to the country's foreign policy. Argentina ceased to be the United States' "ideal ally" in Latin America, as Washington had categorized the Galtieri government prior to 2 April. Argentine military specialists were withdrawn from El Salvador, as were Buenos Aires' representatives from the Inter-American Defense Council. It is no secret that certain Argentine officers also demanded more decisive measures--as far as the breaking off of diplomatic and other relations with Washington.

Simultaneously Argentina took a number of steps to strengthen diverse cooperation with many Latin American states which had actively supported it in the conflict with Britain and emphatically condemned the leading capitalist powers' sanctions in respect of Buenos Aires. Amadeo Frugoli, minister of defense in the Galtieri government, observed that in the course of the conflict there had been a "new discovery of Latin America which is forcing a reassessment in the

* GRANMA, Havana, 19 June 1982.

** See PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 7, 1982, p 55.

*** GRANMA 27 May 1982.

sphere of international relations"; and prompting a study of the "possibilities of forming a Latin American bloc which will serve as an effective instrument of defense."* At the end of May Argentina notified the Andean Pact countries that, lowering customs duty 20 percent, it would facilitate access to the country's domestic market of all commodities from Latin American states and requested via the ALADI that similar measures be adopted in respect of its exports.

The extension of relations with Cuba, which not only as a Latin American state but also as a leader of the nonaligned movement gave Buenos Aires decisive support, came to have appreciable significance in Argentina's foreign policy in the course of the development of the conflict with Britain. This led to a stimulation of Argentina's activity in the nonaligned movement. As in the past, but particularly emphatically after 2 April, the movement itself again joined with Argentina's demands for an end to the colonial status of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). During a visit to Havana at the head of an Argentine delegation Nicanor Costa Mendez, minister of foreign affairs in the Galtieri government, expressed at a meeting of the nonaligned movement's Coordinating Bureau at the start of June 1982 profound gratitude for this organization's assistance and solidarity and for the "fraternal friendship of the Cuban people and government" with respect to Argentina, which is struggling for a return of the Malvinas.** During his visit to Havana N. Costa Mendez and Cuban Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca signed a document on resumption of the agreement on cooperation between the two states.

Thus an appreciable reorientation was discerned in Argentina's foreign policy at the time of the Galtieri government even. Priority came to be given to relations within a Latin American community framework and also to relations with other developing countries, in other words, relations along "South-South" lines. Basilio Lami Dozo, commander of the Argentine Air Force, emphasized that henceforward for the republic the center of attraction for its foreign policy was in Latin America.***

The British forces' capture of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) has led to the country's further shift toward positive changes not only in foreign policy but also in the domestic political situation. It is a question of an increased trend toward the country's democratization, authorization of the activity of parties and public organizations and a return to civil forms of government. As far as the Malvinas problem is concerned, the broadest circles of Argentine society have advocated even more decisive actions against British colonial domination. Thus Gen (ret'd) Jorge Raoul Carcano, who was commander of the ground forces in 1973 and had ties to the leftwing Peronistas, wrote an open letter to the armed forces calling for cardinal changes and continuation of the war with Britain. He proposed that military aid be accepted from all states which wish to offer it, on condition of respect for Argentina's national sovereignty; the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the United States and the

* AMERICA LATINA. INFORME POLITICO, London No 11, 1982, p 088.

** GRANMA 5 June 1982.

*** Ibid., 22 June 1982.

European countries supporting Britain; and renunciation of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty and withdrawal from the OAS until its charter is revised to exclude the United States. These ideas of Carcano's are, as observers report, widespread in nationalist circles of the air force, whose representatives (as also those of all of society and the army) were profoundly shocked by the decision on the capitulation of Argentine troops on the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).*

Argentina's military defeat led to a government crisis in the country. As a result of consultations among members of the military junta General Galtieri, as is known, resigned as president and commander in chief of the army. Considerable disagreements were manifested within the junta itself on the question of the procedure of the country's institutionalization and the nomination of an interim president. The air force (and also navy) command proposed the appointment as president until the holding of elections of a civilian, with the transition to civilian government not being put off for long. The army insisted that it remain in power for a further 5 years at least. The army command nominated for interim president Gen (ret'd) Reynaldo Benito Bignone. In response to this the air force and navy representatives refused to participate in political leadership of the national reorganization process, declaring that they would remain in the military junta only to decide questions of the state's security and defense.

This forced the army leadership to consent to compromise in the name of preserving army unity. Their communique observed that the main tasks of the R. Bignone government, which is transitional, are catering for the institutionalization process; agreeing as quickly as possible with political leaders on the measures necessary for the legalization of parties and the transfer of power to civilian forces following elections in the first months of 1985 (not after 5 years, as outlined by the army earlier); and concentrating the government's activity mainly on the aspects which will guarantee continuity and further development in the institutional period** (in September the military junta was reconstituted as the organ of supreme political authority).

On 1 July 1982 the R. Bignone government (besides the president himself, it contained only one military figure--the minister of the interior) embarked on its duties in accordance with a program drawn up by the army high command. It confirmed continuity of the new trends in foreign policy determined under the conditions of the exacerbation of relations with the leading capitalist powers. At the same time the new government announced a revision of the previous course in the economic and social spheres. D. Pastore, minister of economy in the new cabinet, ascertained that the Argentine economy was in a critical state as a result of the so-called "liberal philosophy"*** by which the military had been guided in socioeconomic policy since 1976. Pastore emphasized that the new economic policy would henceforward (as a counterweight to the prescriptions of the Chicago School) be geared toward the achievement of economic recovery under an increase in wages and price control.

* See LATIN AMERICA. WEEKLY REPORT No 24, 1982, London, pp 1-2.

** GRANMA 23 June 1982.

*** The reference is to the liberalization of rules for the functioning of private capital.

Juan Aguirre Lanari, the new Argentine foreign minister, observed that the main foreign policy tasks would be a strengthening of relations with the Latin American countries and active participation in the nonaligned movement. The Bignone government emphasized particularly that restoration of the republic's national sovereignty over the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) would be a main priority of its foreign policy.

From the first days of the Bignone government taking office the Reagan administration declared that it "attaches tremendous importance to the restoration of normal and friendly relations" with Argentina. It is significant, however, that the White House did not say a word here about the timing of an end to the anti-Argentine sanctions, endeavoring, to all appearances, to use them as a means of pressure.*

In the reply the new Argentine president noted that it was not his country which had initiated the deterioration in relations between the two countries.**

The possibility cannot be ruled out that in time the most reactionary circles of the Argentine establishment will attempt to effect a return to the past, consigning to oblivion the lessons of the past crisis. Such trends can now be discerned. However, Argentina's return to the former role of Washington's "automatic ally," in its interventionist acts against other countries of the continent included, and a return to hardline dictatorship would be a very difficult matter under the circumstances.

The crisis in the South Atlantic has thus objectively accelerated the process of urgent changes in Argentina itself, and these changes could lead to the consolidation of the anti-imperialist elements in the country's foreign policy, its increased independence in the world arena and a strengthening of its ties to the states which displayed genuine solidarity at a difficult moment.

The Latin American Response

The main consequence of the crisis, however, would appear to be its impact not so much on Argentina as on all of Latin America. The events in the South

* It would not seem out of place in connection with the crisis in the South Atlantic and the White House's position to recall a fact which has been in existence for almost 2 years now and which sheds additional light on the Republican administration's approach to Argentina. On the eve of Reagan entering the White House a war game was being played in U.S. military academies which provided for the mining of Cuba's four main ports "in response" to the "commitment of Soviet troops to Poland" assumed by the Americans. Simultaneously a plan of action was being studied to force Argentina to join in the "grain embargo" with respect to the Soviet Union by way of a threat to regard it as an enemy. It cannot be ruled out that it is this plan, with certain deviations, by which the Reagan administration is guided, having chosen the crisis in the South Atlantic as a pretext. See LATIN AMERICA. WEEKLY REPORT No 50, 1980, p 3.

** GRANMA 6 July 1982.

Atlantic elicited on the continent broad solidarity with the Argentine people's just struggle for their legitimate rights. "The time of Latin American solidarity has come," a statement of the revolutionary government of Cuba at the start of May 1982 emphasized. "The struggle for the return of the Malvinas is the cause of the Argentine people and, consequently, the cause of Latin America and the Caribbean. It is our cause!"*

The support for Argentina rendered by the vast majority of Latin American states became increasingly active as the situation in the South Atlantic worsened, Britain's aggressive actions increased and anti-Argentine sanctions were imposed by the United States, the EEC and the majority of developed capitalist countries. This solidarity was manifested both at government and intergovernment level and at the unofficial level. Many public organizations and political parties (while noting here sometimes that they do not approve of the nature and form of government of the military in Argentina since 1976) spoke out emphatically in defense of Argentina's sovereign rights to the islands, sharply condemned the reprisals of the leading Western countries in respect of Buenos Aires and supported the demands for a strengthening of the inter-American cooperation bodies to counteract both military and economic aggression against the countries of the continent.

A distinguishing feature of the solidarity with the Argentine people was the fact that the peoples and the vast majority of governments of Latin American countries perceived Britain's military operations against Argentina as a threat to the entire continent. It was for this reason that solidarity was also manifested in such concrete forms as the offer of military assistance to Argentina (combat equipment--aircraft, tanks, warships and so forth--and also the possibility of dispatching regular army subunits and volunteers). Such assistance was offered by, inter alia, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Peru and also Guatemala and a number of other countries (after the restoration of Britain's colonial domination in the archipelago, certain states of the continent reconfirmed their intention to grant Argentina direct military assistance if its government requested such).

The crisis in the South Atlantic was reflected most directly in the leading bodies of the inter-American system--the OAS--and mainly in the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty organization. For the first time in its period of validity this organization, which has been in existence for 35 years now, encountered a real danger to peace and security on the continent on the part of a noncontinental power, that is, a situation came about wherein the inter-American system was to have taken responsive action. But the United States, which in the past categorized any internal changes in this Latin American country or the other inconvenient for it as a manifestation of "outside interference" and imposed on the states of the region application of the provisions of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty to its own ends, on this occasion declined to evaluate Britain's actions as the threat of a noncontinental power. This "double-entry bookkeeping" of Washington's paralyzed the "collective defense of the Western hemisphere" mechanism, causing unanimous indignation in Latin America.

* GRANMA 3 May 1982.

On 28 April the plenary session of the 20th Consultative Meeting of OAS foreign ministers approved a resolution proposed by Brazil and Peru in co-authorship with Costa Rica and Honduras by 17 votes in favor (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay and Ecuador) with 4 abstentions (Colombia, the United States, Trinidad and Tobago and Chile). The resolution called on Great Britain to immediately halt military operations in the South Atlantic and on Argentina to refrain "from any actions which could exacerbate the situation". The resolution contained an appeal for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with regard for "Argentina's sovereign rights to the Malvinas and also the interests of their inhabitants" and fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 502 in all its parts. In addition, the American state's foreign ministers expressed regret in connection with the adoption of coercive measures against Argentina by the members of the EEC and other states and declared the need for them to be lifted.* In the course of discussion of the draft of the resolution Venezuela insisted on more decisive wording.

Only 2 days after the adoption of the above resolution the Reagan administration openly took the side of Britain, imposing sanctions on Argentina. There was a split in the inter-American system. "The United States' position," the Nicaraguan journal PATRIA LIBRE emphasized, "again convinces the Latin American peoples that the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty operates only when it is a question blockading Cuba and suppressing the Dominican people and when attempts are made to bar the path to the victory of the revolutionaries of El Salvador or any other American country, but it is impotent when it is a question of extracontinental aggression perpetrated by a colonial empire."**

Peruvian President F. Belaunde Terry categorized Washington's support for the British colonial adventure as madness, observing that the United States "has destroyed everything that has been built up in the relations of American states since the time of Roosevelt."*** Brazilian Foreign Minister R. Saraiva Guerreiro emphasized: "We do not wish to dramatize the situation, but we have a crisis of the system, and it will not remain exactly as it was."**** Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo declared in an appeal to Latin American states at the start of May 1982 the need for the central institutions of the OAS to be removed from Washington inasmuch as the position of the United States "inflicted a heavy blow on the inter-American system."***** The Peruvian Chamber of Deputies condemned Reagan's policy, recommending that the government convene a meeting of representatives of the Latin American republics to restructure the existing system and the defense of the Western hemisphere and draw up the institutional principles of a Latin American community.*****

Having obtained the support of the United States and the EEC, at the start of May the Thatcher government frustrated attempts at a peaceful settlement of the

* GRANMA 28 April 1982.

** PATRIA LIBRE No 21, 1982, Managua, p 48.

*** AMERICA LATINA. INFORME POLITICO No 12, 1982, p 069.

**** GRANMA 8 May 1982.

***** GRANMA 5 May 1982.

***** Ibid., 6 May 1982.

Malvinas problem and pinned its main hopes on military force. In this situation Argentina again appealed to the OAS for the convening of a second plenary session of the 20th Consultative Conference of American states' foreign ministers.

At the second plenary session held at the end of May 1982 the U.S. delegation resorted to various measures of pressuring the Latin American countries, endeavoring to prevent their unification in support of Argentina.

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco emphasized, addressing the session: "In view of the fruitlessness of the efforts that have been made up to the present in the political and diplomatic spheres and in connection with the unjustified obduracy of the British Government this meeting should immediately adopt the measures provided for in article 8* of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty in order to resolutely concretize the display of continental solidarity."**

The resolution adopted by the session (17 for with 4 abstentions) on 29 May 1982 was far more sharply worded than at the first session. It condemned "most vigorously the unwarranted and disproportionate armed assault by the United Kingdom, which is influencing the security of the entire American continent"; expressed the resolute demand that Britain immediately cease military operations against Argentina and withdraw its armed forces from the region of the conflict without delay; and mentioned the need for the urgent achievement with UN assistance of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The OAS foreign ministers demanded that the U.S. Administration immediately lift the sanctions against Argentina and "refrain from rendering the United Kingdom material assistance in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity enshrined in the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty." The resolution put forward the demand for the "immediate cancellation of the coercive measures of an economic and political nature" against the Argentine Republic by the EEC countries and other states which had not yet done so. Of particular importance for Argentina was clause 7 of the resolution, in accordance with which each participant in the Rio Treaty may render the Argentine Republic the assistance which it considers necessary. Furthermore, the resolution did not rule out the possibility of such assistance being granted, if necessary, on a coordinated basis, that is, by several countries.***

A particular feature of the crisis of the inter-American system in connection with the conflict in the South Atlantic is primarily the fact that never before this had its most conservative component, namely, the military structure of the inter-American system, been subject to such deep erosion. In other words, whereas previously crisis was the permanent dominant of such components of the system as economic activity, political structure and ideological foundations

* This article provides for the recall of ambassadors, the breaking off of diplomatic relations, the complete or partial cessation of economic relations or rail, maritime, air, postal, telegraph, telephone and radio telephone communications and the use of military force by all participating countries.

** GRANMA 29 May 1982

*** Ibid., 29 May 1982.

within the OAS framework, currently all components of the inter-American system have been affected most seriously.

Statesmen of the majority of Latin American countries are now putting forward various plans for a reorganization of the inter-American system: the creation of an organization of Latin American states in place of the OAS (that is, without the United States), the establishment of a body for the collective defense of Latin America without the participation of the Pentagon and so forth. An essential element which had not been observed hitherto in inter-American relations has been determined in the present crisis of the structures of this system. It is a question of the actual intention of the Latin American states to use in their own interests the mechanism of the inter-American system created by Washington for imposing its diktat on the countries of the region and for suppressing the liberation movement on the continent.

Essentially a process of the suffusion of the old instruments of imperialist domination in the Western hemisphere with new content was outlined.*

The actions of the majority of Latin American states with respect to application of the Rio Treaty for the purpose of combating the actual extracontinental aggression on the part of Britain are as yet one of a few "fragile" pieces of evidence of a kind of transformation of the inter-American system into a Latin American organization, and considerable efforts on the part of the Latin American countries themselves are required to strengthen this trend, consolidate the common basis for joint collective actions and repulse the attempts by imperialism to split the unity of the region's states "from within".

In the light of what has been said above N. Costa Mendez's statement that Cuba "can and should return to the inter-American system ..." is highly indicative. Responding to the question of the possibility of Cuba's return to the OAS, Fidel Castro observed: "We must see how events develop; it would be somewhat premature to speak of this. The OAS has been an instrument of aggression in respect of Cuba, Santo Domingo and Central America. If it ceases to be such an instrument, and in this case (during the Anglo-Argentine conflict--V.L.) it has ceased to be such, then virtually for the first time in many years we are prepared to express praise of the OAS. The OAS and the meeting within the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty framework have occupied a correct position, and I believe that this has been so essentially for the first time in its history."***

*It would appear advisable to recall in this connection that in 1979 at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Havana Gen Omar Torrijos, obviously with the possibility of the above-mentioned trend in mind, opposed a draft resolution which contained a demand for the annulment of the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty and also the liquidation of the Central American Defense Council. Then O. Torrijos observed that this organization or the other "is as good or bad as the people which constitute it." Omar Torrijos, "Soy un soldado de America Latina," Panama, 1981, pp 10, 11.

** GRANMA 28 May 1982.

*** GRANMA 5 June 1982.

The crisis in the South Atlantic overturned in the minds of the ruling circles of many Latin American countries the traditional concepts of security which had been foisted on them by Washington. An understanding of the need for an independent approach, particularly to questions of relations between West and East, has become almost universal on the continent. Speaking on 1 July 1982 in the Permanent Council of the OAS, Hilarion Cardozo, the permanent representative of Venezuela in this organization, observed that Latin America "lacks the forces and possibilities for enlisting the United States on its side, while Washington has the forces and possibilities for involving us in the West-East conflict."*

We would note that the crisis in the South Atlantic at that time compelled many Latin American countries to adopt a new approach to the situation in Central America and relations with Cuba and the other socialist states. This has put on a different plane the problem of support for the Reagan administration's interventionist policy in Central America and the Caribbean. A trend toward an examination of questions of the reorganization of inter-American relations and the consolidation of Latin American unity in a package with a peaceful settlement of the situation in Central America has been determined. Panama's dual initiative appears extraordinarily fruitful in this respect. Addressing the UN General Assembly's Second Special Disarmament Session in June 1982, this country's representative proposed the convening by analogy with the 1975 Helsinki Conference of a conference on the security and cooperation of Central America and the Caribbean and, in addition, a conference of heads of state or government of Latin American countries in parallel with a conference of armed forces' commanders to lay the foundations for the region's reliable defense and collective security from Rio Bravo to Patagonia.** It is significant that a similar proposal on the convening of a conference of presidents and foreign ministers of Latin American states was put forward in August 1982 by Belisario Betancur, the new president of Colombia--a country which at the time of the Malvinas crisis occupied a somewhat different position to the vast majority of states of the continent.

The crisis in the South Atlantic lent impetus to the development of foreign policy directions which are "nontraditional" for many continental states of Latin America, particularly their more active participation in the nonaligned movement. Together with Argentina Venezuela and Colombia, for example, declared their aspiration to strengthen their relations with the nonaligned countries. L. Herrera Campins and B. Betancur noted that their countries intend to enhance their status in the nonaligned movement, switching from observers to full members.

An important part in the spread of the "Latin America branch" of this organization was played by the meeting of the nonaligned countries' Coordinating Bureau at ministerial level in Havana at the start of June 1982, that is, at the very height of the Malvinas crisis. Together with condemnation's of Britain's aggression and support for Argentina's just demands in respect of the islands in the South Atlantic this meeting also paid particular attention to other questions of the situation in Latin America.

* GRANMA 5 June 1982.

** EL BAYANO No 100, 1982, Panama, p 16.

The crisis in the South Atlantic, together with its specific refraction in the inter-American system, lent powerful impetus to the strengthening of the existing Latin American associations and the development of countermeasures in the interests of counteracting and neutralizing somewhat the acts of economic aggression on the part of imperialism. Through such organizations as the Andean Pact, the ALADI and the SELA the Latin American states not only condemned the sanctions of the United States, the EEC and the other developed capitalist countries but also took concrete steps for the unification of their efforts and resources to lessen the negative effect of the sanctions.

The most substantive actions of a strategic nature were realized within the framework of the SELA, which held a special meeting of representatives of governments of the Latin American countries. An important agreement was adopted in accordance with which the economic reprisals are categorized as a threat to the sovereignty and economic security of the SELA states, are contrary to the rules of international law and violate the provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of States' Economic Rights and Duties and the GATT. Taking account of this practice of imperialism, the SELA meeting adopted a decision on the development of a general strategy which "will ensure for Latin America protection of its economic security and independence, strengthening its aggregate potential for action and mutual assistance to ward off measures or threats of economic pressure."* A concrete manifestation of economic support for Argentina on the part of the SELA was the formation of a special action committee for coordinating the cooperation of the region's countries with Argentina. This committee, which adopted a number of measures to establish mutual customs preferences for Argentina in the markets of countries of the region, was made up of the representatives of 18 Latin American states--the largest number of SELA states represented in special committees (at the end of August the number of members of this committee was 22).

The first meeting of the committee, which took place on 26-27 July 1982 in Buenos Aires, that is, after Britain had captured the islands, discussed measures for the creation of a mechanism of the collective self-defense of Latin America and recommended that the SELA Latin American Council Eighth Session adopt effective decisions to ensure regional economic security. This session, which was held at the end of August in Caracas, approved 32 agreements, including one on the reorganization of relations with the United States and the EEC. The SELA Latin American Council Eighth Session at ministerial level was described by many of the continent's statesmen as the most important in this organization's history.

Global Aspects

The conflict in the South Atlantic was evaluated, not without reason, by the majority of Latin American countries not simply as an armed clash between Argentina and Britain, supported by the United States, but as a military conflict between the region as a whole and NATO.

* GRANMA 5 May 1982.

Indeed, the NATO bloc turned the war in the South Atlantic virtually into a "proving ground" for the most modern types of weapons. Voices were heard to the effect that the North Atlantic bloc would "benefit from the experience" accumulated by the British expeditionary corps in the course of the military operations against Argentina. In addition, in June 1982 even a NATO naval squadron was conducting special exercises during which the tactics of Argentine aviation were copied and countermeasures were developed. It is also known that certain British ships were dispatched to the region of the conflict carrying nuclear weapons. According to press reports, the British destroyer "Sheffield," which sank, had on board a lethal nuclear cargo which in time or even now could be a source of pollution of the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. These actions of Britain's are a most flagrant violation of the Tlatelolco Treaty banning nuclear weapons in Latin America for Great Britain signed the the supplementary protocols to this treaty 1 and 2 and undertook to respect the status of a nuclear-free zone in the region.

As the American commentator Jack Anderson, inter alia, reported, in a top-secret message of the Thatcher government the Reagan administration was informed of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the British task force and that the task force command had orders to use them "in an extremely dire situation."* The Argentine Air Force Command noted that Argentine aviation could have conducted even more active and successful operations against the British task force, but it was held back by the danger of Britain's use of nuclear weapons. It is now hard to contemplate what would have happened if Argentine aviation (and it had overwhelming superiority in the air) had really during the conflict increased the power of its raids, the more so in that certain Latin American countries, particularly Venezuela and Peru, were prepared to put modern warplanes at Argentina's disposal. However, it cannot be ruled out that Argentina's defeat prevented the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) being turned into a "Latin American Hiroshima".

Another global aspect of the crisis is the fact that Britain's actions in the South Atlantic have complicated most directly the solution of the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In particular, Vice Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, chairman of the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission, and Julio Cesar Carasalez, head of the Argentine delegation at the UN General Assembly's Second Special Disarmament Session, declared that in the light of the events in the South Atlantic Argentina reserves the right to use nuclear energy for military purposes** (it should be borne in mind that even prior to the conflict Argentina had not subscribed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and had not ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty).

Furthermore, the likelihood of Latin America's more active involvement in the conventional arms race and the impeding of regional disarmament measures arises inasmuch as the events in the South Atlantic showed Latin America's undoubted military weakness in the face of the military might of the NATO bloc. Addressing the UN General Assembly's Second Special Disarmament Session, J. Cesar

* GRANMA 3 May 1982.

** GRANMA 12, 23 June 1982.

Marasalez observed that the conflict in the South Atlantic is compelling a reinterpretation of certain concepts and plans in the disarmament sphere for measures with respect to regional disarmament cannot be effective as long as transregional powers invade with the most powerful weapons (both nuclear and conventional) at their disposal.* The likelihood of new impetus to the arms race in the region and a strengthening of the development of the local military-industrial complex is being created. And the Malvinas problem in itself, whose solution has become even more complicated following the restoration of the colonial status of the islands in the South Atlantic, is a factor "compelling" an acceleration of Latin America's "rearmament".

In a purely military respect the conflict overturned many concepts prevalent in military circles of the countries of the continent. The combat operations in the South Atlantic region showed the increased significance of the navy and air force in a modern war, while the Pentagon had oriented the armed forces of the countries of the region toward conducting "internal warfare" against "subversive elements," that is, gave priority to the strengthening mainly of the ground forces. In the light of the "military lessons" of the Malvinas crisis many Latin American states--primarily Argentina itself--have begun to revise the "internal warfare" concept and "national security" as it has been traditionally understood.

Following the capture of the islands, different versions of the "perpetuation" of the archipelago's colonial status** directly tied in with global geopolitics have been drawn up in ruling circles of Britain and in NATO as a whole. In particular, a plan to make the islands an American naval and air base either of the type of the U.S. base on Ascension Island (which has a civilian population) in the Atlantic or of the type on Diego Garcia (from which the civilian population has been expelled) in the Indian Ocean is being actively discussed. U.S. Navy circles, who consider the creation of an Ascension Island-Falklands (Malvinas)-Diego Garcia triangle a fascinating idea, are approaching this plan with unconcealed interest.

Plans for the creation of multilateral forces with the participation of such countries as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and also Chile, which in the course of the conflict essentially adopted a pro-British position, having become the West's main ally in the Southern cone, are also being discussed.

British military experts claim that the minimum measures necessary for Great Britain's creation of a strong defense system here are the stationing of a military garrison of 3,000 soldiers (almost two per inhabitant) and the dispatch of 2 nuclear submarines, 2 frigates, 1 destroyer, 12 Harriers and a

* GRANMA 23 June 1982.

** In addition to other, misunderstood political considerations, Thatcher also harbored a personal interest in the restoration of the colonial authority on the Falklands (Malvinas). N. Costa Mendez pointed out in an interview that 46 percent of the land of the archipelago is owned by the British Falkland Islands Company and the remaining 54 percent belongs to 23 owners, among whom is Margaret Thatcher. See GRANMA 27 May 1982.

helicopter squadron. London's annual military spending on the upkeep of the naval and air base will constitute approximately \$720 million.*

Thus Britain's attempts to preserve fragments of the empire are leading to serious complications in the international situation. It was not fortuitous that in a message to nonaligned countries' heads of state in connection with the dangerous development of the Anglo-Argentine conflict Fidel Castro emphasized particularly that the imperialist powers were attempting to make the colonial war "a lesson for all third world countries which defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity, irrespective of sociopolitical regime...."***

This "lesson" was given to all the developing countries not only in the form of military actions but also aggression of an economic nature. Essentially two blocs took shape in the course of the conflict--a kind of "front" of Latin American countries, on whose side were all the forces operating from anticolonialist positions, and a bloc of developed capitalist countries (with a few exceptions) headed by Britain and the United States. Support for London was manifested both in the granting of concrete assistance of a military nature (the United States, New Zealand, Portugal and certain others) and in the form of economic pressure on Argentina by way of the imposition of sanctions or restrictive measures (the United States, the EEC, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan).

It is significant that the support for Britain by certain West European countries, particularly France, was largely explained by the fact that they were or still are colonial powers apprehensive over the fate of their own possessions. Sometimes support for British aggression by this West European country or the other was accompanied by reservations and complicated demarches*** for Britain's "legitimate rights" to the islands in the South Atlantic are greatly doubted in the majority of West European states. As many West European statesmen explained, the imposition of sanctions was brought about by an endeavor to prevent Argentina "setting a precedent," using force in recovering the islands (although this precedent was set in respect of them by Britain 150 years ago), and also by a desire to "avert a war," proceeding from the fact that a demonstration of "Atlantic solidarity" should "restrain" Argentina and make it more amenable to negotiation. In practice, however, the measures of the West European countries and the United States within the EEC and NATO frameworks were a direct encouragement of the Thatcher government to war.

The official propaganda of the West European countries in which parties which are members of the Socialist International are in power also contained the proposition that a victory of "democratic" Britain would lead to the fall of the dictatorship in Argentina.

* AMERICA LATINA. INFORME POLITICO No 12, 1982, pp 090-091, 095; GRANMA 6 July 1982.

** GRANMA 11 May 1982.

*** Thus the FRG supported Britain out of a spirit of "Atlantic solidarity". However, as Federal Chancellor H. Schmidt declared here, the solidarity of the West German Government should not be interpreted by London as a carte blanche. The British expedition to the South Atlantic was in itself, Schmidt believed, an anachronism. See GRANMA 3 May 1982.

The economic sanctions of the EEC imposed on Argentina were emphatically condemned in Latin America as contrary to the very idea of the establishment of a new economic order. As a sign of protest, inter alia, the Latin American countries canceled a meeting with EEC representatives scheduled for June.

Economic sanctions, which are a customary practice of imperialism against the socialist states, are also actively used, as the events in the South Atlantic showed, for pressuring the developing countries. The declaration of the non-aligned movement's Coordinating Bureau meeting in Havana mentions specially the increased trend toward the use by imperialism of various forms of economic aggression against the nonaligned countries and the developing countries as a whole and emphatically rejects the use of economic blockade, sanctions and measures of pressure and blackmail against the developing countries, including Argentina.*

The political consequences of the crisis in the South Atlantic are manifold for Latin America and will be revealed in full only after a certain time has elapsed. The fact that the events which began on 2 April 1982 marked a kind of boundary dividing the history of the continent into the "pre-Malvinas" and "post-Malvinas" periods is undoubtedly clear now.

A determining feature of the new situation was the fact that the states of the region had a sharper sense than ever before of their dependent position in the "backyard" of the capitalist system and realized the need for joint efforts and organizational unity for the strengthening of their political independence and economic self-sufficiency. "The tragic lesson of the Malvinas shows," a declaration of the Latin American Parliament emphasized, "that the alternative for Latin America is either unification or vassalage."**

It should be mentioned that imperialist circles of the United States and certain other developed capitalist countries are not concealing their hopes that the crisis in the South Atlantic will not have special consequences for the West. They believe that the "class instinct" of the ruling circles, the very heavy economic dependence of the majority of Latin American states and their "peripheral" position in the world capitalist system will ultimately have the determining impact on the policy of the countries of the region and will prevent them realizing the initiatives proclaimed in the acute period. It is becoming obvious in this connection that the solution of the new problems which Latin America has encountered will largely depend on how firm the positive changes in the international activity of the majority of states of the continent brought about by these events prove.

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* GRANMA 7 July 1982.

** Ibid., 23 June 1982.

'MODERNIZING-REPRESSIVE' REGIMES PRESENT PROBLEM FOR 'DEVELOPMENTALIST' IDEOLOGY

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 24-40

[Article by A.F. Shul'govskiy: "The State and 'Civil Society': New Concepts"]

[Text] Since the latter half of the 1960's problems of dependence have been moving to the forefront in sociological and political studies devoted to the state and society in Latin America. Properly speaking, they had attracted research workers' attention earlier also. Thus the developmentalists had much to say about the influence of outside factors on the development of the countries of the continent, proposing their means of overcoming their "periphery status". However, the problem of dependence in the works of representatives of the "new wave" of Latin American sociologists and political scientists were examined from an entirely different angle. F. Cardoso, who was at the sources of the new interpretation of the dependence phenomenon, observed that the essence of this approach amounted in the most general outline to an interpretation of the problem of underdevelopment from "historico-structuralist stand-points". In the domination of the "industrial centers" the supporters of the new approach to the problem of dependence saw a permanent factor predetermining an insurmountable asymmetry of the interconnection of the "peripheral" and "central" economic systems.¹

The very formulation of the problem of dependence from the new angle testified that a "reassessment of values" had occurred in the development of the social sciences in the countries of the region, and the basic theoretical principles of developmentalism proceeding from the proposition concerning the surmounting of the "peripheral status" on the paths of modernization with an extension of the sphere of "political democracy," to which understanding and assistance on the part of the "industrial centers" were to contribute, were subjected to all-embracing criticism. The assumption of office in a number of countries of rightwing-authoritarian, modernizing-repressive regimes dispelled the illusions of the developmentalists and many of their supporters concerning the virtually unlimited opportunities for pursuing a policy of social transformations while relying on an "enlightened" state of "universal prosperity," having deflated the idea of "Westernization" based on a strengthening of the institutions of "representative democracy".

The Theory of Dependence and the State: Evolution of Ideas

The supporters of the theory of dependence undoubtedly made a contribution to the formulation of a number of important and acute problems of Latin American reality, criticizing the apologetic bourgeois and pro-imperialist theories of the "salutary" role of foreign capital and the transnational corporations (TNC). They did much in the sphere of a study of the new forms and methods of the TNC's penetration of the economy of the countries of the region and endeavored to reveal the mechanisms of their influence and show the role of imperialist monopolies in the establishment of rightwing-authoritarian counterrevolutionary regimes. In this respect the supporters of the theory of dependence went considerably further along the path of extended scientific analysis than the developmentalists.

While evaluating the views of the scholars of this persuasion objectively and with understanding Latin American Marxists also note obvious weaknesses and contradictions in their formulation and solution of many important problems. Endless fascination with the structuralist method of research and absolutization of the dependence factor lead, as Orlando Millas has observed, to their essentially losing sight of the effect in Latin America of the general laws of capitalism under dependence conditions. For them capitalism on the continent is developing entirely under the influence of "outside impulses emanating from the imperialist metropolis." "In reality, however," Orlando Millas observes, "a dialectical and dynamic interconnection exists wherein the development of capitalist relations and the economy is determined by internal factors within a dependence framework."²

The structuralist approach to the problems of capitalism also caused a manifest underestimation of the dynamics of the class struggle and the complexity and asynchronous nature of the composition of social and political forces. This was manifested particularly distinctly in the belittlement of the role of the working class in the liberation movement and the advancement to the forefront of the social struggle of representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and middle strata of the population.

While noting a number of common, "generic features," so to speak, characteristic of the supporters of the theory of dependence it is necessary to examine their views in their dynamics and evolution, on which the ideas of scientific socialism are undoubtedly exerting an ever increasing and fruitful influence, although it is frequently manifested in complex and brokered manner and in distinctive forms. In a number of instances Marxism forms as an accretion, as it were, on the structuralist method of analysis and is interwoven with it. It is frequently asserted that the theory of dependence ensues logically from Marxism or, on the other hand, this theory is said to be a supplement to scientific socialism, particularly to Lenin's teaching on imperialism.

It also happens that the ideas of Marxism are perceived dogmatically, without a due aspiration to their creative application to Latin American reality. And this leads to the use only of individual elements of the Marxist categorical and conceptual apparatus which neighbor the concepts and categories typical

of the theory of dependence. At the same time, however, the trend toward acceptance of the ideas of scientific socialism -- an integral system of views in the entire unity of their structural components -- being manifested more definitely. Such a path is characteristic, for example, of the well-known Mexican economist and sociologist Alonzo Aguilar and a whole group of his comrades. The journal which they publish, ESTRATEGIA, is making a big contribution to the propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas, particularly the Marxist teaching on imperialism, and conducting a high-minded polemic with both developmentalism and the supporters of the theory of dependence.

As distinct from the developmentalist concept with its central proposition concerning the capacity of the state to overcome the negative influence of the "industrial centers," the supporters of the theory of dependence cleave to entirely different views, and in their extreme version, furthermore, in the approach to an analysis of the problem of state and society. In determining the essence and forms of the Latin American state they have emphasized particularly its "satellitized" nature, so to speak. The state, as they have endeavored to prove, has not possessed the slightest degree of autonomy in relation to the "international power centers". An exception was made only given recognition of such "autonomy" with respect to the local bourgeoisie, and even then only to the extent that it itself had been "satellitized" or, as Gunder Frank wrote, "Lumpenproletarianized,"³ being a lackey of the TNC. Gunder Frank, whose views are influential for part of the radical intelligentsia, puts forward a "new theory" of the role of the state in the developing countries. The essence of it is expressed in the following words: "The state in the Third World may be relatively independent of the local bourgeoisie, but simultaneously it is not only extraordinarily weak in the face of the imperialist bourgeoisie of the metropolis but is also its instrument and creation even." The functions of this state are, as the author asserts, to ensure in the interests of the TNC the process of the accumulation and centralization of capital within the framework of a new international division of labor, which is leading to the "transnationalization" of the economy of the Latin American countries, requiring the creation of a new state "model".⁴

The fact that in all counterrevolutionary coups of recent decades without exception the armed forces had the decisive say influenced the definition of the regimes which emerged as a result. They were frequently characterized as "national security" regimes and an "emergency" or "military" state. It is not surprising that this approach to the problem of the state found supporters among certain Chilean sociologists, who attempted in this key to explain the essence of the fascistizing counterrevolution in the country. Irrespective of the differences in the definition of the state in Chile--some spoke of the "military" state, others of a state of "dependent fascism"--the proposition of the creation of a counterrevolutionary regime which is the creation of "outside factors" in the shape of the TNC and international "power centers" was postulated invariably. According to the Chilean sociologist Alvaro Briones, in order to understand the essence of the Chilean regime (he describes it as a state of "dependent fascism") it is necessary to proceed from the obligatory premise of the undisputed priority of "international factors". The author explains the subordinate position of internal factors by the "dependence of the socioeconomic structures of the Latin American countries." Such regimes,

According to him, "are ultimately an expression of the characteristic features of an economic model and policy born of the requirements of the new international division of labor necessary for overcoming the crisis of capitalism on a world scale."⁵

Referring the counterrevolutionary regime as a "military state," another Chilean sociologist, Fernando Mirez, considers it not only a creation of imperialism (this is already a truism, according to him) but goes further, emphasizing that it is radically changing the entire system of previous social production relationships in the country, thereby creating a new type of society. He, particularly, speaks of a revival of the traditional latifundist system and a return to the times of capitalism of free competition. This is happening because the "military state," as the author claims, "is being divorced" from society and, bypassing it, "communicating with the world capitalist market directly."⁶

Absolutization of the external factor in such evaluations of the essence of the state elicits justified criticism on the part of Marxist scholars. Thus polemicalizing with Alvaro Briones, Daniel Fuensalida emphasized that the fascist counterrevolution in Chile cannot be explained by proceeding solely from the proposition of imperialism's endeavor to bring the economy "into line" with the new conditions of obtaining "monopoly profit on an international scale." This interpretation of the fascist coup succumbs to the sin of "economism" and leads to an underestimation of its internal causes determined primarily by an upsurge of the revolutionary movement, which had jeopardized the interests of imperialism. According to Fuensalida, it was only after the defeat of the Chilean revolution and the "rescue" of capitalism that the conditions were created for imperialist capital and the local financial clans to aim at bringing the Chilean economy into line with the "process of dependent capitalist reproduction."⁷

The appeal of progressive Latin American scholars to the ideas of scientific socialism upon an analysis of the problems of the state and society testifies to the qualitative changes occurring in the study of these extraordinarily important questions.

The Marxist Method of Analysis and the Problems of the State and Society

Many pronouncements of Latin American scholars on the importance of a study of the state and society in the light of Marxist-Leninist ideas could be adduced. Speaking of their attraction, the Mexican political scientist Atilio Boron observed that they afford an opportunity for a scientific comprehension of new social phenomena and for a new level of research to be reached. He wrote of the creative boldness and perspicacity of V.I. Lenin, who made an inestimable contribution to the development of the theory of the state and study of the problems of state-monopoly capitalism.⁸ Another Mexican scholar, Arnaldo Cordova, emphasized the fruitfulness of the Marxist method of analysis, noting that it helps explain the common features of the bourgeois state in the Latin American countries and the classical "Euro-American" state, simultaneously revealing the singularities and specifics of their manifestation. He criticized the attempts to depict the process of the inception and evolution of the state on the continent as a purely Latin American phenomenon absolutely inexplicable from the viewpoint of the general theory of the state. Refuting the proposition concerning the "truncated" and even "nonexistent" ("satellitized") state,

the author emphasized that the characteristics of the inception and development of the state revealed by the founders of scientific socialism are entirely applicable under Latin American conditions also.

The Ecuadorean expert Agustin Cueva sharply opposed the reformists who are attempting to apply extraclass criteria in an analysis of different types of Latin American state. At the same time, however, he criticized the "fruitless attempts" to reveal the dialectics of the interconnection of the state and society being made by the supporters of "ultraleftism," who confine themselves merely to a simple ascertainment of the class nature of the state. In Cueva's ironical observation, they lower the cover of night, when "all the cats are gray," on the historical and political processes.⁹

Employing the Marxist dialectical-materialist method, progressive Latin American scholars are paying increasingly great attention to research within the framework of the historical process into the manifold forms of the rule of the ruling classes and the revelation of the most varied political regimes existing under the same type of social structure. The historical approach to an analysis of political systems and regimes affords Latin American Marxists an opportunity to study such a problem, which is exceptionally important in scientific socialism, as the role of the state in defense of the interests of the bourgeoisie. A situation wherein the state gradually becomes, to use the words of the "Communist Party Manifesto," "a committee controlling the common affairs of the entire class of the bourgeoisie"¹⁰ is taking shape in Latin America as capitalism develops in depth and in breadth. The distinctiveness of this process is, as Latin American scholars have shown, the fact that the state in the Latin American countries, as distinct from Europe, say, has been a far more active force, stimulating a strengthening of the positions of the local bourgeoisie "from above".

Particular attention in Latin American sociology and political studies is paid to an analysis of the essence of the various forms of the modern state, and study of the authoritarian "model" of the state and explanation of the causes of its emergence are of the greatest interest in this respect, moreover. Various concepts of the state (developmentalism, the theory of "Westernization" and many aspects of the theory of dependence) and also the American concept of the authoritarian-corporative state in Latin America are criticized. According to the supporters of the latter concept, this "model" of the state is a kind of dominant of the political development of the countries of the continent which essentially does not change but merely adapts certain of its aspects to present-day requirements. "The existence of corporativist structures supported by the values of a political system oriented toward hierarchy, status and paternalism," the American sociologist [Vayarda] writes, "predetermines the fact that traditional sociopolitical institutions based on Iberian-Latin traditions preserve an astounding vitality."¹¹ Furthermore, this "model" itself is presented as some "Latin American third way of development" which is opposed both to "liberal democracy" and "Marxist socialism".¹² This approach not only gives rise to a manifest subjective relativism in the evaluations and classification of political systems (both pro-imperialist regimes and the Unidad Popular Government in Chile, the military-patriotic regime in Peru and so forth are ascribed to the authoritarian-corporativist regimes) but affords an opportunity for propagandizing the views concerning the effectiveness of the policy of the modernizing-technocratic "ruling elites".¹³

criticizing the concept of authoritarianism in its American interpretation for its abstract and antihistorical method, Latin American scholars turn for an explanation of the essence of the "new authoritarianism" to an analysis of the economic and social foundations of the contemporary forms of counterrevolution and connect this phenomenon with the process of the monopolization and concentration of capital and the creation of a new bloc of forces of the ruling classes. "We are dealing," A. Boron writes, "with a new form of bourgeois domination reflecting the need for a fundamental reorganization of the production apparatus. This need has been caused by the appearance of new forms and mechanisms of capitalist accumulation."¹⁴ Describing the social composition of the counterrevolutionary alliance, A. Cueva notes that its principal components are the TNC and the local monopoly bourgeoisie. And this means that "imperialist capital is no longer based, as was the case earlier, on the trading and brokerage bourgeoisie but is entering into an alliance with its junior partner, who is essentially identical to him in economic interests."¹⁵

The theory of the "satellitized" state and its conversion into a blind tool at the service of the "industrial centers" and TNC is sharply criticized in this connection. Opposing the proposition of the subordination, progressive weakening and, finally, the actual destruction of the Latin American states by the developed capitalist powers and the TNC, the Argentine sociologist Marcos Kaplan believes that quite different processes are occurring in reality connected with the increased role of the states of the region.¹⁶ While by no means belittling the influence of the dependence factor (he operates with the "dependent-associated development" category), F. Cardoso opposes the proposition that the TNC are a kind of creator of the Latin American authoritarian state. The work "The State and Political Processes in Latin America," which he wrote in conjunction with the Chilean sociologist E. Faletto, says the following in this connection: "We believe that an assessment of the role of the TNC which amounts to their representing a demiurge in history while the activity of the state is ignored leads to one-sided conclusions. First, the internal processes are subordinated to the logic of the 'accumulation of capital by the transnational enterprises' and, consequently, are made fully dependent on external factors. And, second, this leads to a belittling of the role of political factors, which influence the forms of the development of the capitalist economy both internationally and within the framework of a single country."¹⁷

These problems are analyzed cogently and in depth by A. Aguilar. He is opposed to an examination of the problems of capitalism worldwide and in Latin America in particular solely from the viewpoint of the activity of the TNC. According to him, it can be explained only in the context of the complex processes occurring in the capitalist system. "... The internationalization of capital and the forms of activity of the TNC," A. Aguilar wrote, "are not something independent. In addition, they do not cast doubt on or, even less, rescind the laws which determine capitalist development at its current stage." The Mexican scholar draws attention to the increased role of the state and connects it with the imperatives of capitalist modernization and an endeavor to strengthen the positions of capitalism: "if there has indeed been a permanent factor in our countries' development strategy in recent years, it is the efforts which are being exerted for the defense of the interests of capital and the capitalists."¹⁸

The dialectics of the increased role of the capitalist state are leading to a growth of its relative independence of society and an increase, to use Lenin's words, in the "Leviathan of statehood,"¹⁹ which is penetrating all areas and spheres of social life. "The increase in the relative independence of the capitalist state," Soviet legal experts write in this connection, "appears as the establishment of its maximum power over society and, consequently, the ever increasing alienation of state power from society."²⁰

These problems are attracting the increasingly great attention of Latin American specialists. Thus, for example, Marcos Kaplan writes that at least in the most developed countries of Latin America the state is acquiring the features of a kind of "Creole Leviathan". "The state is increasing its power continuously, thereby becoming the main force of society and the basic factor in the creation of its structure and reproduction mode."²¹

The addressing of this problem is leading Latin American scholars to a higher level of research designed to reveal the dialectics of the interconnection of the economic basis with the political superstructure under the conditions of the accelerated process of capitalist modernization. A trend which is common for the modern capitalist state stands out increasingly distinctly as these problems are studied: it has ceased to play the part of administrator of the affairs of the entire class of the bourgeoisie and is orienting itself increasingly manifestly toward defense of the interests of its local monopoly groups operating in an alliance with the TNC.

The works of the Chilean economist and sociologist R. Lagos Escobar are typical in this respect. Back in 1961 he published an interesting and in-depth study entitled "The Concentration of Economic Power," which examined the process of the strengthening of monopoly trends in the country's economy and the emergence of powerful clans of the financial oligarchy.²² The scholar returned to this subject after the counterrevolutionary coup. Analyzing the class essence of the regime and the structure of power, he emphasized that the key positions in the state are in the hands of the monopoly clans of the financial oligarchy, which exercises its "'absolute hegemony,' subordinating to it other groupings of the bourgeoisie."²³

At the same time, however, Latin American experts are paying increasingly great attention to an analysis of the process of the state's increased relative independence of society. Two questions have attracted their interests: the role of the armed forces in the process of capitalist modernization and the problem of the technobureaucracy, or "state bourgeoisie," as this social group is frequently called.

In speaking of the forms and mechanisms of the interconnection of the armed forces with the ruling classes many Latin American experts have deemed it necessary, without doubting the procapitalist and pro-imperialist sympathies of the upper military strata, to also distinguish other aspects of the problem. According to the Chilean sociologist Hago Semelman, it cannot be reduced to the fact that the armed forces passively serve the interests of the ruling factions of the bourgeoisie, not championing their own corporative-professional goals.²⁴ On the contrary, the growth of the relative autonomous nature of the armed forces is becoming increasingly manifest as the conflicts between different

frictions and groups of the bourgeoisie increase. According to the Brazilian sociologist [Mantega], the assumption of power by the army under these conditions leaves the military certain freedom of maneuver. Thus "the military bureaucracy has its own support which is outside the civilian society--the military corporation."²⁵

The problem connected with a definition of the role of the technobureaucracy is studied in approximately the same key. Thus F. Cardoso emphasizes that its role as an important state mechanism cannot be understood without an analysis of its complex and brokered relations with various groups of the bourgeoisie. According to him, this social group is acquiring increasingly great significance in the running of the state, performing an increasingly active political role and championing its own corporative interests.²⁶

The research into the mechanisms of the functioning of the state and the process of the deepening of its relative independence of society brought the Latin American scholars right up to a study of individual types of political regimes as methods and forms of rule of the ruling classes. Certain differences have been discerned in the approach to this problem. This has been manifested, in particular, in the evaluations of the concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state developed by the Argentine sociologist Guillermo O'Donnell. In his definition at the head of such a state are elite-technocratic groupings connected with the armed forces, the state sector and private enterprise. In the political plane such a state endeavors to stifle the political assertiveness of the masses, employing both methods of terror and repression and forms of corporativist control over the trade unions and other mass organizations. The prerequisites of the emergence of such a state, however, are, according to O'Donnell, the new forms of the accumulation and concentration of capital determining the development of the process of capitalist modernization.²⁷ Thus his concept amounts to the fact that the greatest likelihood of the emergence of an authoritarian-bureaucratic state exists in the Latin American countries which have advanced farther than others along the path of capitalist development. At the same time, however, he opposed the fatal inevitability of the establishment of such a state, calling for an attentive study of the processes in the "civil society" which are capable of preventing the establishment in power of authoritarian regimes.

As a main counterargument, O'Donnell's opponents put forward the proposition that his concept omits the problem of the class nature of the state and absolutizes its form and explained this by the departure of theory from actual premises. Thus, for example, the Guatemalan scholar J. Abrego wrote: "The main thing is to reveal the class essence of the state, in no event concentrating attention on its forms."²⁸ And unequivocally rejecting any usefulness in an analysis of various political forms of rule of one and the same class, the Brazilian sociologist R. Mauro Marini referred to the fact that the bourgeois state in any of its "hypostases," so to speak, is antipopular and repressive.²⁹

As is not difficult to discern, in criticizing O'Donnell's concept his opponents have dissolved the question of political regimes in the problem of definition of the type of state, that is, confined themselves to an ascertainment

of its bourgeois essence, practically ignoring the political forms of the government of various blocs and factions of the ruling classes. Attention was drawn to this fact by, inter alia, Cardoso, who as corroboration of his viewpoint referred to the socioeconomic processes (the monopolization and concentration of capital, worker and social policy and subordination to the imperatives of capitalist modernization), identical in typological essence, which are occurring in, say, Brazil, Mexico or Venezuela. "The economic policy," he wrote, "which is being pursued in Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina or Brazil is generally of the same type, but their political regimes manifestly differ from one another." Cardoso believes that the basis of the assertion that the existence of a military-authoritarian state is absolutely essential for the modernization of capitalism is a "confusion of the political regime concept with the type of state category."³⁰

These disputes are far from academic inasmuch as they reflect actual and important processes occurring in the Latin American countries which testify to an extraordinarily complex and acute struggle around the determination of the further paths of development of the states of the region.

The State and the Problem of the Legitimization of Power

The advancement to the forefront of the problem of the struggle for democracy is a characteristic feature of the modern political thought of Latin America. It is now not only the progressive forces and those of the left which speak of the struggle for democracy; ideologists and leaders of rightwing-authoritarian regimes are swearing allegiance to it, and it is being declared by representatives of various factions and groupings of the bourgeoisie. As a group of progressive Uruguayan scholars emphasizes, "the very concept of democracy is interpreted variously. Thus now ideologists of the ruling classes, the centers of imperialist hegemony and even those whose authoritarian policy is marked by the imprint of bloody repression talk about democracy. However, the contradictions between their words and deeds are so obvious that their declarations elicit only a feeling of loathing." This same document emphasizes that the entire history of Latin America testifies that the struggle for democracy has been inseparably connected with the protests of the people's masses, and the fact that the ruling classes have frequently used the people's democratic aspirations to their own ends is in itself no answer to the question of who the principal character in this struggle was.³¹ The struggle for democracy by no means signifies a return to the past, to, say, the "populist" state with its forms and methods of mobilization of the people's masses.

According to the well-known Peruvian sociologist, Henry Garcia, it is a question of struggle for a renewed democracy representing an integral part of a revolutionary development alternative capable of the radical renewal of society. It is not fortuitous that the ideas of the founders of scientific socialism on democracy and on the ways to build a new classless society are of tremendous interest to the progressive scholars of the continent. In the course of the debates and discussions of these problems much is said, inter alia, about the interpretation of the experience of the Paris Commune in the works of K. Marx and V.I. Lenin as important stages en route to the Marxist-Leninist development of teaching on democracy of the new type. At the same time, however, there is emphasis of the need for study of the ideas of the founders of scientific

socialism and democracy is an integral system of views. Thus opposing the assertion that socialism and democracy are incompatible, the Chilean sociologist Enrique Bernales emphasizes that exceptional importance is attached to the problems of democracy in the works of K. Marx and V.I. Lenin.³² Representatives of the forces of the left refer frequently in their reasoning to K. Marx's well-known ideas which he formulated as a result of an analysis of the experience of the Paris Commune: "The commune is the reverse absorption of state power by society, when society's own vital forces take the place of the forces subordinating and enslaving it; this is a transfer of power to the people's masses themselves, which in place of the organized force of their oppression create their own force; this is the political form of their social liberation, taking the place of the artificial force of society (arrogated to themselves by their oppressors) (their own force which has been counterposed to them and organized against them) used to oppress them by their enemies."³³

What, then, can the ruling classes of Latin America counterpose to a truly democratic state expressing the interests of the people's masses? The answer to this question is not straightforward. Now even the far-right, extremist factions of the ruling classes have been forced to maneuver, employing democratic slogans for demagogic purposes. This is the behavior, for example, of the extreme-right forces in Chile, endeavoring under the flag of "neodemocracy" to legitimize forms of domination which are characterized by a preservation of the fundamentals of repressive and fascistizing authoritarianism. The 1980 constitution, in particular, testifies to this.

The theory of "limited" or "controlled" democracy has become widespread in the ranks of the ruling class of Latin American countries. Its principles were formulated within the framework of the so-called Trilateral Commission which was set up in 1973. It incorporated businessmen, representatives of the political elite, trade union leaders, economists, sociologists and political scientists from the United States, West Europe and Japan. The creators of this theory declare that the classical forms of "representative democracy" are no longer capable of containing the pressure of the struggle of the people's masses. Its institutions are in need of considerable reorganization inasmuch as there are limits to the "endless" expansion of political democracy. In propagandizing the basic postulates of this theory its supporters appeal to the firmness of authoritarian traditions in the Latin American countries and advocate a combination of authoritarian-conservative principles in political life with democracy, unequivocally recognizing the armed forces' right to intervene in politics.³⁴ The Colombian communists emphasize that the process of the implantation of "limited democracy" is characterized by a formal preservation of the facade of "representative democracy," but with the "predominant influence of real military power based on the doctrine of 'national security,' which serves the goals of the struggle against the protests of the people's masses demanding genuinely democratic changes."³⁵

For an understanding of the attitude toward democracy of different groupings and factions of the ruling class considerable significance is attached to an elucidation of their attitude toward the problem of the legitimization of their political domination. This question is attracting the increasingly great attention of progressive Latin American scholars. "The profound contradiction between the

imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the requirements of the exigencies of the legitimization of their domination, which is immanently inherent in the bourgeois state," H. Semelman writes, "is becoming increasingly manifest and acute."³⁶ The Argentine political scientists Juan Carlos Portantero and Emilio de Ipola see the increasingly great attention to these problems as testimony to the strengthening of Marxist political theory.³⁷

How to explain the fact that influential factions and groupings of the bourgeoisie are advocating a liberalization of the policy of rightwing-authoritarian regimes, the development of more flexible methods of policy in respect of the working people's masses and the legitimization of their domination? Answering this question, progressive Latin American scholars employ the deliberations on the interconnection of the state and society of Antonio Gramsci, who, *inter alia*, wrote: "In the East the state was all, and civil society was in a primary, amorphous state. In the West there were regulatory relations between the state and civil society, and if the state began to stagger, the firm structure of civil society appeared. The state was merely the forward trench behind which was a strong chain of fortresses and casemates. Of course, this applies to this state or the other to a greater or less extent, but it is this question which requires a thorough analysis with respect to each nation."³⁸ Carrying these ideas over onto Latin American soil, it may be concluded that the counterrevolutionary coups d'état here have set as their goal the strengthening of the positions of the bourgeoisie in the civil society and the creation of a ramified social system of the defense of capitalism, as in the countries of the West.

However, the paradoxical and at first sight entirely unexpected nature of the situation is that the repressive functions of the state in respect of society have assumed such hypertrophied proportions that it is they which have to a considerable extent objectively hindered the creation of such a system with the help of "a strong chain of fortresses and casemates". And this has been manifested not only in the sociopolitical sphere but, furthermore, in the ideological sphere also. The authoritarian state has pontificated, as it were, from the heights of its Olympus in a spirit of great-power chauvinism, while the "civil society" has had to heed it blindly, not daring to violate the "directive" instructions of the ideologists of the propaganda machinery.

Various factions and groupings of the bourgeoisie greeted the establishment of authoritarian-repressive regimes with satisfaction, hoping to strengthen with their help their own positions. However, in time this kind of "consensus" began to show cracks and the interests of different groups of the bourgeoisie conflicted increasingly with the policy of the authoritarian state. To explain this phenomenon Latin American sociologists and political scientists turn to K. Marx's work "18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," which analyzes in great depth the problem of the mutual relationship of the army and the bourgeoisie in the plane of the unity and, simultaneously, difference of their interests. While appealing to the army in the name of the defense of its privileges the bourgeoisie at the same time is apprehensive lest the military display excessive independence and, in Marx's words, "lay siege to the purse of the bourgeoisie."³⁹

Regarding the basic concept of this work, the Brazilian sociologist Emílio (1972) writes that "the policy of the French bourgeoisie analyzed by Marx helps us understand the recent history of our country."⁴⁰ Indeed, following a period of the bourgeoisie's euphoria in connection with the assumption of power by the military, its manifest cooling toward it has come to be observed in Brazil and in a number of other states. Apart from anything else, the dissatisfaction of its influential factions and groupings with military rule is explained by fears of the state's increased intervention in the economy, as occurred in the process of the creation in Brazil of the system of state-monopoly capitalism, when the interests of individual groupings of entrepreneurs were infringed in the name of the long-term strategic goals of capitalist modernization. This explains, as E. Cardoso and E. Faletto write, the increased anti-statist sentiments of the bourgeoisie, which is insistently demanding a constriction of the sphere of the state's intervention in the economy.⁴¹

To a considerable extent these same factors also explain the Chilean bourgeoisie's dissatisfaction with military rule. Even the inspiration behind the economic policy of the Pinochet regime, Milton Friedman, head of the Chicago School, recently declared: "I believe that the free market policy will disappear if the military government is not replaced by a civilian one.... Otherwise, sooner or later--and sooner rather than later, moreover--economic freedom will be stifled by the authoritarian policy of the armed forces."

Describing the reasons for this position of M. Friedman and the grouping of the Chilean bourgeoisie connected with him, S. Bitar wrote that it is by no means a question of the latter's adherence to democracy or of an endeavor to abandon the antipopular economic "model". These forces merely advocate the strengthening of the foundation of the "free economy," the more so in that the Chilean military also, according to the author, cannot be indifferent to this problem under the conditions of the deepening crisis. They are beginning to ponder the problems of strengthening the economic power of the state,⁴² proceeding from the imperatives of "national security".

The reason for the growing dissatisfaction of the bourgeoisie, including its monopoly factions and groupings connected with the TNC, is to be found in its reluctance to support the economic plan of the extreme-right groupings oriented toward the creation of fascist totalitarian regimes. They prefer a certain synthesis of authoritarian methods of government and the preservation or restoration of certain--even if modified--institutions of "representative democracy" and for this reason advocate the elaboration of a policy of social maneuvering and more flexible methods of political and ideological influence on the masses. In other words, in Latin America also the same trends--with an adjustment for the concrete-historical conditions, naturally--as in the European capitalist countries can be observed in the positions of the local bourgeoisie.

"As the experience of fascist Germany showed," Soviet scholars write, "the monopoly bourgeoisie's handing of emergency powers to the military-bureaucratic machinery, representing for it at a certain stage a way out of and salvation from the immediate threat of proletarian revolution, at the same time does not ease but, on the contrary, intensifies the crisis. The collapse of fascism served as a graphic lesson not only for the peoples but for the imperialist

bourgeoisie also. It is here that an explanation should be sought for the fact that it is far from always and usually circumspectly that it is disposed to resort to fascist methods of domination. It does this only under exceptional circumstances, when there is a threat of its power being overthrown, as a rule.⁴³ Furthermore, the upsurge of the struggle of the working class and working people's masses and democratic processes, which are spreading with increasing strength and depth in countries in which until comparatively recently the positions of reaction were seemingly strong, are influencing the protests of various circles of the bourgeoisie against the most odious aspects of the policy of the authoritarian state.

Thus the authoritarian state has not succeeded in subordinating "civil society" to it and reorganizing it in its own image and likeness. In addition, its policy has led to an exacerbation of the conflicts and given rise to growing forces of resistance in the "civil society". Thus, drawing attention to this process, Brazil's communists emphasize that the "social and economic changes that have been occurring in the country in recent years are strengthening and stimulating the struggle of the civil society. Organized forces demonstrating with increasingly great persistence against tyranny and for freedom, human rights are democracy and strengthening therein."⁴⁴ The forces of resistance in "civil society" are also growing in other countries where rightwing-authoritarian regimes are in power. In Chile, despite the bitter repression of the fascistizing counterrevolution, the struggle of the working class is developing and the aspiration to unity of the democratic forces is growing. Palpable blows have been struck at the dictatorship by the progressive forces of Uruguay, which was shown graphically by the results of the constitutional referendum in November 1980.

Even comparatively recently the ideologists and leaders of the rightwing-authoritarian regimes were prophesying that in the near future all the countries of Latin America would inevitably be taking their path. Time has shown that the peoples of the continent do not wish to be guinea pigs in the experiments of fascistizing counterrevolution. Despite all the difficulties and complexities, the struggle of democratic and progressive forces for a renewed democracy wherein the state would cease to be a tool in the hands of a privileged minority and would serve the interests of the people is developing in Latin America.

FOOTNOTES

1. COMERCIO EXTERIOR No 8, Mexico, p 851.
2. ESTUDIOS S 1, No 79, pp 61, 62.
3. A.G. Frank, "Lumpenburguesia: lumpendesarrollo," Montevideo, 1970.
4. DESARROLLO INDOAMERICANO No 55, Barranquilla, 1980, pp 12, 14.
5. COMERCIO EXTERIOR No 8, 1976, pp 927, 930.
6. ALAI No 48, Montreal, 1980, p 559.

7. ARACUARIA DE CHILE No 13, Madrid, 1981, p 72.
8. CUADERNOS POLITICOS No 15, 1978, pp 41-42.
9. REVISTA MEXICANA DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS Y SOCIALES No 82, Mexico, 1975, pp 33-38.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 4, p 426.
11. ESTUDIOS ANDINOS No 1, Pittsburgh, 1974-1975, p 255.
12. "New Corporatism. Social-Political Structures in the Iberian World," Notre-Dame--London, 1974, p 31.
13. "Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America," Boulder (Colorado), 1980, pp 259, 286.
14. CUADERNOS POLITICOS No 15, 1978, p 32.
15. CIENCIAS SOCIALES No 4, 1978, Mexico, p 127.
16. NUEVA SOCIEDAD No 55, Caracas, 1981, pp 7, 17.
17. REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA No 2, Mexico, 1977, pp 363-364.
18. ESTRATEGIA No 33, Mexico, 1980, p 66.
19. V.I. Lenin, "Complete Works," vol 33, p 336.
20. "Political Mechanisms of Monopoly Dictatorship," Moscow, 1974, p 8.
21. DESARROLLO INDOAMERICANO No 44, 1978, pp 37, 40.
22. R. Lagos Escobar, "La concentracion del poder economico," Santiago de Chile, 1961, pp 166-167.
23. CHILE-AMERICA No2 72-73, Rome, 1981, p 91.
24. REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA No 4, 1978, p 835.
25. Ibid., No 4, 1976, pp 889-890.
26. Ibid., No 3, 1975, pp 624-625.
27. Ibid., No 1, 1977, p 14.
28. CIENCIAS SOCIALES No 7, Guatemala, 1980, p 31.
29. ALAI No 6, 1980, pp 63-65.
30. E.F. Cardoso. "On the Characterization of the Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," Cambridge, 1977, p 25.

31. ALAI No 41, 1980, p 488.
32. "America Latina 80: Democracia y movimiento popular," Lima, 1981, pp 12, 49-50, 95.
33. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 17, p 548.
34. VISION No 10, Mexico, 1981, pp 6-12.
35. TRIBUNA DEL 13 CONGRESO PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE COLOMBIA No 1, 1980, p 6.
36. ALAI No 6, 1980, p 52.
37. NUEVA SOCIEDAD No 54, 1981, p 9.
38. A. Gramsci, "Selected Works," vol III, Moscow, 1959, p 200.
39. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 8, p 136.
40. CUADERNOS DE CEAS No 68, San Salvador, No 68, 1980, p 8.
41. REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA No 2, 1977, p 378.
42. See CHILE-AMERICA Nos 76-77, 1982, pp 28-29.
43. F.M. Burlatskiy, A.A. Galkin, "Sociology. Politics. International Relations," Moscow, 1974, pp 194-195.
44. "Teses para uno Debate Nacional de Comunistas para Legalizado Partido Comunista Brasileiro," Voz de unidade, Sao Paulo, 8 May 1981. Suplemento especial, p 18.

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MEXICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION WEAKENS PRI INFLUENCE ON WORKERS

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 48-59

[Article by Yu.I. Andreyeva: "Problems of the Country's Development and the Proletariat's Struggle"]

[Text] Presidential elections were held on 4 July 1982 in Mexico, victory at which went to the PRI, which has been in power unchanged since 1929. Its candidate, Miguel de la Madrid Urtado, was elected head of state and government for a 6-year term. He will take office this December.

In connection with this event LATINSKAYA AMERIKA offers for the readers' attention a selection of articles which analyze the domestic and foreign policy and social and economic aspects of the contemporary life of Mexico--one of the biggest and most developed Latin American countries which is playing an ever increasing part in continental and world affairs.

The appreciable changes in the alignment of class forces that have occurred under the impact of the monopolization of the economy and the centralization of capital and scientific-technical progress have led to the emergence of new trends in the Mexican workers' movement. The proletariat now constitutes approximately one-half of the economically active population, numbering over 8 million. The industrial nucleus of the working class is strengthening and the numbers of the skilled factory-plant proletariat, which is concentrated at increasingly large enterprises, are increasing with the development of modern and the modernization of the traditional industrial sectors. Of the 5.15 million industrial workers, the factory-plant proletariat constitutes over 73 percent, and of these up to 43 percent are employed at enterprises employing more than 200 persons. Some 40 percent of the workers of processing industry are employed in the sectors producing producer goods.¹ The rapprochement with the proletariat in terms of work conditions and economic position of part of the technical intelligentsia and employees is leading to a broadening of the base of the workers' movement.

All these factors are creating new conditions and opportunities for a rise in the ideological-political level of the proletariat and its organization. In industry the proportion of workers and employees associated in trade unions

constitutes 38.6 percent, whereas the average for the country is 15 percent. The level of syndicalization in power engineering amounts to almost 98 percent, in transport 85 percent and in the extractive sectors 78.6 percent. At the same time, however, it amounts to only 3 percent approximately in agriculture and the service sectors.²

In parallel with this process the increased concentration of production and the centralization of capital have led to the growth of local monopoly groups. Currently 50 financial-industrial associations control the 300 biggest enterprises producing up to 45 percent of GNP.³ The strengthening of the local monopolies, the close interweaving of their interests with those of foreign capital and the rapid penetration of the TNC in the most important sectors of the economy together with scientific-technical progress are exacerbating the class conflicts.

In the 1970's this was expressed, in particular, in the fact that together with strikes and demonstrations for higher wages, in the course of which a number of economic demands were put forward, a mass struggle developed for the liberation of the unions from the influence of the machinery of state and the union bureaucracy, there was an upsurge of the independent peasant movement and the demonstrations of all democratic, anti-imperialist forces increased. A crisis of the party system was discerned in the new political situation of the 1970's: on the one hand numerous parties and groupings of the left were formed, on the other, the disagreements within the existing parties deepened.

Under the conditions of the polarization of political forces the ruling circles began to pay special attention to the policy of social maneuvering in order with the help of social programs to "integrate" the workers' movement into the capitalist system and prevent the development of the class consciousness and struggle of the proletariat.

A most important part in alleviating the class conflicts has been assigned the media of ideological influence on the working class, primarily refinement and dissemination of the concept of the workers' "coparticipation" in the creation of the modern "industrial society". The worker's well-being is linked merely with the correct organization of the system of production and labor, which can allegedly be achieved by the common efforts of the unions, businessmen and the state. For this reason the working people are being called on to follow the "new form of class consciousness," which implies their active participation in the solution of economic and social problems within the framework of the bourgeois state.⁴ Even in the period of President L. Echeverria's term of office (1970-1976) numerous "funds" and committees made up of representatives of the machinery of state, businessmen and the unions were formed which extended the working people's rights in the solution of a number of social problems. There was a considerable increase in state appropriations for the building of educational institutions and certain changes to social legislation were made which increased the number of categories of working people covered by social security. The stimulation of government activity in the social sphere, which was persistently propagandized in the bourgeois press, contributed to a decline for a certain time in the wave of strike protests.

However, in the fall of 1973 the intensity of the strike movement again increased sharply, reaching in October of the following year the record figure for many years of 2,000. This was caused by the exacerbation of the crisis phenomena in the country. The serious difficulties encountered by the L. Echeverria government, primarily the shortage of capital, entailed a rapid growth of the foreign debt, increased inflation and a drop in the working people's real income. By July 1976 the prices of consumer goods had almost doubled compared with 1973. For the first time in 22 years the Mexican peso was devalued and a floating exchange rate for it was introduced in the fall of 1976.

The L. Echeverria government then increased workers' and employees' wages 14-23 percent. At the same time price increases for 100 consumer commodities were limited to 10 percent.⁵ However, owing to violations on the part of businessmen and merchants, the actual price rises were considerably above this level. For this reason the main trade union centers put forward the demand for a wage increase of an average of 65 percent. The workers were convinced that the government's social policy not only had not contributed to a redistribution of national wealth to their benefit but had not prevented the decline in their living standard. Even the president himself acknowledged that the government's social policy had not achieved its original goals.⁶

The new government headed by President J. Lopez Portillo, which took office in 1976, set course toward economies in state spending, including spending for social needs. An important place in the anti-inflation measures was occupied by wage-freeze programs. This policy was given an ideological basis also. The idea of the "cointerparticipation" of the working people, private capital and the state in the solution of the problems of stabilization and modernization of the economy under the slogan of the nation's unification in the "fight for production" was advanced to the forefront. In practice, however, this led to a broadening of the "partnership" of the leaders of the main unions and the state in the solution of economic and social problems by way of administrative reforms, which increased the elements of collegiality in controlling the state economy, with the help of the extensive attraction of private capital.

In the channel of this policy the so-called Workers Bank was founded; agreements were signed between the Mexican Workers Confederation (MCC) and several other trade union centers on the one hand and the National Company of Fertilizer Subsidies on the other on the creation of consumer stores; and the activity of the National Credit Fund,⁷ which had been formed earlier, was stepped up. In turn, in 1977 the trade union bureaucracy agreed to limit wage demands, actually orienting the workers toward maintenance of the existing income level, although the cost of living was increasing rapidly. Only as a result of active struggle in 1978 and 1979 did the proletarian manage to extend the framework of the limitation of wage increases "voluntarily" proposed by the union leaders to 12-15 percent.⁸

Wage control together with other anti-inflation measures of the government brought about a decline in real work income and the absolute amounts of personal consumption. According to ECLA data, in the period 1974-1977 a slowing of the growth of the real guaranteed minimum wage was observed in

declined in 1977 for the first time in many years it declined in absolute terms.⁹ In the period 1978-1980 the working people's average real wage continued to decline. Despite the improvement in the main economic indicators, price increases amounted to almost 30 percent in 1980. As the report of the National Communist Party (NCP) Central Committee pointed out at the 19th congress in May 1981, the anti-inflation measures had brought the monopoly haute bourgeoisie additional profits, yet inflation "is practically beyond the government's control."¹⁰ The entire brunt of the economic crisis and its consequences was borne directly by working people.

Under these conditions the Lopez Portillo government implemented certain political reforms. A general amnesty for political prisoners was declared in April 1977, and a law extending the opposition parties' participation in parliamentary elections was passed in May 1978. The Communist Party was officially registered in the elections, but its institutionalization was made conditional on it obtaining no less than 1.5 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections in July 1979.

The intensification of the ideological struggle for the trade unions under the conditions of the upsurge of the workers' movement reflected the existing crisis of the trade union structure which had been discerned in the first half of the 1970's. Influential democratic movements and groups had emerged in 1972-1976 in the United Electrical Workers Union ("Democratic Tendency") and in the national union of miners and metal workers, railroad workers, auto workers and others. By 1975 some 150,000 workers had in the course of a persistent struggle quit progovernment organizations and set up trade unions on a class basis. The Telephone Workers Union was freed from PRI control in 1976. Official recognition of their unions was later achieved by many categories of employees: university lecturers and maintenance staff, specialists with degrees, civil servants and bank and trading employees, that is, categories of wage workers the majority of whom had been prohibited by Mexican law from associating in unions and striking. Some 36 unions of university and other educational institution workers embracing 60,000 persons were set up altogether.¹¹

Steps were also taken to set up a single coordinating center of the trade union struggle--the National Popular Action Front. However, formulating a common program and tactics of the associations constituting it was not successful.¹² A principal obstacle in the way of the expansion and development of the movement for the democratization of trade union life was the ideological, political and organizational disconnection of the independent unions and currents.

The leaders of the "Democratic Tendency" of electrical engineers presented the concept of revolutionary nationalism. Having proclaimed socialism the main goal of the workers' movement, they linked it with the struggle against imperialism within the framework of the development of "permanent Mexican revolution". They considered the main impediment in the way of revolution the existing trade union structure and called for its replacement on a democratic basis. They assigned the "progressive sectors" of the ruling PRI an important part in this process. Party bourgeois syndicalist concepts were

...movement aimed at converting the unions into a self-sufficient force capable of solving all the problems confronting the working class, stress was on virtually independent trade unions. Autonomy from the ruling party and the state was proclaimed the basic guarantee of their successful activity. Anarchist, isolationist sentiments and concepts found favorable soil for their development in these unions. The proletariat is proclaimed the sole revolutionary force in society and the trade unions the sole proletarian "party". The Christian democratic tendency prevailed in certain organizations.

However, the trend toward defense of the class positions of the trade unions was manifested increasingly distinctly among the trade union masses. This was largely connected with the fact that new personnel from the ranks of the working class had blended into the leadership of the middle tier of the organization in the course of the working people's struggle. The influence of the communists in the miner and metal worker, railroad worker and education and university worker union broadened.¹⁴

The liberals also attacked the bureaucratic leadership of the unions. This was expressed in a weakening of the positions of rightwing leaders both in the main propaganda organization--the M&C--and in a number of other trade union centers, where groups of democratically-minded leaders frequently began to strive for solutions which ran counter to the class collaborationist line of the ruling upper strata.¹⁵ The exacerbation of the disagreements and the split in its ranks were, in particular, the reason for a certain reorientation in the policy of the bureaucratic leaders of the M&C. They began to take account to a greater extent in their programs of the working people's demands. The growing pressure on the policy of the "official" union leaders on the part of the independent trade union movement and the democratically-minded leaders became an increasingly important factor of the further democratization of union life. Despite the fact that the bureaucratic leaders continued to retain the dominant positions in the leadership of the organizations, the conduct of the broad union masses came to determine their position increasingly.

A qualitatively new stage in the process of the democratization of the unions had arrived by the end of the 1970's: the democratic movement within the management unions had strengthened and been stimulated markedly, and its contacts with the independent worker associations had expanded. The achievement of trade union unity on the basis of a joint struggle program became increasingly urgent. In January 1978 two major associations of working people--the Mexican Electrical Workers Union and the Mexican Domestic Telephone Workers Union--concluded a pact on mutual assistance. The reformist and most liberal leaders of a number of major trade union centers then came out with the declaration of a "national assembly of the revolution" with the participation of representatives of both the official unions and the independent associations of working people. The First National Assembly of the Congress of Labor was held in July 1978. It reflected on the one hand the endeavor of the bureaucratic leaders and the government to maintain influence in the trade unions and subordinate the democratic organizations to themselves, and on the other, their participation in a number of important issues occurred under the influence of the struggle of the broad union masses.

The mere fact of the participation of representatives of the democratic trade unions in the assembly of the official trade union association--the Congress of Labor--and the possibility accorded them of forwarding alternative proposals with respect to a way out of the protracted economic crisis being found testified to the successes of the working people's struggle. Most important socioeconomic demands such as nationalization of the main industrial sectors, financial reform, limitation of the activity of the monopolies and others were inserted in the economic program adopted at the assembly. For the first time at their official forum the bureaucratic leaders spoke in support of the struggle of a number of democratic unions and their official recognition and discussed the question of the legal grounds of the existence of unions of a different political persuasion. However, the assembly did not formulate any measures for the realization of the economic program which it had adopted. Despite the very limited nature of its results, it was, as the Mexican communists believed, a positive step in the struggle for the unity of the unions and for their formulation of a joint alternative program for overcoming the economic crisis.¹⁶

A characteristic feature of the workers' movement of recent times has been the participation in the strike struggle of workers of practically all sectors of industry, transport, the services' sphere and so forth. Whereas in 1975-1977 there was an annual average of 500 strikes, approximately 600 were recorded in 1978 and up to 900 in 1979.¹⁷ The assertive position of workers with high general educational and technical training and a broader social outlook is leading to the growing complexity of the motives for protest and the forms and methods of struggle and the increased organization, aggressiveness and fruitfulness of the protests. An increasingly large place in the strike struggle is being occupied by major sectorial strikes aimed against mass dismissals connected with the technical reorganization of production, against restrictions on wage increases and other anti-inflation measures and for an improvement in work conditions as a result of the revision of collective contracts. Tens of thousands of people often take part in such strikes. Thus in 1978-1980 there were sectorial national strikes of electrical engineers (20,000), textile workers (25,000), telephone workers (22,000), rubber and sugar industry workers (42,000), railroad workers (10,000) and of a number of other sectors.¹⁸

Strikes by workers of a group of enterprises of this sector or the other by geographical region are being practised increasingly extensively. In 1978, for example, workers of the 12 biggest metallurgical and mining enterprises of Monterey demonstrated for the democratization of union life and against dismissals; and 15,000 bus drivers of the north of the country and large-scale detachments of power engineers struck in 1979-1980.¹⁹ Such protests are in the majority of cases short-term and effective. Together with these "graduated" or "increasing" strikes, work stoppages or slowdowns and hunger and other strikes are becoming increasingly widespread. Thus in 1978 railroad telegraph operators successfully employed hunger strikes in combination with "graduated" strikes. If the ruling circles go for compulsory arbitration in the solution of labor conflicts or resort to reprisals to end the strikes, the workers employ diverse, frequently political methods of struggle: together with protest marches, meetings and demonstrations they address their demands directly to the representatives of state power.

The mass enlistment in the strike struggle of workers employed at enterprises of General Motors, General Electric, the Anaconda Corporation, Volkswagen, Kelvinator and others is imparting an anti-imperialist thrust to the entire workers' movement. Protests against American imperialism's interference in the country's internal affairs together with the demands for democratic transformations are being heard increasingly often in the course of mass demonstrations of large-scale detachments of the proletariat of modern sectors of industry²⁰ and testify to the growth of its class consciousness, contributing to a weakening of the influence of economism and reformism in the workers' movement.

However, the influence of national-reformist ideology which was predominant in the unions for many years is still reflected in the proletariat to a large extent, particularly at small-scale and medium-sized enterprises of the traditional sectors, where the level of education and degree of organization of the workers are lower, as a rule, than at the large-scale enterprises. And in certain modern sectors of heavy industry the process of the growth of the proletariat's class consciousness is extremely complex. Thus the influence of the ideas of reformism and economism is still quite strong among the oil workers. On the other hand, avant-gardist, anarcho-syndicalist tendencies are being engendered among some metal workers and electrical engineers. Such phenomena are explained to a certain extent by objective historical conditions of the formation of this detachment of the proletariat or the other. But in addition to this they are being encouraged by the ruling circles, which are perfecting their methods of influencing the working class within the framework of the state-monopoly structure.

An important part in the modernization of capitalism is being played in Mexico by the socioeconomic development program being implemented by the state based on an extension of the production and exports of oil. The certain economic growth and the possibilities for a more flexible social policy (the creation of new jobs, an increase in wages and a reduction in taxes for the most organized and skilled workers and such) are being used by the bourgeoisie to strengthen the ideological offensive against the working class. "Coparticipation" slogans are being preached increasingly persistently. Thus attempts are being made to create in the workers the illusion of the possibility of the solution of socioeconomic problems under the conditions of capitalism. Reformist policy is undoubtedly impeding the growth of the workers' class consciousness. However, in the future the development of neocapitalist modernization being effected in the interests of monopoly capital will lead to a further deepening of class and social conflicts and the growth of the proletariat's struggle.

In the situation of the growing role of the working class and its mass organizations and the strengthening trend toward the renewal of the structure of the unions on a democratic basis particularly great significance is attached to the elaboration of a politically substantiated platform corresponding both to the current demands of the struggle of the trade unions and the prospects of the country's social development. At the 18th congress in May 1977 the MCP analyzed the process of democratization and politicization which had embraced the unions. A national party conference in December 1978 was devoted to questions of the communists' tactics in the trade union movement. The communists

were set the task of participating in the work of all trade union organizations without exception, regardless of their ideological and political persuasion, guided by the MCP's program of struggle for immediate socioeconomic reforms and the country's democratic renewal.²¹ The tactics of broad alliances pursued by the communists under the conditions of the radicalization of the working people's masses and all progressive forces and active struggle for the ideological and political independence of the working class are creating more favorable conditions than hitherto for the increased influence of progressive proletarian ideology.

Abiding by the decisions of the 18th congress on the development of the policy of broad alliances of the democratic forces, the Communist Party is implementing this policy actively. Taking into account the trend toward the rapprochement of the parties and organizations of the left, the MCP presented in the 1979 election campaign the initiative of the creation of a coalition of forces of the left based on a joint program and a single list of candidates. In February 1979 the coalition, which included the MCP, the Mexican People's Party (MPP), the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Socialist Unity and Action Movement (SUAP), put forward common candidates for the country's parliament.

At the elections of 1 July 1979 the coalition of forces of the left won an impressive victory, taking third place among the seven political parties which participated. The MCP obtained 18 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. For the first time in the last 33 years the MCP was recognized as a legal political party. At the 19th congress in March 1981 the party, proceeding from an analysis of the concrete situation, put forward an antimonopoly and anti-imperialist program of struggle for the democratic renewal of the country's political and socioeconomic life and the creation of a broad coalition of all left and democratic forces.²²

The 20th MCP Congress was held in October 1981. Developing the ideas put forward at the 18th congress, the question of the creation of a mass revolutionary party of the working class as an essential factor in the struggle for democratic and antimonopoly transformations with a prospect of socialism was examined in the course of it. Proceeding from an evaluation of the political situation in the country and the growth of the trend toward the unity of forces of the left, the congress reached the conclusion of the possibility of the creation of a united party of the left. The Mexican United Socialist Party (MUSP), which nominated Arnolfo Martinez Verdugo presidential candidate at the July 1982 elections, was formed in November 1981 at the constituent assembly of five parties of the left--the MCP, MPP, SUAP, RSP and the Popular Action Movement (PAM).

The First MUSP Congress, which adopted a declaration of principles and party program and statutes, was held in March 1982. The documents emphasize that the MUSP is a revolutionary party of the working class guided in its activity by the teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin and proclaiming as the ultimate goal the building of socialism.

Proceeding from the internal political situation in Mexico, the party believes that the main strategic task is unification under the leadership of the working class of all democratic forces.²³

The struggle for democratic transformations, which is currently being moved to the forefront, will, as the party documents observe, make it possible to unite the broadest circles of Mexican society around the working class and create the basis for the development of an "alternative force" capable of accomplishing a socialist revolution.²⁴

The program of democratic demands set forth in the documents was the point of departure for the party's election campaign. Making active use of this "campaign," which was termed a "march for democracy," the MUSP endeavored in the course of it to strengthen its ranks and extend its influence among the workers and all democratic forces of the population.

Although the process of the organizational development of the party is not yet complete, the number of its members is increasing constantly. Numerous meetings, demonstrations, television speeches and other election acts organized by the MUSP have contributed to strengthening the party's influence in the masses. Striking testimony to this is the fact that at the final meeting of the party's election campaign, which was held on 19 June in Mexico City's main square--Socalo--up to 100,000 persons gathered in front of the presidential palace. It developed into a powerful demonstration by forces advocating profound democratic change.

At the election on 4 July 1982, in which nine political parties participated, 821,990 votes (3.65 percent) were cast for Martinez Verdugo; the congressional candidates from the MUSP obtained 915,370 votes (4.37 percent), which was 210,000 more than obtained by the coalition of left forces at the 1979 parliamentary elections. Having achieved a considerable success at the elections, the MUSP has become the country's third political force. It will be represented in the Congress by 17 deputies.²⁵

The important political successes of the united party of forces of the left are revealing new prospects for strengthening the influence of the proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard in the Mexican working people's masses.

FOOTNOTES

1. Estimated from "IX Censo General de poblacion. 1970". Resumen General, Mexico, 1973; "X Censo Industrial. 1975". Resumen General, Mexico, 1978.
2. CUADERNOS POLITICOS No 7, Mexico, 1976.
3. CUADERNOS DEL CES No 23, Mexico, 1977.
4. G. Ortega Molina, "El sindicalismo contemporaneo en Mexico," Mexico, 1975, pp 28-30, 76-80, 97-100; F. Gonzales Pineda, A. Delhumeau, "Los mexicanos frente al poder (participacion y cultura politica de los mexicanos)," Mexico, 1973, pp 219-230.
5. FORO INTERNACIONAL No 3175, Mexico, 1979, p 392.
6. Ye.S. Pestkovskaya, "Evolution of Mexico's Class Structure in the Period of Stable Development," Moscow, 1979, p 105.

7. EL DIA, Mexico, 22 February 1978; FORO INTERNACIONAL No 3175, 1979, pp 390-401.
8. ESTRATEGIA No 20, Mexico, 1978, p 37.
9. "Progreso economico y social en America Latina. Banco interamericano de desarrollo. Informe 1978," Washington, 1978, p 354; ESTRATEGIA No 20, 1978, p 58.
10. OPOSICION, Mexico, 25 January 1981; 15 March 1981.
11. ESTRATEGIA No 9, 1976, pp 29, 45, 63-64; P Gomez, "Democracia y crisis en Mexico," Mexico, 1976, p 83.
12. Por la libertad y democracia sindicales. XVIII Congreso nacional. Mexico, 1977, p 55-56.
13. CUADERNOS POLITICOS No 5, pp 48-62; ESTRATEGIA No 21, 1978, pp 60-62.
14. J.S. Castro, "Nuevos problemas y nuevos enfoques sobre el movimiento sindical," Mexico, 1979, p 7; OPOSICION 15 March 1981.
15. EXCELSIOR, Mexico, 31 January 1977.
16. NEXOS, Mexico No 14, 1979, pp 7-9; OPOSICION 20-26 August 1978, pp 3, 9-10.
17. INFORMACION SISTEMATICA, Mexico Nos 37, 39; 1979; OPOSICION 12-19 August 1979.
18. OPOSICION 7 December 1980; EL DIA, Mexico, 30 June 1978; INFORMACION SISTEMATICA Nos 37, 38, 1979.
19. EXCELSIOR 25, 27 April 1978; INFORMACION SISTEMATICA Nos 37, 38, 1979; NEXOS No 14, 1979.
20. ESTRATEGIA No 9, 1976, pp 46, 63-64; INFORMACION SISTEMATICA No 38, 1979; OPOSICION 15 March 1981.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. ASI ES, Mexico, 16-22 April 1982.
24. "Marcha por la democracia. Primera etapa de la gira de A. Martinez Verdugo," Mexico, 1982; ASI ES 16-22 April 1982, pp 21-28.
25. EXCELSIOR 16 July 1982.

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ROLE OF MEXICAN PRI, PRESIDENCY EXAMINED

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[Article by K.D. Garibashvili: "Certain Singularities of the Political Structure"]

[Text] The right to create political associations is enshrined in the 1917 Mexican Constitution. But the main feature of domestic political life is the historically evolved actual monopoly of power of the PRI, which has ruled the country since 1929. The interpretation of the concepts of the 1910-1917 Mexican revolution adopted by its ideologists has been made the basis of the party's ideological principles and program goals. The concept interpreted thus envisages at this stage the preservation and consolidation of the domination of the national bourgeoisie with simultaneous reliance on the people's masses and consideration of their anti-imperialist sentiments and social demands. It would seem that such dualism bears the imprint of the bourgeois-democratic nature of the 1910-1917 Mexican revolution. While essentially bourgeois, at different moments of its history the Mexican state has also appealed to a greater or lesser extent to democratic values, endeavoring to gain the support of broad strata of the people.

While adhering to the standpoints of bourgeois nationalism and a reformist position, the party leadership declares here the need for the elimination of exploitation in the country and the creation of a society based on the "principles of social justice". The program documents of the party emphasize that its main goal is "the building of a new society in which man will realize his potential in full, enjoying the benefits of justice, freedom and democracy."

PRI theorists endeavor to present the party as a supraclass and all-people party and as the "party of the working people" even. As proof of this postulate, reference is made to the fact that the PRI has a multiclass social base and its members are the representatives of the most varied strata of Mexican society: the declaration of the party's principles proclaims that it "consists of peasants, workers, employees, officials, specialists and the intelligentsia, petty and medium-scale industrialists, traders and landowners."*

* "Declaración de los Principios," TIEMPO, Mexico, 3 October 1972, p 13.

The PRI has a precise and well-"oiled" internal organization in which great attention is paid to the mutual relations of the central and local party bodies. At the same time, however, the organization of party life is constructed on the principles of strict bureaucratic centralism. The decisive say in the determination of party affairs and the shaping of its policy belongs to the PRI leadership.

Having been in power for several dozen years, the PRI has in fact grown together with the machinery of state. The process of this interpenetration has become so deep that a party-state bloc has taken shape whose representatives in the shape of the party-state bureaucracy exercise all power in the country. Members of the government, the highest state officials, and the leaders of trade unions and peasant organizations under PRI control are enlisted, as a rule, in the formulation of the PRI's political line.

The party machinery is divided into three sectors uniting all the main social forces of the country by way of incorporation in the party of the corresponding organizations with collective membership status. These are the worker, agrarian and so-called "popular" sectors (the latter was created later, in the 1950's, for the incorporation of the bourgeoisie). The biggest collective member is still the agrarian sector of the PRI represented by the National Peasant Confederation and the Agrarian Communities League. The worker sector of the PRI incorporates the majority of the trade unions, including the Mexican Workers Confederation and the Federation of Civil Servant Unions. The "popular sector" incorporates the National Confederation of Public Organizations, craftsmen, small-scale businessmen, cooperative organizations and cultural, youth, women's and other public organizations.* Together with collective membership the PRI Statutes also provide for individual admittance to the party.

With all its strict centralization the PRI permits (within appropriate limits) different currents within it. The party has right and left wings, whose existence makes it possible to perceive the changes in the public mood more sensitively and adapt flexibly to the demands of the moment.

The same tendency also operates in fact in respect of the remaining parties which exist in the country--both right and left. While maintaining firm control over power--particularly in recent years--the PRI even encourages a strengthening of opposition forces to a certain extent in order to have an opportunity to accomplish more effective social maneuvering, while at the same time "decompressing" the intensity of class conflicts, which is increasing in connection with the growing crisis in the country.

While permitting the opposition a certain freedom of action, the PRI keeps an attentive eye here on the limits of this freedom. The ruling party resorts to the most varied forms of control of the opposition, as far as even the elementary "subsidizing of its leaders and granting them various sinecures in the machinery of state."**

* "Political Parties. Handbook," Moscow, 1981, p 300.

** P. Gonzalez Casanova, "La democracia en Mexico," Mexico, 1965, p 12.

According to the 1917 constitution (article 40), Mexico is a representative republic. A distinctive concept of representation has evolved in the country. On the one hand the president and his associates are endowed with broad powers enabling them to exercise their power without special restrictions (certain Mexican experts connect this singularity of the state system with the objective need for a strong authority which had arisen by the 1920's since prior to this the country had grown weary of the long "sedition"). A mechanism for limiting this power was created at the same time. The constitution (article 83) categorically prohibits renewed occupancy of the presidency to all who have at some time exercised the functions of chief of the executive authority (and this article is fulfilled unswervingly). This prohibition applies not only to the president but also the vice president and persons who have been acting president of Mexico. The effect of this constitutional prohibition is eased somewhat with respect to members of parliament. A deputy cannot be reelected a deputy or a senator a senator, however, the election of a deputy as senator and senator as deputy is permitted by federal election legislation.

The procedure of the election of the president and the formation of the chambers of Mexico's highest representative institution is regulated by the 1917 constitution and the 1973 Federal Election Law. Not only is the country's highest representative body completely replaced every 6 years, a new president is elected also.

In accordance with the constitution (article 82), a native Mexican, the son of Mexican parents, who has reached the age of 35 may become president of the country. A presidential candidate must have lived in the country for no less than 1 year by election day. Mexicans who belong to a religious profession and are ministers of any religion or are on active military service cannot be presidential candidates (legally this restriction is explained by the fact that by virtue of their profession priests and servicemen are subordinate to the strict discipline of the corporation to which they belong and at the same time exert a specific influence on their congregation or service subordinates. But the hostility of the church and the army to the revolution and the statehood which it created which existed at the time of the adoption of the 1917 constitution were also reflected here). Nor can the top civil servants be presidential candidates unless they resign no less than 6 months prior to the elections. The country's Basic Law stipulates a further qualification--in accordance with the tradition which has evolved in Mexico, an essential condition of being a presidential candidate is that this person has to be a member of the ministerial cabinet. Many Mexican presidents--Emilio Portes Hill, Pasqual Ortiz Rubio, Miguel Aleman, Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez, Gustavo Ordaz Diaz and Luis Echeverria Alvarez--were cabinet members (the majority were ministers of the interior) prior to their election. Prior to assuming presidential office, Plutarcho Elias Calles was in charge of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, while Jose Lopez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid headed the Ministry of Finance and State Credit in the government of their predecessors.*

The process of the election of the president of the republic in Mexico incorporates two main stages.

* D. Cadena, "El candidato Presidencial 1976," Mexico, 1976, pp 225-226.

At the first the presidential candidate is nominated. In accordance with federal election law, the right to nominate presidential candidates is enjoyed by officially registered national political parties. The practice whereby for nomination of its presidential candidate a party convenes a special congress at which together with the election of the presidential candidate a program document is adopted representing the party's election platform has become widespread. The parties submit their presidential candidates to the Federal Election Commission for registration, after which the candidate of the governing PRI is declared the official candidate and the candidates of the remaining parties the unofficial candidates.

At the second stage the presidential elections proper are held. Thus the question of the election of the new president is actually decided long before the election and represents the political prerogative of the ruling circles of the PRI. Throughout the PRI's time in office in Mexico its candidate has always defeated the presidential candidates from the other political parties. An appreciable part here is, naturally, also played by the position of the head of state who is in office at this time.

The very procedure of nomination of the official presidential candidate, who becomes head of the Mexican government, is conducted behind closed doors.*

Any presidential election in Mexico could provide an idea of the procedure of the election of the president. The 1976 election could be cited as an example. Originally the majority of PRI leaders preferred the representative of the party's conservative wing, State Secretary Mario Moya Palencia. Other names were mentioned immediately prior to nomination of the official presidential candidate. The candidacy of Jose Lopez Portillo did not enjoy extensive support in the PRI's leading circles. However, it was on his election that President Luis Echeverria Alvarez insisted. The struggle over the issue of nomination of the official presidential candidate went on for a long time in the upper reaches of the party hidden from the eyes of outsiders. The candidacy of J. Lopez Portillo, who enjoyed the support of President L. Echeverria, was confirmed at the Eighth National Assembly of the PRI in September 1975.

By virtue of the above-mentioned reasons, the change of presidents in Mexico exerts a big influence on the country's entire machinery of state. But this applies not only the change of individuals. The new president sometimes changes not only the composition of the highest echelon of federal executive authority but also, within the limits of its authority, makes changes to the structure of the machinery of state. As distinct from other republics with a presidential form of government, where the highest representative bodies participate in this form or the other in the appointment of ministers, the Federal Congress in Mexico is removed both formally and in fact from the process of formation of the government. The appointment and removal of the highest officials of federal executive authority constitutes the exclusive prerogative of the president of the republic.

* "Mexico Hoy," Mexico, 1979, p 259.

Having charted the political line, the head of the federal executive authority selects the corresponding executants for its implementation. As a rule, the president nominates for the highest government offices his closest assistants. However, despite the weightiness of his powers, the president is forced to take account in the process of the selection of colleagues of the position of various influential forces of the country. Thus in accordance with evolved tradition in Mexico, the head of state annually addresses the banker, industrialist and merchant associations. These appearances are of a purely practical nature for the associations of business circles exert a big influence on the assignment of executive personnel of the machinery of party and state.* In selecting the highest administrative employees and leaders of ministries and other departments the Mexican president takes into consideration the demands of the leaders of the PRI also.

The president's consideration of a whole number of factors exerting a direct or indirect influence on the work of the executive authority and the multifermity of criteria taken into account in the selection of people to fill ministerial positions are determined by the framework of intraparty political tactics, the social thrust of the policy of the ruling circles essentially remaining unchanged. The multiparty system which exists in the country affords the ruling class room for maneuver, but does not confront it with the need (as is the case in a number of bourgeois countries of West Europe and in Japan) to overcome the serious difficulties connected on the one hand with the need to take account of the interests of different groupings and parties of the "establishment" and, on the other, to defend itself against the powerful pressure of popular, democratic forces. The influence on the ruling circles both from the right and from the left is exercised in more concealed, intermediary forms different from those which usually operate in countries with classical bourgeois democracy.

The staffing of the federal executive authority machinery in fact represents the political prerogative of the PRI alone. Since its creation the Mexican Federal Government has always been one-party in composition. The country lacks an institution of the government's parliamentary responsibility to the Congress. Both de jure and de facto the federal government is independent both of the Congress and the parliamentary elections. The highest representative body may remove individual ministers only by the judicial procedure stipulated by the 1917 constitution (article 108). But this procedure of the Congress's removal of federal ministers, while legally permissible, has never yet been applied.

Mexico's highest representative body consists of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. In accordance with the 1917 constitution, the principle of their equality was made the basis of the chambers' interaction. Neither the Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies enjoys any constitutional advantages with respect to the other. The legal status of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies is basically identical. However, there are certain differences between them manifested primarily in the procedure of their formation.

* N.N. Razumovich, "Who Rules in Latin America and How. The Political System of the Latin American Countries," Moscow. 1967, p 88.

The Senate of the Mexican Federal Congress is elected for 6 years. In accordance with the constitution, it is the body of the members of the federation which expresses and defends the interests of the states at a national level. The basis of the formation of the Senate, according to the constitution, is the principle of equal representation: each state (and also the federal capital district) elects two senators by direct vote in accordance with the plurality majority electoral system.

The second chamber of the Mexican Federal Congress--the Chamber of Deputies--is elected for a term of 3 years. For its formation the 1917 constitution also established a plurality majority electoral system, which for a long time served the PRI as a dependable instrument for electoral victory. And although adjustments have often been made to this system, nonetheless, this has not changed its political-legal essence. The demands of certain Mexican circles for the replacement of the majority principle of representation in the Chamber of Deputies of the Federal Congress by the proportional principle have not been adopted.

As a result of the profound sociopolitical crisis which erupted in the country on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's the PRI leadership implemented a number of electoral reforms. The so-called institution of "party deputies" was introduced to the political system providing for representation in the Federal Congress' Chamber of Deputies of all officially registered parties. In this way the PRI hoped under the conditions of the deteriorating domestic conflicts to win the support of the opposition parties. The age limit for members of parliament was lowered in 1971 (from 26 to 21 for deputies and from 30 to 25 for senators). By 1979 the institution of "party deputies" had been abolished, and, in accordance with the electoral legislation, a "mixed electoral system with majority voting predominant" was introduced in the country. In accordance with this, the number of seats in the Federal Congress' Chamber of Deputies was increased from 245 to 400. In accordance with the new system of representation, 300 deputies are elected to the Federal Congress according to the majority system and 100 on the basis of proportional representation. Depending on this, electoral districts of two types are being created for the holding of elections in the country. For the election of deputies in accordance with the majority system the entire territory of Mexico is broken down into 300 districts, each of which elects 1 deputy. Multiseat districts are being formed for the election of the remaining 100 deputies by proportional representation.

The 1970's and the start of the 1980's in Mexico's political life have been marked by the growth of the political consciousness of the working class and an intensification of the class struggle. This has led to a strengthening in the country's political life of the positions of the democratic forces. At the 1979 elections the leftwing opposition made itself felt as a serious force (and the Mexican Communist Party obtained 18 seats in the Federal Congress). A most important event in the process of consolidation of the parties and organizations of the left was the creation in 1981 of the Mexican United Socialist Party (MUSP), which, as the 1982 presidential election showed, has become the country's third biggest political force.

The creation of the MUSP was indisputable proof of the growth of the influence of the progressive forces on sociopolitical processes and the increased class consciousness of the working people and their organization. The strengthening of the positions of the forces of the left would thus appear to be not only a result of the class struggle but could signify the start of a new stage in the country's development.

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RECENT CHANGES IN MEXICAN FOREIGN POLICY SURVEYED

Moscow LATINSKAYA AMERIKA in Russian No 11, Nov 82 pp 97-105

[Article by Ye.G. Lapshev, "Ideological Principles of Foreign Policy"]

[Text] The foreign policy of Mexico, which is one of the most influential Latin American states in the international arena, is characterized today not only by independence but also a marked stimulation and growing constructive contribution to the improvement of the international situation. This is also manifested, in particular, in Mexican diplomacy's new approach to many important current international problems.

In December 1977 then Mexican Foreign Minister Santiago Roel said in an interview with the Mexican newspaper UNO MAS UNO that henceforward Mexico would formulate a new, scientific approach to international problems. "The diplomacy of 'men of letters and poets' will be replaced by the diplomacy of specialists in the sphere of international relations, economics, power engineering, communications, science and technology."*

All this by no means signifies that Mexico has abandoned the traditional, determining foreign policy principles--respect for independence, observance of noninterference in other states' internal affairs and the right of the peoples to self-determination. On the contrary, as an analysis of the new concepts shows, they are being formulated on the basis of long accepted fundamental principles, but with regard for the new realities which have evolved both within the country and in the international arena. Speaking on 21 March 1980 on the national holiday--the birthday of Benito Juarez--Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda emphasized: "It has now become necessary for Mexico to adapt to the demands of the present day. We now need a new foreign policy based on our traditional principles, but adapted to the requirements of the actual situation in which we live."**

The development of new foreign policy concepts was brought about primarily by the complex domestic political processes and structural socioeconomic changes in the country.

The social differentiation and class and political polarization of Mexican society have increased in recent years. The positions of the monopoly haute bourgeoisie have strengthened. The role of the bourgeois state in the economy

* UNO MAS UNO, Mexico, 2 December 1977.

** EL DIA, Mexico, 22 March 1980.

and politics has increased. State-monopoly trends have been developing. All this is leading to Mexico's foreign policy becoming on the one hand a subject of class struggle between the forces of reaction and democracy and, on the other, an arena of political struggle between different bourgeois groupings, which is reflected in the Mexican state's formulation of the approach to most important present-day problems.

Circles of the financial-industrial oligarchy, which are closely linked with foreign capital, welcome the penetration of foreign, chiefly American, capital in Mexico which has been strengthening in recent years. They are endeavoring to strengthen the economic and political alliance with American imperialism. Not content merely with economic might and having found themselves removed from direct, immediate influence on the state's domestic and foreign policy, they are demanding greater participation in the adoption of the most important, including foreign policy, decisions, for which the ruling state-party bloc in the shape of the top state bureaucracy and the party "elite" are primarily responsible. Attempting to push Mexican foreign policy toward reactionary pre-imperialist positions, the financial-industrial oligarchy is putting up increasing resistance to the state's implementation of the basic principles of the country's foreign policy and opposing its constructive, peace-loving steps in the international arena.

Other influential circles of the local, haute included, bourgeoisie are advocating a more assertive, flexible policy of the state in the world arena which would be aimed at a quest for the new markets for the investment of capital and the sale of commodities and the creation of a favorable atmosphere, without discrimination, for international economic cooperation and against the domination of foreign, primarily transnational, corporations. They advocate an extension of the foreign policy role of the state, rightly considering it an important instrument capable of securing their interests in the world arena.

In the development and implementation of a foreign policy course Mexico's ruling circles have to take into consideration the mood of the broad working people's masses and the liberation, anti-imperialist traditions. Their influence on the state's foreign policy has increased particularly in recent years. The country's democratic forces are demanding of the Mexican Government increasingly persistently a consistent and decisive policy of economic liberation from foreign dependence and a strengthening of the foreign policy independence and national sovereignty of Mexico.

Being in itself heterogeneous, having absorbed the supporters of different bourgeois groupings and being a kind of "balancer" between them, the ruling state-party bloc reacts sensitively to the alignment of class and political forces within the country. Understanding that the internal political status quo largely depends on a flexible foreign policy and that the strengthening of Mexico's international positions is conditioned by internal political stability, the government considers domestic and foreign policy interconnected and geared to the realization of the two-in-one concept of the country's "national interests".

Analyzing the "national interests" concept, the prominent Mexican historian Mario Ojeda writes that "national interests" depend on the result of the

overall component of the interests of different classes, parties or power groups. However, it is also necessary to take account of the fact that within the nation-state system there are certain basic interests which objectively coincide such as the sovereign nation's existence, territorial integrity and complete autonomy in the solution of domestic and foreign policy questions."*

From the time of the inception of an independent Mexican state the foreign policy has, as a rule, been defensive. This has been dictated by the concretely evolving historical situation and the geographical factor. "With the exception of the General Lazaro Cardenas and Lopez Mateos governments," the Mexican journal FORO INTERNACIONAL wrote, "the remaining governments born of the revolution assigned Mexican diplomacy a purely defensive or, more precisely, passive, conservative role; it was important to preserve the country's sovereignty...."***

However, a stimulation of Mexico's policy in the international arena came to be observed at the frontier of the 1960's. This was caused by the fact that on the one hand there had been a considerable strengthening of the economic and political positions of the local bourgeoisie within the country and in the world arena. The state's role in the economy increased. Mexico was in 17th place in the world in terms of a number of most important economic indicators. In addition, there had been a considerable increase in the economic assertiveness and political ambitions of the bourgeoisie in the world arena. On the other hand, the structural crisis which had occurred under the conditions of the general crisis of the world capitalist system and which hit its economy in the mid-1970's had an impact on Mexico's foreign policy. The period of the country's comparatively stable economic development was replaced by a production slump, a decline in the gross domestic product growth rate and Mexico's increased financial-economic, foreign trade and technological dependence on foreign monopolies.

Social tension in the country had risen sharply by the end of the 1960's. The contradictions of the entire system of the political power of the bourgeoisie had intensified. Broad strata of the working people demanded active participation in political life and its democratization. Given the evolved system of power, the financial-industrial oligarchy found itself pushed aside from direct participation in state and political activity. Thus the contradictions of the system of power in Mexico led to a new composition of class and political forces. And although by the end of the 1970's the Jose Lopez Portillo government had managed a temporary stabilization of the country's economy and the "oil factor" had played a definite part in the strengthening of Mexico's economic positions, in political life the negative features were surmounted more painfully.

The country's ruling circles reacted very flexibly to the situation. Back in 1970 the Luis Echeverria government announced the start of the era of "open democracy" and recognition of the multififormity of ideological and political

* M. Ojeda, "Alcances y limites de la politica exterior de Mexico," Mexico, 1976, p 79.

** FORO INTERNACIONAL, Mexico No 1 (69), vol XVIII, 1977, p 177.

currents in internal political life. This policy was also continued by the J. Lopez Portillo government, which in 1977 effected an important reform based on the "ideological and political pluralism" concept.

The policy of "ideological and political pluralism" within the country spread, as it were, to the foreign policy sphere also. And, furthermore, it was emphasized in every way here that the tasks of Mexico's foreign policy in the international situation which had evolved could only be tackled successfully given "broad democracy" and political stability within the country. Benito Juarez, Jorge Castaneda emphasized in March 1980, called for Mexicans' reconciliation, respect for human rights, respect for others' ideas and for democracy. "For this reason democracy within the country and the championing of the principles of independence and noninterference in the international arena are two sides of the same coin."*

Having declared democracy within the country an essential condition for pursuing an independent foreign policy, the country's ruling circles believe here that foreign policy should be of an assertive, aggressive nature and based on traditional principles. "Our present position in the world," Jorge Castaneda declared, "is conducive to an increase in our activeness in the international arena. In addition, defense of our domestic interests currently insistently demands that we be an active participant in international affairs. The complexity of the problems of our economy, the diversity of our natural resources and our need to obtain financial resources and technology abroad--all this is forcing us to open more widely the windows onto the outside world.... Of course, leaving our own home is not without danger. But to stay home and gaze passively at what is going on outside it not only means losing the possibility of defending it but leads to self-asphyxiation."**

Whence Mexico's increased endeavor to make its constructive contribution to the struggle for peace and disarmament, for the establishment of a just international economic order and for the triumph of traditional foreign policy principles. "We no longer want a world divided into two antagonistic blocs.... We are therefore disturbed by the return to the cold war"--thus, in brief, may be summarized the viewpoint of Mexico's official circles.***

Speaking of the possibility of and need even for the development of normal, good-neighborly relations with all countries, irrespective of their sociopolitical system, on the basis of the "political pluralism" concept, Mexican President J. Lopez Portillo said in an interview with the French LE MONDE at the end of February 1982: "Why have we established good relations with Marxist regimes, in our region included? Because we believe in the principle of nations' self-determination.... If we agree with pluralism in our society, we must also recognize pluralism in the world arena. And since the world is pluralist, we must be tolerant with respect to one another. Whose position is the right one? Everyone has grounds for his own position."

* EL DIA 22 March 1980.

** Ibidem.

*** Ibidem.

Relying on traditional principles and taking account of existing realities, particularly the situation which has come about in Central America and the Caribbean, Mexico is demonstrating a new approach to the liberation, anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of this subregion.

The ruling bourgeoisie proceeds here, naturally, from its own class economic and political interests. Mexico is greatly interested in political stability in the countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, Mexican ruling circles fear with good reason that any political upheavals in this region connected with the terror of reactionary dictatorships against their own peoples with the support of the United States could also be reflected in stability in Mexico itself. And, finally, the political destabilization of this region caused by Washington's interference in support of Central American reaction is fraught, as Mexican official circles point out, with the risk of internationalization of the conflict, which does not correspond to the ruling circles' interests. "The crisis, whose temporary epicenter the El Salvador conflict has become," Lopez Portillo observed in February 1981, "threatens to embrace all states of the region. It is for this reason essential to prevent the internationalization of the crisis, implementing for this a comprehensive program whose goal would be unswerving observance of the principles of self-determination and noninterference."*

Mexican official circles are adopting a realistic position in respect of the events occurring in Central America. Speaking at a reception in honor of French President F. Mitterrand, who visited Mexico at the end of October 1981, Lopez Portillo declared, with reference to the Central American situation: "The settlement of international conflicts demands recognition of the fact that the cause of social tension in the majority of poor countries is not the conflict of interests of the big powers but a profound need for radical reforms satisfying the peoples' legitimate aspiration to greater social and economic justice."

This same idea was extensively developed and argued in depth by Mexican President L. Portillo in his speech in Managua, which elicited much international comment and, in particular, was evaluated positively by the Soviet Union.**

From the very start of the revolutionary-liberation struggle in Nicaragua and subsequently in El Salvador Mexico has repeatedly expressed to the United States its dissatisfaction with its policy of interference in the Central American countries' internal affairs and support for reactionary regimes attempting to suppress the liberation struggle by military means. At the start of 1981 during a meeting with U.S. President Reagan, Lopez Portillo recommended that he refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Central America and respect the process under way there. At the end of March 1981 Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda told journalists following a conversation with U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig that Mexico would continue to insist on respect for the peoples' right to self-determination.

* THE NEW YORK TIMES 12 March 1981.

** For text of speech see LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 7, 1982.

In presenting positive, constructive initiatives for a peaceful settlement of all international disputes in Central America and the Caribbean Mexico is demonstrating adherence to its traditional foreign policy principles. It is also taking into consideration here the concretely evolving situation in this part of the world. It should be said that it regards these principles and the "political pluralism" concept as the most effective foundations for the normalization of the situation south of the Mexican border. "We are maintaining Mexico's traditional position, which amounts to noninterference in other countries' internal affairs and a people's right to choose for themselves the government which they wish to have"--this is how Jorge Castaneda defines the essence of Mexico's approach to Central America.

That which is new in Mexico's foreign policy doctrines is also connected with the fact that Mexico has been acting, and particularly assertively since the period of the Luis Echeverria presidency, as part of the developing world, sharing and supporting the propositions of Third World ideologists. At the same time it is also putting forward its own concepts connected with the role and place of the developing countries in present-day international relations. This policy is conditioned, in particular, by the need for realization of the class goals of the ruling Mexican bourgeoisie. They amount primarily to strengthening economic relations with the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and thereby securing for itself the necessary markets for the sale of commodities and capital investment. In diversifying economic relations with these countries, certain circles of the Mexican bourgeoisie are endeavoring to ease Mexico's foreign trade dependence on foreign, primarily American, monopolies. Mexican diplomacy is thereby pursuing the goal of strengthening and extending its international positions. Championing Third World ideology, in the domestic policy plane the country's ruling circles are endeavoring to strengthen in the minds of the broad masses of the population Mexico's allegiance to the struggle for social justice and against imperialist exploitation. President Luis Echeverria declared in the report to the Mexican National Congress on 1 September 1976: "We are cooperating actively with the Third World and support particularly the Latin American countries' efforts aimed at their liberation. Their struggle is our struggle. We must coordinate our efforts in order to break the chain of dependence and strive for harmonious development."*

Supporting the "poor and rich countries" theory which is prevalent in certain developing states, Mexican officials emphasize that the developing countries are experiencing "dramatic suffering from the consequences of the economic war unleashed by the great centers of world power."** In an interview with the journal LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, in particular, Lopez Portillo observed that Mexico "opposes powerful states' interference in other states' internal affairs."***

* "Mexico a traves de los informes presidenciales," vol 3, "La Politica exterior," Mexico, 1976, p 524.

** PENAMIENTO POLITICO No 58, vol XV, Mexico, 1974, p 277.

*** LATINSKAYA AMERIKA No 2, 1977, p 120.

It is characteristic in this connection that it was Mexico which initiated the idea of the establishment of a new international economic order and the elaboration of a charter of states' economic rights and duties and proposed the creation of an organization like the SELA which would unite all the developing countries. It is in this plane that it is necessary to examine the creation of the Third World Social and Economic Research Center with its headquarters in Mexico, which was headed by L. Echeverria.

It is well known that Mexico pays particular attention to the development of relations with the Latin American countries and their economic, political and cultural integration. The concept of Latin Americanism, which was put forward by Mexican diplomacy back in the mid-1960's, contains the idea of the creation of an alliance of all Latin American countries without the participation of the United States and for this reason is characterized by an anti-imperialist thrust and corresponds to the Latin American peoples' national interests.

From all these concepts and doctrines and also the foreign policy acts of Mexican diplomacy based on them ensues a number of positive points reflecting the national interests of both Mexico and the developing countries which oppose the expansion of the imperialist monopolies and support a return of natural resources, final economic liberation and the strengthening of national sovereignty. The Soviet Union's attitude toward these aspirations is well known. "Soviet people," L.I. Brezhnev observed, "are invariably on the side of the peoples of Latin America, as of other continents also, struggling for a strengthening of their sovereignty, true economic independence and the right to dispose of their own natural resources themselves."*

At the same time it has to be mentioned that Mexican diplomacy's adherence to the "poor and rich countries" theory which is manifested at times and the calls for the unification of the "poor South" against the "rich North" allegedly represented by the great powers without differentiation of their sociopolitical systems leads to the entirely unwarranted identification of imperialism, with its aggressive policy of national and social enslavement, with socialism--the bastion of peace and the security of the peoples and ally of the developing countries.

An examination of the ideological foundations of present-day Mexico's foreign policy reflected in its traditional foreign policy principles and the new concepts and doctrines shows that in the present exacerbated international situation Mexico is continuing, as a whole, to abide by the principles advanced in the course of the revolution and the heroic struggle against foreign intervention and for independence.

The Mexican state not only operates in the international arena with an independent foreign policy but also, relying on concepts formulated in the concrete international situation which has evolved, is demonstrating a new, constructive approach to the solution of most complex international problems.

* PRAVDA 3 March 1981.

Mexico has emerged in the international arena as an authoritative state which is making its positive contribution to the strengthening of peace and international security. It is important to mention in this plane the continuity of its foreign policy, the basis of which are traditional principles. According to a statement of the new president, Miguel de la Madrid Urtado, his government will continue the foreign policy course based on recognition of the people's right to self-determination and noninterference in other countries' affairs.

In an interview with the American NEWSWEEK Miguel de la Madrid replied to the question of whether the new government would pursue the former policy: "Yes, unreservedly. The principles of our foreign policy remain. We will support peoples' right to self-determination, the peaceful settlement of conflicts and international cooperation."

The friendly country's peace-loving foreign policy has always been appreciated at its worth in the Soviet Union. Speaking at a luncheon on 21 May 1981 in honor of Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda, USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko said, in part: "If we leaf through the pages of the history of even recent years, not to mention decades, Mexico has always been on the side of peace between peoples. And where the most acute questions of the struggle for peace and prevention of the threat of war are being decided, we see the hand of Mexico raised in support of proposals aimed at the consolidation of peace between peoples."

This is to the undisputed credit of those who are determining the theoretical and practical line of the country's foreign policy.

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